LEADERSHIP BUREAUCRCY AND PLANNING IN INDIA

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A Sociological Study

P. K. B. Nayar

Foreword by
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Foreword

INDIA HAS been engaged in planning as a process of economic development and social change for over fifteen years. Though there has been some sort of a pause in planning and deceleration in development for the past three years, planning continues to command the attention, if not allegiance, of the Indian people. A great part of the developmental work has to be carried out in the States of the Federal Union. The Union Government with about half of the public investment programmes under it is mainly concerned with projects—industrial, selected power, transport and communication—which by their nature and technology are of a *concentrated* character. On the other hand, the State Governments concerned with development mainly in agriculture, irrigation, education, health, etc., are responsible for programmes of *diffused* character. The planning efforts needed at the two levels, and two different areas of activities, are dissimilar in many ways. At the State level, there is greater need to achieve multiple linkages with people. The concentrated types of projects have built-in organization and direction in their technologies themselves. In the diffused types of development, organization and direction have to be consciously contrived critical inputs.

It is a matter of concern that in spite of the importance of State planning to the development process, till recently very little analytical attention has been given to it. It is a merit of Dr. Nayar's study that it ventures to explore this little known area of understanding.

Planning cannot be an isolated impulse. It cannot be reduced to a department in a Government. It has to pervade the Government efforts as a whole, or the great part of them. It has to become the *leitmotiv* of administration. Then again, planning will not "take-off" unless the leadership in the government and to a large part outside also has a

commitment to it. Close links with the people, with multiple and cross channels of communication, howsoever rudimentary, are essential for its success. Dr. Nayar highlights these conclusions through empirical study with the rigorous use of sociological analysis.

In a developing society, Governments play a leading role. In the Governments, bureaucracy has an important, often decisive, part to play. Dr. Nayar's study helps to outline the new orientation needed by them all. His study helps to blunt despair and impart a surge to intellectual effort and constructive endeavour.

I commend the work to the general reader and the administrator.

Parliament House
New Delhi-1
October 1, 1968

Asoka Mehta

Preface

THIS IS a sociological study of Indian planning, using the structural-behavioural frame of reference. It focusses attention on the role of leadership and bureaucracy in socio-economic development. The machinery for planning and personnel for its implementation have been a comparatively neglected subject in the literature on Indian planning; emphasis so far has been on the economic aspect. The present study attempts to fill this lacuna by analyzing the planning machinery and process in two states in India.

The field-study for this research was conducted in 1965 from March to September. Three months were spent in Hyderabad, three months in Trivandrum, and four weeks at the Planning Commission, New Delhi. Officials and non-officials were interviewed and plan data from published and unpublished sources were analyzed. But major emphasis was given to interviews with officials. All officials were assured that the data collected would be kept confidential and that the interviewees would not be identified with any statements. Therefore, maximum anonymity has been maintained in the use of interview data even to the point of detracting from the strength of some of our arguments. In using government documents, no sources have been quoted which are not available to a private citizen and none cited when the information was of a confidential or restricted nature. As a result, footnoting sources have been avoided in many cases.

Since the completion of the study in early 1966 many developments, which have impact on our work, have taken place. To incorporate them and bring the book up-to-date, the second chapter has been rewritten and a Postscript added.

This study has been made possible by a grant from the American Inter-University Research Programme in Institution Building, which covered the expenses of research including field-work. I am thankful to the Programme for the grant and to Prof. Milton Esman, Research Director,

for making all arrangements relating to field-research.

I wish to express my appreciation for the full co-operation received from both government officials and private citizens contacted in connection with the study. In particular, I should thank Messrs V. Ramachandran, IAS and B. P. R. Vittal, IAS for their keen interest in, and strong support for, this study. Apart from providing necessary facilities for the research, they devoted considerable amount of their precious time in enlightening me on the different aspects of development administration and in reading the manuscript and offering valuable suggestions. These suggestions have been of special significance to the study as they were the outcome of several years of experience in administration and planning. They were also a corrective to my interpretation of data from a non-bureaucratic perspective. While I have undoubtedly benefitted from their suggestions, they are not responsible for any views expressed in this book or for any error in my interpretation of the data.

I owe special thanks to Professors Jiri Nehnevajsa, Robert Avery, Morris Berkowitz, Hans Blaise and William Delany of the University of Pittsburgh for suggesting useful changes in the earlier drafts of the manuscript. The contribution of Professor Nehnevajsa needs to be particularly acknowledged. He was my adviser on all matters relating to the study and he spent considerable time helping me to revise and improve the draft. I have drawn immensely from his deep insight and rich experience in sociological research.

Prof. R.C. Goyal of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, Prof. H.K. Paranjape of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, and Dr. Howard K. Hyde of the United States Agency for International Development, New Delhi, have made valuable suggestions to make the book more useful to the reader. Shri Asoka Mehta took time off his busy schedule to peruse the manuscript to write a Foreword to the book. I thank them for their valuable contribution.

My thanks are due also to the Governments of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, and to my employer, the USAID Mission to India, for giving permission to publish the present work. The views expressed in the book are solely those of the author and not of the governments mentioned.

New Delhi
December 20, 1968

P. K. B. Nayar

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TO MY WIFE INDIRA

Chapter One

Bureaucracy and Social Change

Introduction

A MAJOR problem in development administration is to build suitable organizations capable of introducing and sustaining planned socio-economic change. In many developing countries, this problem is being tackled at the government level through planning agencies generally attached to the established public bureaucracy. Even when autonomous or semi-autonomous planning boards are constituted, they deal mainly with overall planning. Many details of planning and usually all the activities requiring implementation are left to the bureaucratic machinery. The planner's role in these countries is confined merely to setting broad objectives, priorities and targets, and evolving major strategies for achieving them. The selection of individual schemes, the elaboration of their details, and the whole task of implementation are entrusted to the bureaucracy. Even in countries where the planning agency completely controls the plan, the shortage of trained personnel in posts of development administration has made it necessary to rely on the bureaucratic personnel to administer these projects.

Assigning the planning function to bureaucracies assumes that a public bureaucracy is capable of handling planned programmes efficiently. Many disagree with this assumption, saying that a bureaucratic organization is characterized by centralization of authority, lack of adaptiveness, heavy emphasis on rules and precedents, restriction of communication, and fear of innovation. Planning involves making proposals for the future, evaluating alternative proposals, and formulating and assessing methods by which these proposals may be achieved. It places

emphasis on change rather than stability, innovation rather than precedent, and adaptiveness rather than rigidity. Because these characteristics clash with those of a bureaucratic system, the breaucracy's ability to act as an instrument of change has been seriously disputed.

The success of a planning body to act as a change-agent therefore largely depends on its ability to create, in the bureaucracy, certain normative patterns that facilitate planning. As these new patterns of behaviour differ from those existing in the bureaucracy, a planning agency cannot be expected to foster them as a matter of course. For the planning body to induce the bureaucracy to accept changes in its existing behaviour patterns, it must possess certain attributes capable of transforming the bureaucracy from an advocate of the *status quo* to an instrument of change. An analysis of these attributes will throw much light on what is needed for a planning organization to act as a change-agent in a bureaucratic context.

This study is concerned with identifying some of the key factors that make an innovative agency an effective tool of socio-economic development. In particular, it examines the processes and strategies by which a planning organization attempts to introduce and sustain change through a bureaucracy.

Writers on bureaucracy have expressed doubts about its capacity to undertake any programmes to change the *status quo*. According to Laski, "the characteristics of such a regime (bureaucracy) are a passion for routine in administration, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in making decisions and a refusal to embark upon experiment . . .

"The tendency accordingly has been a certain suspicion of experimentalism and a benevolence for the 'safe man'."[1]

Von Mises puts it more tersely, "Nobody can be at the same time a correct bureaucrat and an innovator. Progress is precisely that which the rules and regulations did not foresee. It is necessarily outside the field of bureaucratic activity."[2]

[1] Harold J. Laski, "Bureaucracy", *Encyc. of the Social Sciences*, III (New York, 1935), pp. 70-71.

[2] Ludwig von Mises, *Bureaucracy* (New Haven, 1944), p. 67.

March and Simon[3] had the same point in mind when they spoke of "Gresham's Law of Planning": daily routine in the bureaucracy has a tendency to drive out planning out of the country.

These theoretical criticisms are based on the bureaucracy's emphasis on discipline and conformity to prescribed rules and norms of behaviour. These characteristics are theoretically conducive to a ritualistic adherence to precedent and to a deep-seated aversion to innovation. As a result, "... there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby an instrumental goal becomes a terminal goal ... This emphasis resulting from the displacement of original goals develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily."[4]

Thus, not only are original goals forgotten or by-passed but new goals are scrupulously avoided. "True enough, administration, especially in the mass state, lives inevitably close to the common stream of life and hence near the signal masts of change. But, as a going concern, it bears a distinctly conservative streak. It responds to the present in the light of the past, confining the future to the immediately foreseeable. It has an operational interest in stability, it has an undisturbed working rhythm, in today's repetition of yesterday. Not unnaturally, the higher civil service usually favours a firm structure of political power as something to lean against. Expressed differently, administrative systems normally have a professional predilection for the *status quo*. Higher civil servants often emerge as the emotional defenders of the given order of things."[5]

The maladies from which bureaucracies suffer most frequently have been aptly summed up by Robson as "... an excessive sense of self-importance on the part of officials or an undue idea of the importance of their office; an indifference towards the feelings or the convenience of individual citizens; an obsession with the binding and inflexible authority of depart-

[3] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958), p. 185

[4] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1963), p. 158.

[5] Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Servant as an Action Group in Western Political Development," *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, ed., Joseph La Palombara (Princeton, 1963), p. 87.

mental decisions, precedents, arrangements of forms regardless of how badly or with what injustice they may work in individual cases; a mania for regulations and formal procedure; a preoccupation with the activities of particular units of administration and inability to consider the government as a whole; and a failure to recognize the relations between the governors and the governed as an essential part of the democratic process."[6]

The Developed Societies

These are not merely theoretical criticisms of bureaucracy. Max Weber[7] noted that the orders of Frederick the Great of Prussia to abolish serfdom were ignored and temporized by the officials, and that the Russian Czar was rarely able to carry out anything that displeased his officials. A British parliamentary committee which had to study the training of civil servants in Great Britain towards the end of the Second World War noted that "the faults most frequently enumerated are over-devotion to precedent, remoteness from the rest of the community, inaccessibility and faulty handling of the general public, lack of initiative and imagination, ineffective organization and waste of manpower, procrastination and unwillingness to take responsibility or give decisions."[8]

Commenting on the British bureaucracy, the *New Statesman and Nation* said, "The years between 1914 and 1942 do not reveal in our officials any profound grasp of the new age into which we are moving.... The Service, in brief, has lived on the capital of the original Benthamite endowment too long. It is time that

[6] William A. Robson, "Bureaucracy and Democracy," *The Civil Service in Britain and France*, ed., W A. Robson (New York, 1956), pp. 3-4. See also, G. D. H. Cole, "A Better Civil Service," in The Fabian Society, *Can Planning be Democratic?* (Bombay, 1945), pp. 107-33.

[7] See Arnold Brecht, "Bureaucratic Sabotage," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXIX (January 1937), p. 87. According to B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great once observed: "You know yourselves that anything that is new, even though it is good and needful, will not be done by our folks without compulsion." Quoted in Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization"; "The Russian and Soviet Case," in La Palombara, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[8] Eric Strauss, *The Ruling Servant: Bureaucracy in Russia, France and Britain* (New York, 1961), p. 43.

its first principles both of structure and function were re-examined."[9]

During its short rule (1929-1931), the Labour Government in Britain found that many of its radical reforms could not be carried out because of bureaucratic resistance. George Landsbury, First Commissioner of Works in the Second Labour Government, strove for many reforms, particularly in the field of unemployment, old age pensions and education. As one of the group of officials called upon to solve these problems, he found the road blocked at every turn by the civil servants. These officials, he said, acted quite constitutionally, refusing to comment on policy, only questioning whether or not a proposed policy would work. But Treasury representatives always found reasons why ministerial proposals could not be carried out. Landsbury soon came to feel the futility of his position and concluded that if a Socialist Government was to succeed, dependence could not be placed on civil servants who were not Socialists.[10]

The Social Democratic Party in Weimar Germany, also found that bureaucracy played a major role in blocking social and economic reforms. "They will not just say 'No' to new proposals. They would adjust the political plans to expediency and would take the fundamentals off the radical proposals and reduce them to cautious experiments in various directions, preserving a conservative trend."[11]

Even the National Socialist (Nazi) Party, with all its dictatorial machinery, complained that, despite having passed decrees ordering the immediate dismissal of all officials who did not wholeheartedly support the Nation State, the bureaucracy did not meet their standards.[12]

An Australian participant in a Labour Government, V.G. Childe, discusses the role of outwardly obsequious civil servants

9 J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy* (Yellow Springs, 1944), p. 287.

10 Charless Aikin, "The British Bureaucracy and the Origin of Parliamentary Policy," *American Political Science Rev.* XXXIII (1939), pp. 40-41.

11 Arnold Brecht, *op. cit.*

12 *Ibid.*

in helping to transform the attitudes of Labour Ministers.[13] In France, too, "reactionary officials" successfully sabotaged the efforts of the Blum Government in finance and foreign affairs.[14]

The New Deal provides other glaring examples of bureaucratic resistance to reform. White and Smith[15] point out that party leaders of the Roosevelt Administration privately complained of the difficulty in changing bureaucratic patterns. The public-service machine tended to continue in a straight line, disregarding the different influence of a new public policy. According to James A. Farley, "some of the greatest troubles the President has had were caused by subordinate officials who were in sharp disagreement with his policies and, rightly or wrongly, were sabotaging the job he was trying to accomplish."[16] On the principle that new ideas require new blood, the Roosevelt Administration had to recruit many people for positions in New Deal agencies. Senator George Norris, the proponent of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), insisted that only people who believed in the purposes of the new agency could make it a success. TVA employees therefore had to take an oath not only to uphold the constitution of the United States but also to abide by the ideals of the TVA.

In his classical case study of a socialist government in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, Lipset[17] found that many of the reforms initiated by the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (a political party) had been modified in implementation by the bureaucracy. "A number of civil servants were able to convince their ministers that certain changes were not administratively feasible or that they would incur too much opposition. . . .Some deputy ministers (civil servants) exchanged information with other deputy ministers. . . . Some key officials boasted of "running my department completely" and of stopping

[13] S M Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 259. See also Howard A. Scarrow, *The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Durham, 1957), Mr. Scarrow also points to the generally conservative character of the Australian bureaucracy.

[14] Kingsley, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[15] Leonard D. White and T. V. Smith, *Politics and Public Service* (New York, 1939), p. 57.

[16] *White and Smith, op. cit.*, p. 92.

[17] Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-57.

hairbrained radical schemes."[18] "One deputy minister who was later demoted insisted on carrying out the letter of all regulations even when the resultant action was contrary to the overall policy of the government."[19] "One cabinet minister decided that a certain government work that had previously been contracted out to private concerns should be done by government employees whenever possible. His deputy minister, however, continued sending the work out to private concerns."[20]

Michel Crozier,[21] who made a recent study of two bureaucratic agencies in France, found that because of the absence of effective feedback and the weight of impersonal rules that may be affected by change, "one may validly argue that a bureaucratic system will resist change as long as it can; it will move only when serious dysfunctions develop and no other alternative remains."

The problem was not different in the Soviet Union despite the use of coercive measures to enforce proper bureaucratic behaviour. To ensure against possible sabotage, the Communist regime assigned its most trusted members to key positions in the administration. Even so, in the early post-Revolutionary years, its control over the bureaucracy remained precarious. Five years after the Revolution, Lenin complained, "We now have a vast army of government employees but we lack sufficiently educated forces to exercise real control over them. Actually, it often happens that at the top where we exercise political power, the machinery functions somehow, but down below, where the state officials are in control, they often function in such a way as to counteract our measures ... there are hundreds of thousands of officials who came over to us from the Tsar and from bourgeoisie society and who sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously work against us. Nothing can be done in a short time, that is clear. Many years of hard work will be required to improve the machinery, to reform it and to enlist new forces."[22]

18 Lipset, *op cit.*, p. 263.
19 *Ibid.*, p. 265.
20 *Ibid.*, pp. 266-67.
21 Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago, 1964), p. 196.
22 Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

The Developing Countries

This resistance of the bureaucracy to social change is not confined to Western countries. Most of the developing nations, including India, whose public services have been organized along Western bureaucratic lines, exhibit the same characteristics.[23] The bureaucracies of Egypt and Pakistan, modelled after those of the Western colonial countries, illustrate this tendency.

In a report submitted to the Central Committee for Reorganization of the Machinery of Government of the United Arab Republic (Cairo, 1962), Luther Gulick and James K. Pollock observed that "only a few officials and intellectuals now know what the plan is or pay any attention to its provisions." According to them, the problem arises not due to unsound planning but because of administrative habits of the total government. "The men who run the agencies and their top civil servants never before lived in a world of comprehensive social and economic planning. The whole psychology of the thing is new to them. Such planning was not part of their work habits."[24]

With a bureaucracy similar to that of India, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) has hindered many social reforms. According to Braibanti,[25] the top executives in this highly stratified public service, who enjoy great prestige, view themselves as classical generalists and guardians "similar conceptually to Confucian or Platonic canons." The gap between the ruler and the ruled has resulted in a bureaucracy suspicious of rational planning, forecasting, technology, and modern concepts of administrative efficiency. Frank Goodnow,[26] in a case study of

[23] Robert Presthus, "Weberian v Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Societies," *Administrative Science Quart.*, VI (1961-62), pp. 1-24. A.T. J. Matthews, *Emergent Turkish Administration* (Ankara, 1955); B.L. St. John Hamilton, *Problems of Administration in an Emergent Nation: A Case Study of Jamaica* (New York, 1964).

[24] Nimrod Raphaeli, "The Machinery of Planning in the U. A. R." *International Rev. of Administrative Sciences*, XXXI (1965), pp. 104-6. See also Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt. A Case Study of the Higher Civil Service* (Princeton, 1957).

[25] Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis," *South Atlantic Quart*, LVIII (1959), pp. 258-304.

[26] Frank Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation* (New Haven and London, 1964), p. 239. See also Albert Gorvine, "The Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan, "*Middle East Journ.*, XIX (1965), pp. 321-36.

the Civil Service of Pakistan, found little recognition by the CSP of the need for change. Long-established methods and organizations were assumed adequate; and if inefficiency was admitted, it was usually attributed to a shortage of experienced officers (like members of the CSP) or failure to follow traditional methods. "The officers do not seem to grasp the tremendous magnitude of the job to be done. . . if Pakistan is to become a modern nation. There is also a natural bureaucratic reluctance to accept the proposition that procedures must be continuously adapted to meet the changing demands made upon government."[27]

India which inherited the British administrative system, has a bureaucracy that fits the classical pattern described by Weber.[28] It also exhibits most of the structural and behavioural traits associated with its Western counterparts, while contributing new elements drawn from the authoritarian, status-oriented society in which it functions.[29] The tradition of Indian bureaucracy has been based on preservation of law and order. Only in exceptional cases and at personal risks, did members of the superior civil service undertake the responsibilities connected with developing a welfare state.[30] Neither their educational background nor their training was oriented toward handling the

[27] Goodnow, *op. cit*, p. 239.

[28] The elements of bureaucracy most frequently cited are hierarchy of office, division of labour, appointment by merit, limited authority of office, rules governing behaviour of members, procedural devices for work situations, and impersonality of relations. See Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, trans., A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, 1947), pp. 329-41; *Essays in Sociology*, trans., Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), pp. 196-204.

[29] Some scholars have argued that all bureaucratic structures are modified by the social environment. See Crozier, *op cit.*, Morroe Berger, *op.cit.*, Robert Presthus, "Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," *Public Administration Rev.*, XIX (1959), pp. 19-35; "Weberian v. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society." *Administrative Science Quart*, VI (1961-62), pp. 1-24. Fred Riggs argues for an ecological approach to the study of public administration in *Ecology of Public Administration* (New York, 1961). For an application of the ecological model, see Richard L. Harris and Robert N. Kearney, "A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Systems of Canada and Ceylon," *Administrative Science Quart.*, VIII (1963-64), pp. 339-60.

[30] Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India, II, The Guardians* (London, 1954).

issues of development administration. The general administrator was a product of a law-and-order, revenue-collecting government. By education, training, and experience, he was deliberately made nonspecialized. His functions were to limit the role of government, to promote stability by minimizing change, to co-ordinate the activities of government, and to provide a tight chain-command control over governmental actions and personnel.[31]

To be sure, there were brilliant men in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) who contributed to the social and economic uplifting of the people in their care. In general, however the Civil Service attitude towards change was negative. At the Secretariat lavel, where the separation of policy from implementation freed the officials from facing consequences of their actions, this was even more true. All proposals for change were received with suspicion and, if possible, discouraged. "Any proposal for change had to overcome a formidable series of hurdles. A suggestion from, say a District Officer, must first be examined by the provincial government. This meant as a rule that it was submitted to a Secretary to Government, accompanied by a long minute, discussing every precedent, however remote, and every foreseeable objection . . . Minute industry, a most persevering consideration of all orders and rules, and a determination to make no mistakes were the usual features of these discouraging documents.

"The office note usually suggested rejection; it was the safest course and the least trouble. The whole system was admirably devised for detecting unsoundness but the last in the world to encourage a daring and statesmanlike experiment."[32]

There has been no reason to assume that these conditions were confined to the colonial past and that they changed considerably after Independence. Traditions and long-standing idealized patterns of behaviour could not be adapted overnight to a new socio-political set-up.[33] Democracy and planning required

[31] Wallace A. Sayre, "Some Problems of Public Administration in a Developing Economy," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, VIII (1962), pp. 137-52.

[32] Woodruff, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

[33] According to Misra, the character of the Indian Civil Service changed from time to time, but slowly and not in pace with the social and political development. See. B. B. Misra, "Efforts for Administrative Reforms Before Independence," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, IX (1963), pp. 311-35.

that the civil service play a role which was, in many ways, different from that required for a law-and-order state. It is true that the dilution of the higher civil service by admitting the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and expanding the IAS through recruiting many officials from the open market changed the character of the top bureacracy.[34] However, the newly-instituted IAS, having no tradition of its own, accepted some legacies of the Indian Civil Service, including its claim to exclusiveness and class-consciousness.[35] People who worked very closely with the higher civil service testify that no substantial change in the attitude of the civil servant has taken place during the past fifteen years.

In 1953, the Prime Minister of India complained that the Government of India was an "administrative jungle." He was dissatisfied with both methods and men; the ideas of many who were working in the administrative machinery, he said, were wrong—especially their ideas about themselves.[36] Mr. A. D. Gorwala, a former member of the ICS, in his report on administrative reforms in Mysore State, mentions the Secretaries to Government as one of the weakest links in the Mysore Government Secretariat and adds: "With rare exceptions, the Secretaries are much below standards to be expected from men in that rank in matters of initiative and taking responsibility for taking decisions. If work is really contemplated, most of the amiable gentlemen now filling Secretaries' chairs should be replaced by men of sterner calibre, more forthright and industrious, the

[34] Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," *Administration and Economic Development in India*, eds., Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (Durham, 1963). See also T. C A. Srinivasavaradan. "Some Aspects of the IAS " *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, VII (1961), pp. 26-31.

[35] See Jawaharlal Nehru· "Whatever we may say, we are so caste-ridden, not caste-ridden in terms of castes only, but in terms of other things... The British introduced in the Services this caste feeling—the superior services, the inferior services, the ICS and all that. It is going, of course. Nevertheless, this tendency of official caste ... is there." "Prime Minister's Address at the Annual Meeting," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, VI (1960), p 335 See also O. K. Ghosh, *Problems of Economic Planning in India* (Allahabad, 1964), pp. 249-50.

[36] A. D. Gorwala, *The Administrative Jungle* (Patna, 1957), pp. 1-2.

force of whose example combined with their readiness to inspect rigorously and punish without fear or favour could bring about considerable improvement both in quality and speed."[27]

Appleby reports that a very intelligent Chief Secretary of one of the Indian states described himself as a conservative on administrative reforms because, by his own observation, there is always a good reason for the traditional ways of doing business.[38]

A content analysis of the states' administrative reforms reports, covering the past twenty years, showed the inordinate delay caused by procedures to be a major problem in the states' bureaucracies. Although various reforms committees attempted to address themselves to this problem in various ways, none seems to have succeeded in striking at the root of the difficulties.[39]

Delay is not the only sin of the Indian bureaucracy. As in the West, many reforms were defeated by the administrators' attitude towards their newly evolved responsibilities. The following case, reported by N.B. Desai, illustrates how a measure to encourage cottage industries actually backfired in the hands of officials who apparently had no sympathy for the reform. "One of the objectives of India's First and Second Five Year Plans is the encouragement of cottage industries and the emancipation of the backward castes (or communities) from their centuries old disabilities within Hindu culture. On February 28, 1951, a member of a so-called backward community (head of a family of 18 members) applied to the Collector (District Administrator) for permission to put up a cottage industry in the form of a brick kiln for his personal use and sale. The application is received and returned to the village officer for affixing of a (revenue) stamp and advice. Permission is granted for one year on April 25, 1951, with request for revenue assessment to be charged against the applicant. On May 3, 1951, the village official informs the Mamlatdar (Taluka) that the

[27] *Indian Jour of Public Administration*, IV (1958). p. 135.

[38] Paul H. Appleby, "History and Precedent vs. Reform." *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, I (1955), pp. 303-9.

[39] Jithendra Singh, "The Administrative Reforms Reports of the States: A Content Analysis," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, X (1964), pp. 491-513. See also Ajit M. Banerji, "Fifteen Years of Administrative Reforms. An Overview," *Indian Jour of Public Administration*, IX (1963), pp. 441-56.

applicant had already started work and requests an order to stop the work and levy a fine for unauthorized use of the land. The Deputy Collector who is apprised of the situation levies a fine of Rs. 175 although his subordinate (Mamlatdar) recommended a fine of Rs. 25. (According to the rule concerning the calculation of fines, the maximum fine should have been ten times the assessment of the land used. Since the applicant had used only 60 square yards at an assessed value of 2 pies, the maximum fine should have been 10 times 120 pies or Rs. 6.40.) On September 6, 1951, the Deputy Collector sanctions the assessment and recovery of the fine. On November 1, 1951 and again on March 31, 1952, the applicant states that he applied for permission to put up a brick kiln on February 28, 1951, and as he did not receive permission soon, he got the bricks baked. He also points out that he is unable to maintain his family on the land he owned (756 square yards) and that he had therefore decided to start his cottage industry. Moreover, he indicated that he was under obligation to repay a previous land improvement loan and that this (1951) was a scarcity year. He requested that these facts be taken into consideration and asked the Collector not to recover the heavy fine of Rs. 175 imposed upon him. Despite these representations and despite a report from the village officer confirming that the financial condition of the applicant was poor, the Mamlatdar directs the village officer to explain to the applicant that if he fails to pay the fine and the assessment (for the brick kiln), collection will take place under the Land Revenue Rules by attachment of his property. The applicant states that he will pay after he gets a reply from the Collector. Upon receipt of this statement, the Mamlatdar directs the village officer to recover the amount within two days. Two months later, the village officer reports that the amount of the fine and the assessment have been recovered and credited."[40]

The basic issue here is attitude. The old attitude of the civil servant as master and the people as subjects still persists in spite of the country's having passed from colonialism to democracy and from a police to a welfare state.

Another example of this attitude is reported by a former

[40] William Kapp, *Hindu Culture, Economics Development and Economic Planning in India* (New York, 1963), pp. 88-89.

member of the ICS. "The officer I have in mind is an intelligent man and in his personal relations very kindly and decent but his behaviour when he is sitting in his office is not easy to understand. Unfortunately, it follows a pattern which is widespread.

"A certain private citizen working as an honorary chairman of an organization wrote to him and complained that the work his organization was doing for government was unremunerative and asked for an increase in commission charges. He got no reply to his letter. He wrote again after a full year and again did not get a reply. He waited for another year and then wrote again but this time gave notice that if his request was not acceded to, he would stop handling the job for government. Then the fun began. The officer was furious. 'How dare anybody threaten government like this?' he asked. When somebody went to see him about this, he said, 'He should have come and seen me. He can't give government a threat like this.' When reminded that for two years no reply had been sent, he was unrepentent and repeated that the person should have called on him. The matter was ultimately settled because the citizen had access to the Chief Minister, but not many people have access to the Chief Minister.

"Two points in this story require to be emphasized. First of all that no reply was given for two years and the officer saw nothing strange about this. Secondly, the officer's attitude was that the citizen should have come and seen him, in other words, made a personal petition to him. If this attitude had not been hallowed by tradition, one could legitimately comment that it was compounded both of insensitivity and arrogance."[41]

The writer further illustrates the attitude that pervades the rank and file of the bureaucracy. "I have a friend of mine, a Congressman of impeccable honesty, who happens to know intimately a number of Ministers and senior officials both in his state and in the Central Government. He has been trying to set up an industry and for the last three years has been moving up and down between the state capital and Delhi He does not complain of corruption, for, no official has asked him for money; he does not talk of unfriendliness on the part of the Ministers or senior

[41] H. V. R. Iyengar, "Jungle of Administrative Delays, II," *Indian Express* (Madras, August 18, 1965).

civil servants. They know him well and have all been helpful. But the trail has been exhausting. Even in his case, with the minor officials knowing that he has high connections, there is, at every stage, delay and unhelpfulness in approving of something or other under the statute. For these small things, my friend cannot go to the Minister or senior civil servants. The unhelpfulness comes from a feeling that authority is being exercised over the citizen. The officials, because of the power vested in them, do not regard the citizen as someone to be helped but as a petitioner to whom a favour has to be shown "[42]

The main reason for the lower staff's indifference towards their duties is a lack of creative leadership at higher levels. The elite at the top, "while exceptionally intelligent and competent itself is too preoccupied with old routines to impart much sense of mission or adventure to the rank and file."[43]

The fact that the Indian planners doubted the administration's capacity to implement the plans efficiently is indicated by the following note in the Second Five Year Plan: "While the area of agreement on matters of policy is considerable, doubt exists whether in its range and quality, administrative action will prove equal to the responsibilities assumed by the Central and State Governments in the Second Five Year Plan. It is likely that as the plan proceeds, difficult issues will relate less to matters of policy and approach, more to questions of administration and organization. . . .

"If the administrative machinery both at the Centre and in the states does its work with efficiency, integrity and with a sense of the urgency and concern for the people, the success of the Second Plan would be fully assured. Thus in a very real sense, the Second Five Year Plan resolves itself into a series of well defined administrative tasks."[44]

The doubts of the architects of the Second Five Year Plan have been increasingly substantiated so much so that Tarlok Singh, a member of the National Planning Commission, wrote in 1963: "Experience in the past two years has tended to streng-

[42] Iyengar, *op. cit.*
[43] John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Washington, 1962), p. 135.
[44] Government of India, Planning Commission, *Second Five Year Plan*, 1956, p. 126.

then the view that in its structure, method of functioning and capacity to meet the requirements of rapid development, the administration has not been able to catch up and the distance may be increasing rather than diminishing."[45]

A Model of Bureaucracy

There appears to be overwhelming evidence that a bureaucratic system is not able to handle the task of planning and social change efficiently. "Planning is an analytical process which encompasses an assessment of the future, the determination of desired objectives in the context of the future, the development of alternative courses of action to achieve such objectives and the selection of a course (or courses) of action to achieve such objectives."[46]

Because planning requires imagination and includes an element of risk, the vision to formulate alternate plans and to forecast their outcomes is basic to the process. An uncertain future is at the core of planning activity; this entails willingness to accept risks and to alter the decisions made previously in light of subsequent information. The planner must be able to quickly perceive inter-relationships among various programmes of action and fit pieces together He must be able to get along with others. These qualities are hard to find in a bureaucracy that does not facilitate the development of an innovative personality.[47] For bureaucracy to suit the needs of planning, it has to undergo onsiderable structural and behavioural change. A few of the more important changes required for this transformation are described in the following pages—(1) replacing a vertical with

[45] Tarlok Singh, "Administrative Assumptions in the Five Year Plans," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, IX (1963), 336-43. See also Asoka Mehta, "Administrative Leadership." *Indian Jour. of Public Administration*, XI (1965), 671-79.

[46] Brian W. Scott, *Long-Range Planning in American Industry* (American Management Association Inc., 1965), p. 21.

[47] This innovative personality is in many respects similar to the "democratic personality" described by Karl Mannheim in *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* (New York, 1950), pp. 230-31. See also Everett E Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, 1962), esp. chaps. 5 & 6.

a horizontal relationship, (2) the shifting of emphasis from rule observation to goal achievement, (3) changing inter-personal behaviour, (4) establishing a two-way communication system, (5) recognizing mutual inter-dependence, and (6) creating a sense of urgency.[48]

1. Horizontal Versus Vertical Relationship

A bureaucratic system is monocratic with a single formal line of command and control. It is characterized by a hierarchy of superior-subordinate relationships in which the person at the top assumes all authority and issues general orders to initiate action. Orders reach the lowest subordinate through a series of layers. Status and reward systems closely follow the pattern of these hierarchies. There is no effective delegation of authority and not much scope for discretionary decision-making. This type of control-centered administration is ideally suited for discharging routine functions, where tasks are well known, repetitive, clearly defined, and demand relatively simple technology.

Since the functions of a government intent on social transformation are complex and call for a variety of skills—technical and social in addition to administrative—a vertical hierarchy based on a single line of command is ineffective. On account of its rigidity and limited inter-group mobility, a vertical structure inhibits both motivation and adaptiveness. It promotes strata isolation, impedes the unobstructed flow of communication, encourages clique formation, and contributes to the sacrifice of larger organizational goals for the achievement of group goals.[49] Development administration requires more of a horizontal

[48] See Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy which Permit Conflict," *American Jour. of Sociology*. LXVII (1961-62), 177-84; V.A. Thompson, "Administrative Objectives of Development Administration," *Administrative Science Quart.*, IX (1964-65), 91-108; "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quart.*, X (1965-66), 1-20; James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organizations: Notes Toward a Theory," *Approaches to Organizational Design*, ed., James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh, 1966), pp. 193-218.

[49] Nigel Walker, *Morale in the Civil Service* (Edinburgh, 1961). See also Crozier, *op. cit.*; March and Simon, *op. cit.*, Litwak, *op. cit.*

structure with a large amount of delegated authority, less inequality of status and rewards, and more opportunity for discretion and adaptiveness. Such an arrangement facilitates innovation and creativity.[50]

The acquisition and use of a large number of professional, scientific, and technically-trained personnel require a rational status and reward system. A hierarchical authority and reward system induces the technically-trained employees to aspire to administrative posts since these positions carry more tempted prestige. Thus the technically-trained employee is continuously to move into administration *per se*. Blocking this movement results in frustration and a consequent decline of morale in the organization. This, in turn, often causes friction between line and administrative personnel.[51] To overcome this, two or more parallel salary scales related to real rather than artificial needs are necessary to maintain a single status hierarchy. Thus, the specially-trained persons may achieve success without leaving their speciality or aspiring to "superior" posts. Such an arrangement will also force the employees to look outside the organization, to their profession for status recognition, creating a professional atmosphere in the services. This, too, will contribute to innovation and creativity.[52]

2. *Primacy of Goals over Rules*

Bureaucracy is generally excessively rule-oriented. Not only do these elaborate rules delimit authority and responsibility but all action is in such strict conformity to rules and precedents that bureaucratic preoccupation with rule observance often elevates means to ends.[53] There is little room for discretion or adaptation to new needs. Since planning activities neither have

50 Wilson, *op. cit.*; Tom Burnes and G. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation* (London, 1961).

51 See Walker, *op. cit.;* V.A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations* (New York, 1958); Melville Dalton: Conflict Between Line and Staff Manageria Officers," *American Sociological Rev.*, XV (1950), 342-51.

52 A. W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals," *Administrative Science Quart.* II (1957-58), 281-306; Harold L. Willensky, *Intellectuals in Labor Unions* (Glencoe, 1956), pp. 129-44.

53 Merton, *loc. cit.*, p. 158.

any precedents nor lend themselves easily to existing rules, the bureaucracy's immediate response to planning tends to be one of extreme caution. When action is finally initiated, it is trimmed to fit the Procrustean bed of bureaucratic rule. To enable the bureaucracy to cope with planning, therefore, the emphasis on rules needs to be replaced with an emphasis on goal achievement. This can be partly attained by assigning *tasks* instead of *jurisdiction* to officials. Assignment of jurisdiction preoccupies the incumbent with the prerogatives and protocols of the position instead of the purpose of his office. Assigning tasks will compel the assignee to concentrate on real means for attaining goals rather than on the superficialities of compliance.[54]

3. *Change in Interpersonal Relations*

Development administration requires a large number of social skills in addition to technical and professional ones. The administrator has to assume the role of persuader, demonstrator, and listener. The capacity to inspire and motivate others to work, co-operate, and communicate effectively with one another is aided by an informal and more intimate personal relationship. A certain amount of positive emotional involvement by the participant helps to create more spontaneous interest in implementing organizational goals and producing committed employees.[55] Since implementation of many social-welfare plans requires active and spontaneous public co-operation, it seems imperative that the members of the bureaucracy acquire skills in "social engineering" to make themselves and their progammes more acceptable. Impersonal, formal relations make the public hostile to officials and apathetic to their actions. Inside the organization, it dehumanizes participants and chills inter-personal relationships.

Bureaucratic theory has concentrated on the negative aspects of inter-personal relationships and assumed that any deviation

[54] V. A. Thompson, *loc. cit.*

[55] D.A. Hamburg, "Therapeutic Aspects of Communication and Administrative Policy in the Psychiatric Section of a General Hospital." *The Patient and the Mental Hospital*, eds. Greenblatt *et al.* (Glencoe, 1953), pp. 91-107.

from formalism amounts to an undesirable shift from universalism to particularism. Recent studies have shown that behaviour that deviates from formal expectations need not necessarily be disfunctional. Behaviour should be judged by its results rather than a preconceived set of norms associated with the bureaucratic role. The test of a particular behaviour should be the extent to which it contributes to fundamental organizational goals rather than established bureaucratic procedures.[56]

4. *A Two-way Communication System*

Traditionally, bureaucratic communication has been typified by the predominance of a one-way flow from the superior to the subordinate without adequate feedback. There is no delegation of authority and no meaningful communication with subordinates. Communication is restricted to prescribed channels which reflect the formal line of command. In a developing society, this often overloads the lines of communication, delaying and distorting it in the relay process. Planning activity requires original data for formulating plans and feedback on the effects of these plans. A development plan calls for increasing speciallization and inter-dependence, the co-ordination of which depends on effective two-way communication. There exists a need for tapping all possible channels of communication—horizontal and vertical, formal and informal. Hence, when such communication links develop, there may be some loss of central power; people holding super-ordinate positions may experience some loss of their power, but they will gain influence by sharing some power with others.[57]

5. *Recognition of Interdependence*

Administration of development plans is a highly inter-dependent activity, not only because it must use the services of a large number of specialized departments and agencies, but also

[56] Peter M. Blau, *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago; 1956); Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," *Administrative Science Quart.*, III (1958-59), 509-25.

[57] Richard L. Simpson, "The Vertical and Horizontal Communication in Organization," *Administrative Science Quart.*, IV (1959-60), 188-96.

because it requires the concerted action of all. Inter-dependence creates a need for co-operation and for an attitude of willingness to be co-ordinated. It also implies an ability to perceive, understand, and to adapt positively to the needs of the rest of the organization. This, again, emphasizes horizontal relationships among departments. Acceptance of the need for inter-dependence is more likely if functionally—rather than authoritatively—created dependencies are involved. Dependence based on skill is more tolerable than is dependence based on imposed authority.

Bureaucracy has a tendency to occupy itself with the goals of subunits rather than those of the total organization. A highly stratified system of status and rewards without effective communication results in strata isolation, further aggravating the tendency for subgoal formation. This makes co-ordination difficult and hampers goal achievement.[58]

6. *A Sense of Urgency*

The administrator needs to realize the importance of speed in dispatching business. Since a plan is a series of successive actions over time, the element of planning may disappear if the original schedule is not followed. Delaying target achievement in one sector raises costs and creates bottlenecks in other sectors that are dependent on inputs from the first. The built-in disposition of a bureaucracy is to let things move at their own pace. Emphasis is not on speed but on avoiding mistakes and conforming to precedents. This disposition is not conducive to change which calls for dynamic action. Planning produces a series of crisis situations; emphasis is on quick rather than correct decisions. One cannot afford to wait, especially when waiting does not ensure correct decisions. Every situation is, in some respect, unique with few rules or precedents for the decision-maker to rely on if he is to make appropriate decisions. Decisions in planning are, in fact, more *ad hoc* than *a priori*. They must cut across the red tape of administrative delays.

All these elements are inter-dependent and reinforce one another. They imply a change in attitude of the bureaucratic employee, especially at the top hierarchical levels. "The task of

[58] V. A. Thompson, "Administrative Objectives, *loc. cit.*

planning is not merely one of visualizing brave new worlds. It is a task of constructing sequences of behaviour that can be carried out and that will bring these brave new worlds into actual being."[59] Persons engaged in planning generally more realistically accept the physical and biological laws to which their plans must conform than the limitations imposed by human psychology. Their approach to planning is frequently based on fairly simplified assumptions of human behaviour, some of which are largely incorrect. One such assumption is that most people can be induced to accept a plan if they see that the plan aims at socially desirable goals. However, accepting a goal, even a desirable one, does not necessarily commit people to the achievement of it, especially when the required means differ widely from established ones. Planning norms not only differ from traditional norms but question the wisdom of many of them. Hence, people may not incorporate these new norms into their pattern of behaviour even if they are convinced of the need to achieve the goals of planning, unless they have compelling reasons to do so.[60]

Another misconception is that people who cannot be convinced of the desirability of a plan are acting from morally bad motives. Bureaucratic officials' resistance to change may not be caused by conscious anti-reform views or deliberate attempts to circumvent reform. Many who opposed innovation were only concerned with doing their jobs as best they could in ways which they thought correct or practicable. They could be expected to behave the same way under any other regime. Bureaucratic rituals, developed for a stability-oriented government, have been so strongly internalized by the members of the bureaucracy that an enormous psychological adjustment is needed to change underlying sentiments and assumptions.[61]

In the absence of compelling reasons to change, superimposing planning on the bureaucracy may not succeed in producing

[59] Herbert A Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration*. (New York, 1962), p. 448.

[60] According to Kurt Lewin, even extensive first-hand experience does not automatically remove false perceptions or create correct knowledge. See Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948), pp. 57-64.

[61] Lipset, *loc. cit.*, p. 262.

the desired results unless the planning agency can provide the necessary leadership and motivational impetus for change.

The questions involved in attempting socio-economic development through the established bureaucratic channels are these:

Can a planning agency, itself a part of the bureaucracy, secure effective support and co-operation from the entire bureaucracy?

Since planning may require certain structural and behavioural changes in the bureaucracy, will the bureaucracy voluntarily accept these changes?

If these changes have to be imposed externally, is it possible for the planning agency to take the initiative? If so, how will it go about introducing change?

What is the leadership's role in this process?

What are the roles of doctrine, programme, resources, and internal structure of the organization in facilitating change?

How are these factors related to leadership?

Can an agency with a bureaucratic structure play any innovative role?

If it cannot, what transformations will it have to undergo to become an effective change-agent?

What part do the environmental units play in introducing change?

What role is played by the agencies that control authority and resources?

How important is their contribution in introducing and sustaining change?

What other sources of support can an innovative agency expect to secure?

What strategies are available to overcome opposition and sustain innovation?

Some of these questions are explored in the following study.

of the state plan outlay in the Second and the Third Five Year Plans. To be sure, they contribute substantially to strengthening the infra-structure of the economy, but their order of priorities is generally determind by non-economic considerations. The popular appeal of many social welfare programmes, the closeness of the state administration to the direct beneficiaries of such programmes, and the pressures and pulls exerted by an articulate electorate on centres of decision-making in a democratic set-up make political leadership inclined to include such programmes in the state plan in larger numbers than are suggested by plan requirements.

There is wide diversity between states in both social and economic matters. This is shown by the large difference in their growth rates and disparity in per capita income. Each state has a unique set of problems, caused by historical factors, location, resource potential, man-land ratio and stage of development. Any plan formulated on an all-India basis must recognize these regional differences and provide remedial measures and an attempt to fit a uniform plan on all the states without taking into account their growth needs and propensities would create discontent in the states and make the process of development uneven and haphazard.

States are heavily dependent on the Centre for financing their plans. The assistance of the Centre as a proportion of state plan outlay has been 62%, 51%, and 62%, respectively, for the First, Second, and Third Plans. Assistance to individual states has shown wider variations. Thus, the Centre's contribution to the state plan outlay during the Third Plan period was 43% for Maharashtra but 81% for Jammu & Kashmir. The heavy reliance of the states on the Centre for financing most of their plan projects has developed in them a client mentality towards the Centre. This has made many states to comply readily with the directions of the Planning Commission and the Central Ministries not only in the matter of fixing priorities but even in selecting individual schemes. The striking similarity of state plan priorities and schemes in spite of differing regional needs is indicative of the influence of the Centre over state planning.

While the plans formulated by the Planning Commission reflect a realistic appraisal of needs and capacity for mobilizing

resources, state plans generally represent a collection of projects which may be fitted into the all-India plan. States do not have any planning machinery worth the name. Most states, so far, have tended to treat planning as a peripheral function, to be performed by an official who has no special qualification for it, possesses no special status, and sometimes combines planning responsibilities with other extremely onerous duties. The work of this official, generally, has been to co-ordinate the schemes submitted by the Development Departments. It will be no exaggeration to speak of state planning as departmental planning. Because of the absence of an expert body (like the Planning Commission) at the state level, state plans have lacked definite objectives, priorities and interdependencies. Since a large part of the plan funds comes from the Centre, and since state plan outlay is finally decided by the Planning Commission, states generally submit a list of all things they want to do and leave it to the Planning Commission to sort them out and relate them to its pattern of priorities and available financial resources. This tendency of the states to unload on the Planning Commission more projects than could be possibly taken up is further strengthened by the fact that the final outcome is the result of hard bargaining where the larger the number of schemes, the greater is the bargaining power.

The Machinery for State Planning

There is no uniformity in the planning machinery of the states. This is true of even the bureaucratic department which handles the bulk of the work of planning. However, it is possible to identify a few agencies in each state, which perform the different tasks of planning. They are:

1. The Cabinet Committee for Planning
2. The Planning Board
3. The Planning Unit (or Department)
4. The Development Departments
5. The Inter-Departmental Committee, and
6. The Planning Advisory Committee.

1. The Cabinet Committee for Planning

State planning at the highest level is the responsibility of the Cabinet. Sometimes, the whole Cabinet may constitute itself into a Planning Committee or set up a Sub-Committee for Planning, consisting of the Chief Minister, Planning Minister, Finance Minister and Ministers of a few other important departments. The former pattern exists in Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Madras, and Punjab. In Haryana and Punjab, the agency is called Planning Board. (This is not to be confused with its namesake described in the next paragraph. The latter is a more compact and technical body than the former.) The Sub-Committee type exists in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. In other states, the Cabinet used to form *ad hoc* committees or sub-committees of itself for discussing Five Year and Annual Plans. The Planning Committee of the Cabinet discusses the broad objectives, priorities and resource availability, allocates funds to various sectors and co-ordinates the plans of the different departments. It also reviews periodically the progress of plan schemes.

2. The Planning Board

This is a small body consisting of a few Cabinet Ministers and experts, and has been constituted more or less on the lines recommended by the Planning Commission in 1962. Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, and Orissa are the only states which have set up Planning Boards of this type. In Jammu & Kashmir, the chairman of the Board is a full-time member; in Kerala and Orissa, the Chief Minister is the chairman.

The Planning Boards perform, on a miniature scale, the work of the Planning Commission at the state level. It works out objectives, strategies and priorities of state planning and, in accordance with these, identifies programmes for inclusion in the state plan. While the experts provide the Board with necessary technical knowledge required for effective planning, the Ministers act as a link between the Board and government and facilitate the acceptance of the plan prepared by it. Though an advisory body, the Planning Board, like the Planning Com-

mission, could exercise effective control over state planning.

3. *The Planning Unit*

This agency is located in the state secretariat and handles all administrative aspects of planning, including co-ordination and review of progress of plan schemes. In many states, it enjoys the status of an independent Department and is headed by a full-time official, called Secretary or Commissioner. Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Nagaland have independent Planning Departments under full-time Secretaries. In Rajasthan, the Chief Secretary acts as Planning Secretary while in Orissa the Additional Chief Secretary heads the Planning Department. In Haryana and Punjab, the head of the Planning Department is called Commissioner for Planning and Finance. In Jammu & Kashmir, he is Commissioner for Planning and Development. In Kerala, the Planning Secretary is called Secretary for Planning and Finance. Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal have combined Planning and Development under one Secretary (in West Bengal, the incumbent is called Commissioner for Planning and Development), while Mysore has combined Health and Social Welfare with Planning tasks. In Gujarat, planning activity is performed by the General Administration Department which is under the Chief Secretary. This Department has a planning unit for the purpose of supervising state planning. In Madras and Maharashtra, planning forms part of the activities of the Finance Department.

Whether independent, or forming part of the Chief Secretariat, or Finance Department, or other departments, the planning body in the secretariat has been, over the years, functioning as the sole agency having responsibility for state planning on a continuing basis. Because of this, the planning unit has increased its area of activity and secured for itself considerable share in state planning. This includes collection of statistics, mobilization of resources, processing of plans, and evaluation of plan achievement. In most of the states, the Statistics Department (or Bureau of Economics and Statistics as it is sometimes called) is under the planning agency. In some

states, the planning agency has a technical wing with technical staff to process the plans sent by the Development Departments. Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have officers either at the Deputy Secretary's level or of slightly lower rank to take care of the technical aspects of planning, including assessment of resources, manpower needs, and the like. Some states have elaborate evaluation wings headed by a Director (Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Mysore, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh) or Deputy Secretary (Andhra Pradesh). Jammu & Kashmir has a Deputy Director to take care of evaluation of plan schemes. States such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh have, besides, Evaluation Committees of Ministers and officials for suggesting and reviewing evaluation programmes.

The planning agency in the secretariat performs a key role in state planning. It acts as the liaison between the Planning Commission and the State Development Departments and communicates the directions of the former to the latter agencies. So also, it collects and co-ordinates the departmental plans for presentation to the Commission. It advises the state cabinet on possible extent of Central assistance for the plan and resources to be mobilized within the state. Its role in advising the Cabinet on sectoral allocations and pruning of departmental plans to accommodate them within available resources is also very important. The Planning Department has responsibility for reviewing the progress of plan programmes and of taking prompt measures for removing bottlenecks in plan implementation. Once the state plan draft is prepared, the department takes initiative in presenting it to the Planning Commission and in arguing the state's case before the Commission.

A recent trend noticeable in the Planning Departments is their willingness to undertake more critical roles in plan formulation. Many of them did considerable spadework in preparing the Fourth Plan Draft. Some of them worked out objectives and strategies which show a fair amount of thinking and model building.

4. *The Development Departments*

Most of the programmes included in the state plans originate

in the Development Departments. Each Development Department has two parts—an administrative part located in the state secretariat and headed by a Secretary or Commissioner, and an executive part headed by an officer, generally called Director. Work at the secretariat level is to process the different demands originating from the executive departments and to exercise general supervision over their operation. It is the executive department that has responsibility for both plan formulation and implementation. While the Planning Commission and the Ministries of the Government of India would give broad indications of the type of projects to be taken up by each state department, the selection of individual projects, the ordering of their priorities and the elaboration of their details are largely the responsibility of the latter. At the time of formulating the Third and the draft of the Fourth Plans, working groups were constituted, one for each activity, to help the departments in selection of schemes and fixation of priorities. By and large, however, the departments continue to play the most important role in state planning. Success of a state plan, therefore, is largely dependent on the capacity of these departments to plan well and implement the plan programmes efficiently and promptly. To enable departments to perform these responsibilities Planning Units (or Cells) were added to them but this step has not improved departmental planning because the personnel of these Planning Units were not experts in planning and programming techniques.

5. *The Inter-Departmental Committee*

In many states, there exists a committee of Secretaries of Government Departments. In Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Madras, Mysore and Punjab, this committee is called the State Department Board and consists of the heads of the Secretariat Development with the Chief Secretary as chairman. In Jammu & Kashmir, the State Development Committee consists of heads of both secretariat and executive departments. The work of the Development Board is administrative co-ordination of plan efforts and removal of bottlenecks of an inter-departmental nature which hinder the implementation of programmes.

6. The Planning Advisory Committee

The Planning Advisory Committee is a body of non-officials, established by the state government to enlist public support and co-operation for the Five Year Plans. The Committee has been in existence in all states. It consists of State Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament from the state, leading members of the state Legislature belonging to different political parties, and representatives of various interests in the state, such as trade unions, chambers of commerce, welfare agencies, and so on. The Chief Minister usually presides over its meetings and the Chief Secretary acts as convener. This committee comes into the picture of state planning at a late stage in plan formulation, generally after the plan has been drawn up and co-ordinated and before presentation to the Planning Commission. The Committee discusses the plan and makes suggestions and recommendations. Those recommendations which do not necessitate major shifts in plan strategies and allocations are generally accepted and incorporated in the plan, as at this stage there will not be much time available to recast the plan. The Advisory Committee presents a forum for interest groups to project their ideas and interests regarding planning. But the impact of the committee on state planning has been generally marginal.

In addition to the agencies described above, there are a few other bodies which play some role in state planning. These are located in the Districts and Blocks. A state plan consists of not only department plans but district plans also. District plans are prepared on the recommendations of the District Development Council or Zila Parishads, and they incorporate the plans formulated by the Block and Panchayat Samities. Though the share of district plans in the state plans has been limited, it is bound to increase with the coming of age of Panchayati Raj institutions on the one hand and on the other, the development of more systematic planning at the state level.

The Planning Process

The First Five Year Plan (1951-56) was mainly an aggregation of schemes, many of which had been started earlier by various government departments. With the preparation of the

Second Plan, however, a regular procedure was evolved.[1]

At the beginning of every Five Year Plan, the National Development Council, which consists of the members of the Planning Commission, prominent Ministers of the Government of India, and the Chief Ministers of all the Indian States, meet to decide on the approach to the plan as well as its scope, objectives, and priorities. The Planning Commission then works out in line with the National Development Council's guidelines, detailed strategies, objectives, targets and priorities for both the Central Sector and the States Sector. It communicates this to the Central Ministries and the State Planning Departments; the latter then transmit this information to the different functional state departments, requesting them to prepare and submit their plans for processing.

The Central Ministries also tell their state counterparts what Central assistance is available for the different items; in some cases, they suggest model schemes for state consideration. Since a large part of the state plan resources comes from the Central Government, the Central Ministries have a decisive voice in the states' selection of schemes. The Central Ministries also assure preferential treatment for favourite schemes, offering assistance ranging from 25 to 100 per cent, depending on the schemes' acceptability to the states. The bargaining power of the Central Ministries is greater if a state department is weak or indifferent to the schemes it selects to include in the state's Five Year Plan. In this case, the directives from the Central Ministry will be accepted whether or not they are applicable to the state.

On receipt of the departmental plans (and plans from the districts), the Planning Department checks them for internal consistency and conformity to the Planning Commission's directives. Because invariably the total cost of the departmental plans is much higher than the ceiling prescribed for the state by the Planning Commission, the proposals must be pruned. This is generally done in a meeting of the Secretaries and Ministers of

[1] Government of India, Planning Commission, *The Planning Process* (1963); S. R. Sen, *The Strategy for Agricultural Development and Other Essays on Economic Policy and Planning* (Bombay, 1962); "Planning at the State Level," *The Economic Weekly*, Bombay, XII (June 1960); A.H. Hanson, *The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plans, 1950-64* (London, 1966).

the Planning Finance, and the concerned Departments.[2] The plan that emerges from this discussion is presented to the Cabinet Sub-Committee for Planning[3] which examines and modifies it in light of political obligations. The plan is then discussed by the State Planning Advisory Committee. At this stage, the state Legislature debates a Five Year Plan; however, it can discuss Annual Plans only after they have been incorporated into the state budget. After approval by the State Planning Advisory Committee, the plan is printed as the State's Draft Five Year Plan and copies are sent to the Planning Commission and the Central Ministries.

The Planning Commission then invites the state representatives—the State Chief Minister and the Planning and Finance Ministers—to New Delhi to discuss the draft plan. Several rounds of conferences are held at this stage—meetings of the Chief Minister and the Members of the Planning Commission, state officials and the officials of the Planning Commission and of the Central Ministries, and so on. As might be expected, much bargaining occurs in these meetings. The state officials seek to get maximum Central assistance while the Planning Commission attempts to make the volume of Central assistance minimal. Much depends on the state officials' ability to convince the Planning Commission and the Central Ministries that their arguments are valid and their schemes feasible. The state officials must argue their case knowledgeably and firmly enough to sell "experts" from the Central Ministries and the Planning Commission who generally are more technically qualified and higher ranking than they.[4] The Central Ministries use these meetings to convince the state of the value of their "pet projects". The state

[2] In Kerala, for the Third Five Year Plan, this was done by 8 Study Groups and a Co-ordination Committee of non-officials and for the Fourth Plan, by a Programme Advisory Committee, discussed in detail elsewhere

[3] Because there was no such committee of the Cabinet in Kerala except for a short period (1962-1964), the Plan is discussed by the whole Cabinet.

[4] One state official told us that he spent over two hours arguing a case with one of the Central Groups and finally succeeded in getting his point accepted by them. He however admitted that generally the state officials are overwhelmed by the sheer number of the central experts who have ready access to facts and figures.

generally accepts these projects in return for support of its own favourite schemes, Following these discussions, the Planning Commission approves the state plan, as modified in the light of these conferences, and fixes the volume of Central assistance.

This procedure, first initiated with the Second Five Year Plan, has been followed for both the annual and subsequent Five Year Plans. For the Third and Draft Fourth Plans, a minor change was introduced in formulating departmental plans. It concerned the appointment of Working Groups—one for each major activity, consisting of senior officials of the major and related departments Some non-officials were also included in the Fourth Plan development Working Groups. The main responsibility for preparing the schemes, however, still rests with each major department.

As stated earlier, these state schemes do not involve any overall planning but only sectoral planning. Overall planning is done at the all-India level by the Planning Commission—an expert body. The states do not have any purely technical-planning machinery; all schemes are prepared by the departments, based upon the corresponding Central Ministries' instructions.[5] These schemes are neither always well thought out nor are they well co-ordinated—temporally or spatially. In part, this is due to a lack of experience in planning; but to an extent, it also reflects various official's unwillingness to take the initiative. The state officials do not pay a great deal of attention to the choice of schemes or even to the details of their formulation. Often they adopt the models supplied by the Central Ministry and fill them with details without analyzing the relevancy of such models. This seems to help officials avoid responsibility for possible failures and it is also a good way to secure the Central Ministry's support for their schemes.

[5] *The Economic Weekly, op. cit.*

Chapter Three

The Planning Departments in Andhra Pradesh & Kerala

IN July, 1944, the Government of India created a Planning and Development Department to organize and co-ordinate planning work.[1] The departments of the Indian Government, the provinces, and Indian states were invited to prepare detailed plans. The Planning and Development Department of the Government of India formulated the Post-War Development Plan. Its main objective was to reconstruct those sectors of the economy that had been seriously dislocated by World War II. The implementation of this plan was entrusted to the different departments of the Government of India, the provinces, and the states. As the Planning and Development Department was constituted on an *ad hoc* basis, it was abolished in 1946 when it completed its assignment. In 1949, the national government put planning activity on a more systematic basis and established a Planning Commission to prepare a comprehensive socio-economic plan for the whole of India. The Commission produced the First Five Year Plan of India (1951-1956).

At the state level, Development Departments were created to implement the Post-War Development Plan. In Madras, the work of plan implementation was undertaken mostly by the Departments of Industries, Rural Development, and Co-operation. But the plans of these departments were not co-ordinated, and *ad hoc* targets were emphasized, e.g., self-sufficiency in food production. Overall economic development was not stressed. This position continued even after

[1] See V. T. Krishnamachari, *Fundamentals of Planning in India* (Bombay 1962); H.K. Paranjape, *The Planning Commission: A Descriptive Account*, (New Delhi, 1964).

the First Five Year Plan was started. Since the First Plan consisted of a collection of schemes taken up by the state at different times under the Post-War Development Plan, no structural change was found necessary. However, when Andhra state was formed in 1953, its new government wanted to give impetus to state planning. It therefore created a planning unit in the Chief Secretary's department—the Home Department—and appointed a professional economist as its head. In 1955, the planning unit was raised to a full department—Planning and Development. Ever since its inception, the Planning Department has been in charge of Community Development Projects and National Extension Schemes (together called "Development"). The Planning Secretary was designated Development Commissenior (later Additional Development Commissioner). Therefore many people, both in the government and outside of it, thought that planning meant only "Community Development".

When the new state of Andhra Pradesh was formed, the Bureau of Economics and Statistics was brought under the control of the Planning Department. In 1961, an evaluation wing was added to the department. As the work of the Planning and Development Department continued to increase, it had to be separated into two independent departments and this was done in 1963, though the Planning Secretary continued as Additional Development Commissioner. In the wake of this separation, the Planning Department was reorganized and considerably expanded by adding a number of technical personnel.

When this study was conducted, the department had four wings: Planning, Economics, Resources, and Evaluation. Administrative personnel included a Secretary, a Joint Secretary, two Deputy Secretaries, two Assistant Secretaries, and staff. Technical personnel included a Director, three Deputy Directors, and technical staff.

In Kerala, because the Post-War Development Plan was mostly a plan for industrial development, the Industries Department was renamed the Development Department. When the Government of India suggested that the state government create a planning unit to implement the First Five Year Plan, the new unit, created in 1953, was established in the Industries Department and headed by a Deputy Secretary of that Department. A

few months later, this unit was transferred to the Chief Secretary's Department. In 1955, it was raised to the status of a semi-independent department under an Additional Secretary with Deputy and Assistant Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary held a combined post in the Planning and Finance Departments. This arrangement was necessitated because the co-operation of the Finance Department was required to achieve any state planning. For one year (1956), the Planning Secretary was designated Additional Planning Commissioner and was given vast powers of supervision over plan implementation. The post was abolished in 1957 when the Planning Secretary was made responsible for the Development Department and made Additional Development Commissioner.

When Kerala was formed in 1956, the Statistics Department was transferred to the Planning Department. A year later, a research wing was started in the Planning Department; it was named the Bureau of Economic Studies. The two departments—Statistics and Economic Studies—continued as separate entities until 1963 when they were merged to form the Bureau of Economics and Statistics.


In 1961, the Planning and Development Department was bifurcated into the Planning and Development Departments. The latter took over the work of Community Development and National Extension Schemes while the former assumed the planning activity of the combined department. The department was bifurcated on the advice of the Government of India, Ministry of Community Projects, which wanted the State Development Department placed under a full-time officer.

In 1963, the liaison with the Finance Department, established at the Deputy Secretary's level was discontinued. The arrangement did not work to the advantage of the Planning Department. A new liaison was established at a higher level. The Planning Secretary was made Additional Secretary for Finance and was given independent charge of certain sections of the Finance Department including control over plan resources.

At the time of this study, the Planning Department in Kerala had an Additional Secretary, a Deputy Secretary (also Deputy Secretary of Store Purchase Department), an Assistant Secretary, and five sections. Except for the addition of one

ORGANIZATION CHART OF ANDHRA PRADESH PLANNING DEPARTMENT


As of March 1, 1965



Note :—Section 11 is currently on other assignment. The posts of two Deputy Directors were not filled.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF KERALA STATE PLANNING DEPARTMENT

As of June 1, 1965



more section, the growth of the Planning Department over the last decade has been negligible.

The Institution Building model which has been used in the study of the Planning Departments of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala divides the components of an institution (or organization) into two broad categories—system variables and linkage variables. System variables consist of leadership, doctrine, programme, resources, and internal structure. These are the elements which are intra-institutional. Linkage variables consist of enabling, functional, normative, and diffused ties. These are external to the institution.[2] The present analysis of the Planning Departments attempts to focus on and establish meaningful relationship between (1) the different elements of the system, i e., the Planning Department, and (2) the system and the environment as represented by the linkage units. In this chapter, we shall examine the first aspect.

Leadership

State Planning Departments are distinguishable from other governmental departments by the following characteristics:

(1) Absence of product specificity. The Planning Departments did not have any original planning function. Their responsibilities in planning were defined only in broad terms such as co-ordination and review, interpreted differently by our respondents in the two states. This created some difficulty in identifying specific activities consistently and uniformly performed by the Planning Departments.

(2) Marginality. The constituent departments did not consider the Planning Departments indispensable. Some respondents felt that the Planning Departments were superfluous and referred to them as a "fifth wheel" in the administration. Some others doubted the Planning Departments' competence to perform the functions of co-ordination and review while a few respondents from the Finance Departments stated that their own department could carry out these functions more efficiently than could the Planning Department. The attitude of the officials of the

[2] A detailed account of the model is given in Appendix A.

constituent departments made it difficult for the Planning Departments to have their role accepted and legitimatized in the bureaucracy. It also weakened the bargaining power of the Planning Departments.

(3) Absence of a power base or external constituency. The Secretariat organization in which the Planning Departments are located has two types of departments—those with executive branches and those without such branches. All important administrative departments, except the Departments of Finance and Law, have executive departments whose ramifications are scattered over the whole area of the state. The executive departments implement the programmes of their administrative departments and, in doing so, they come in direct contact with the beneficiaries of their programmes. Thus, the administrative departments with executive branches have an external constituency—a clientele outside the bureaucracy—to which they could turn for support whenever necessary.

The Departments of Finance and Law did not have a *clientele* outside the bureaucracy, but they did have strong power bases. The Finance Department controlled the state budget; its approval was necessary for all schemes involving additional expenditure. This made the development departments dependent on the Finance Department for most of their activities. The Department of Law gave legal advice to other departments. Its services were indispensable to a bureaucracy that attached great importance to observance of regulations. The Planning Departments did not have an executive department or a power base of any sort.

These factors coupled with the fact that the values it sought to introduce and institutionalize were "precarious"[3] and the constituents affected by these values were bureaucratic department personnel who are usually resistant to change, made leadership an inevitable factor in the Planning Department's organization and development.

[3] Organizational values tend to be precarious when they are undefined, unacceptable to the "host" population and the position of the functionaries is not fully legitimatized. See Burton R. Clark, "Organizational Adaptation and Precarious Values," *American Sociological Rev.* XXI (1956), 327-36.

Locating this new agency within the bureaucracy required its leadership to overcome those bureaucratic traits that hamper the introduction of change. The leadership also had to develop qualities necessary for the new task.

(1) As the responsibilities of the Planning Department were not clearly defined at the outset, the leadership had to decide what tasks the organization should perform and how they should be performed. In other words, the leadership had to define what Selznick[4] calls the "mission and role" of the organization.

(2) The leadership had to see that the organization embodied the above policies in its social structure. In other words, the leadership had to "transform a neutral entity of men into a committed polity."[5]

(3) The leadership had to structure the indifferent and occasionally hostile environment in a way conducive to the organizational mission's achievement.

(4) To decrease marginal status, the organization's existence had to be legitimatized and demand for the organization's products created.

(5) Above all, the leadership had to institutionalize new values which had not yet received general acceptance.

The performance of these critical tasks demanded of the agency's leadership special attributes. These attributes are: (1) hierarchical position, (2) status, (3) motivation, (4) functional competence, (5) organizational competence, (6) continuity, and (7) personal involvement.[6]

[4] "The formulation of policy and the specification and recasting of general aims of the organization so as to adapt them without serious corruption to the requirements of organizational survival is a leadership role." See Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York, 1957), p. 66.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 90-133.

[6] Because this is not a leadership study *per se*, we have not gone into an exhaustive account of all the leadership attributes. Focus has been on the type of leadership needed for an innovative agency, especially one which has a bureaucratic set-up and whose constituents are bureaucratic departments. See Gordon L. Lippit. "What Do We Know About Leadership?" *The Planning of Change*, eds, Warren G. Bennis *et al*, (New York, 1961), 435-437; Ralph M. Stodgill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership," *Jour. of Psychology*, XXV (1948), 35-71; L. Wesley Wager, "Leadership Style, Hierarchical Influence and Supervisory Role Obligations." *Administrative Science Quart.* IX (1964-65), 391-420; Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York, 1961); Likert, "*Motivation: The Core of Management*," (American Management Association, Personnel Service, No. 155, 1953).

(1) Since innovation cuts across many traditional fields, the leadership of an innovative agency must enjoy a high position in the hierarchy to ensure appropriate behaviour among constituent units and to overcome possible resistance from those affected by change.

(2) Similarly, the leadership needs to have very high status because a tradition-oriented society is likely to be very status-conscious and may not accept any reform originating from lower or even lateral units.

(3) Another requirement of the leadership is motivation. Because the tasks are non-routine and unfamiliar and their consequences unknown, only a strongly motivated individual can be induced to welcome them and to pursue them vigorously.

(4) Functional competence is another required attribute; without it, the leadership can neither discharge its duties properly nor secure respect and co-operation from more qualified subordinates and constituents.

(5) Organizational competence is important because leadership has to structure both the organization and the environment so as to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals.

(6) Persons who direct a planning activity must remain in office long enough to work towards achieving planning goals and using feedback information to adapt the plan to changing needs and circumstances.

(7) Personal involvement assumes unique importance in a bureaucratic organization where the emphasis on the performance of one's perfunctory role makes innovation neither possible nor desirable. Personal involvement as used here implies psychological identification with the organization, which persuades the leader to function above the normative expectation of his role. This comes out of a feeling that he has a special mission to perform in the destiny of the organization which involves him fully in its activity.

As will be shown in the following pages, personal involvement was found to be a critical factor in effective leadership. In this study, however, there was only one individual who possessed this attribute. Since all other individuals who played leadership roles in the two state Planning Departments had little or no personal involvement, this has been omitted in discussions of

their leadership.

The leadership of the Planning Department consisted of the Minister for Planning, the Chief Secretary of the state, the Secretary for Planning and the Joint and Deputy Secretaries of the Planning Department. Since the hierarchical nature of the department prevented the Joint and Deputy Secretaries from playing an active part in critical decision-making roles, we have treated the Planning Secretary as the real leader inside the organization.

ANDHRA PRADESH

In Andhra Pradesh, the planning portfolio was generally handled by a senior member of the state Cabinet; twice it was held by the Chief Minister. Formally, the Planning Ministers were always either directly in control or had direct access to the sources of authority and influence.

At least five of the six Ministers ranked very high in terms of status. Two were Chief Ministers, of whom one was a political leader of national reputation. Others were influential members of the ruling party, and as such, enjoyed high status both in the party and the administration.

The approach towards planning seems to have been based on what may be called the grass-root ideology. Hence, the desire to confer the benefits of socio-economic development on all sections of the people was of considerable importance.[7] Three of the Ministers who were interviewed spoke about this very enthusiastically. Ten of the 19 members of the Planning Department and 5 of the 16 members of other state departments felt this to be the motivation of the Planning Ministers. Five respondents from Planning and 6 from other departments said that the Ministers

[7] Andhra Pradesh is one of the first states in India to establish the "Panchayati Raj" (decentralized democracy at the village level). In the Fourth Five Year Plan (Original Draft), it has introduced the concept of "Planning from Below," through the Panchayat Samitis (Block level) and the Zilla Parishads (District level). This is called "Area Planning" and Rs. 1250 million of Rs. 7000 million of the Fourth Plan outlay has been allotted for this purpose. See *Andhra Pradesh, Draft Fourth Plan of Andhra Pradesh: A Preliminary Memorandum* (Hyderabad, 1965), pp. 23-25.

were only complying with the directives of the Government of India, while the remaining respondents from the state bureaucracy thought they were motivated only to do their work efficiently. None of the respondents, however, attributed any motive to the Planning Ministers, that would hinder the planning effort. The Ministers considered the Planning Department a useful instrument in implementing grass-root objectives; these were concerned beyond the more limited tasks of planning with societal well-being.

The Ministers did not rank high in functional competence. As politicians, they had no technical expertise in planning. They were not chosen for their technical skills, even though their tastes and preferences were given consideration in assigning portfolios. Hence, one could not expect a political leader to have great functional competence. Much depended on the manner in which responsibility for technical tasks was delegated to experts; this presupposed recruitment policies based on technical knowledge.

For the same reason, the Ministers' organizational competence had to be discounted. To be sure, they were able political leaders, adept at organizing the party and the electorate, but this was quite different from the organizational competence necessary in public administration.

As elected representatives of the people, the Ministers could not depend on long terms in office. Their position depended on many factors including their re-election by the constituents as well as the shifting winds of power within the party. As a matter of fact, no Planning Minister held office more than two years at a time. Between 1953 and 1965, six Ministers in succession held this office. Frequent changes in personnel were necessitated by periodical reassignment of portfolios in the Cabinet to adjust for political exigencies such as the expansion of the Cabinet or resignations of some Ministers. Although Planning Ministers did not enjoy continuity of office, there was continuity of policy. Except for a one-year period at the beginning, the Congress Party was in power throughout the period covered by this study.

The Planning Ministers generally ranked high in leadership. It might be pointed out that the Minister's job was not to do

things but to get them done by the bureaucracy. He therefore did not require some of the leadership attributes which were better represented by the bureaucracy. What the Minister could contribute was the authority and prestige of his office to the permanent officials of his department. This gave their actions authority and legitimacy and helped them organize the department on sound principles. The Ministers of Andhra Pradesh, appreciating the need for a strong Planning Department, did this.

The Chief Secretary is next to the Minister of Planning in the line of leadership. There have been three during the period under review. His position in the Andhra Pradesh Secretariat is one of *primus inter pares*, with no wide status of authority gap between him and other Secretaries, except that he is the senior member of the higher civil service in the state. Like other Secretaries, he is in charge of a department of government (formerly Home, now General Administration), and even though he co-ordinates government activities at the highest level, this is more a matter of administrative convenience than hierarchical authority.[8] As the head of the Secretariat organization and as the Secretary of the state Cabinet, he enjoys a position which no other Secretary does

As the head of the Secretariat organization, he mediates all disputes between departments, this is important in co-ordinating planning activities. He is also the Development Commissioner, with overall responsibility over the implementation of plans. In this capacity he presides over the state Planning and Development Committee, consisting of Secretaries to the Government and the Co-ordination Committee of Secretaries and Heads of Executive Departments. Finally, as administrative head of the state government, he can act as the vanguard of any reform. The Chief Secretary thus ranks high in functional role and status as his position carries the maximum authority and prestige in the state bureaucracy.

All the Chief Secretaries were motivated to have their leadership of the bureaucracy extended to the field of Planning. The normative role of the Chief Secretary, both as head of the

[8] R. Dwarkadas, *Role of Higher Civil Service in India* (Bombay, 1958), pp. 48-49.

state bureaucracy and as Development Commissioner of the state, required him to assume special responsibility for planning. Apart from the role requirement itself, these officials were genuinely interested in planning because they were convinced that it was essential. The two Chief Secretaries interviewed expressed this view which was supported by respondents in other departments.

None of the Chief Secretaries had any special skill in planning even though, as experienced administrators, they were endowed with abilities and know-how for all administrative aspects of planning. At the state level, more emphasis has been given to administrative planning than to economic planning and experience of the Chief Secretaries was helpful in that regard.

All the Chief Secretaries displayed fairly high organizational skills. The first Secretary was partly responsible for creating the Planning Unit in his department and for inviting a professional economist from outside the bureaucracy to head this new unit. A year later, he initiated for the Planning Unit, an independent Department of the state government. He also played a major part in setting up a series of high-level committees for planning, the State Planning and Development Committee, and the State Advisory Committee. Another Chief Secretary was responsible for helping the Planning Department organize an Evaluation Unit.

As ex-officio Development Commissioner, the Chief Secretary is in charge of supervising plan implementation. A study of the proceedings of the Co-ordination Meetings of Secretaries and Heads of Executive Departments (presided by the Chief Secretary until 1962) shows that the Chief Secretaries played an important role in plan implementation. One of them visited project areas to get first-hand information on plan implementation. During one of these visits, he found schemes for Tribal Welfare quite unrelated to the needs of the tribal people. He therefore strongly urged the concerned officials to visit the places and acquaint themselves with the needs and problems of the people, before formulating plans. The Chief Secretaries thus used the Co-ordination Meetings as effective instruments for supervising the state plans.

The Chief Secretaries also enjoyed continuity in office. The first one held office for over three years (until retirement), the

second held office for nearly seven years, and the third has been in his position since 1963.

Perhaps the most important leadership in the Planning Department has been provided by the Planning Secretary. Not only has he been responsible for conducting the immediate business of the Planning Department, but he is also effectively the leader of the department. The Minister for Planning, being an elected official, cannot be a permanent official and the Chief Secretary has too many other duties to devote much time to planning work. Though there have been Deputy Secretaries and, of late, a Joint Secretary, most of the responsibility and leadership lies with the Secretary.

From 1953 to 1965, four Secretaries have headed the Planning Department. Of these, the first Secretary was in office one year (December 1953 to January 1955), the second held office for nine months (February 1955 to October 1955); the third for nine years (November 1955 to October 1964); and the fourth, still in office at the time of this study, joined the Department in November 1964. The first Secretary was appointed to take care of the Planning Unit, then part of the Chief Secretary's Department, on a contract basis from outside the bureaucracy. He was designated Development Commissioner and Additional Secretary. As such, he had to supervise the implementation of Community Development Projects and National Extension Schemes, and to deal with Secretaries who were his seniors in the administrative hierarchy. Added to this is the fact that he was an outsider and therefore enjoyed little standing in the prestige hierarchy, dominated at that time by members of the Indian Civil Service.

This resulted in a status-role conflict which had a detrimental impact on his effectiveness. His strong positive motivation and his enthusiasm for planning made him overlook or deliberately by-pass many conventions and precedents of the bureaucracy; this contributed to organizational and interpersonal strains. As a professional economist, he possessed the necessary technical knowledge for the job, but at the same time, he lacked experience in administration—especially in managing an organization dominated by status-conscious officials. He soon became convinced that he could not command adequate co-operation of

the bureaucracy to allow him to perform his functions and thus chose to resign.

His successor was a senior member of the Indian Civil Service who was appointed a full Secretary and given independent charge of the Planning Department. The Department was, in fact, separated from the Chief Secretary's Department and raised to the status of a full department. Thus disappeared the status-role conflict which his predecessor faced. However, during his year in office, there was practically no change in the Planning Department. On his transfer, an officer from the Indian Administrative Service was appointed to the position.

The new Planning Secretary was junior among the Secretaries lower in both hierarchy and status.[9] It seems that the Governor of the state, who was very much interested in planning and had been pleased with the past performance of this official, wanted him as Planning Secretary. The lower status of the Planning Secretary was thus offset, in part, by his reputation as an efficient officer and by his relation to the Governor. There were, however, several areas of administration where protocol had to be followed.

As Development Commissioner, the Planning Secretary had to deal frequently with the Secretaries of other Development Departments. He had to preside over the monthly Co-ordination Meetings generally attended by officials senior to him. Since it was not traditional that a junior official secure the compliance of senior officials and preside over their meetings, the new Planning Secretary suggested that the Chief Secretary should take over the Development Commissionership and the Chairmanship of the Co-ordination Meetings. The latter thus became the Additional Development Commissioner and the Convener of the Co-ordination Meetings.

Like his predecessors, the new Planning Secretary was a general administrator and, in the beginning, did not possess much functional expertise in the technical aspects of planning. But since, state planning mainly consisted of co-ordinating depart-

[9] Technically all departments and department heads of the Secretariat are equal in rank. But only senior officials are appointed to important departments, thus maintaining some sort of informal hierarchical situation.

mental plans and as such represented an administrative effort more than economic thinking, the skills required were administrative rather than technical.[10] The competing claims of different departments had to be reconciled with maximum consistency among the various sectors and in conformity with financial and physical targets identified by the Planning Commission. As the funding demanded by the different departments was always greater than the available resources, there was the problem of evolving a criterion for sectoral allocation of funds without creating much protest by the interested departments. Moreover, the departments' implementation of the plans required of the bureaucracy the need for adopting a new set of behaviour which could not be enforced by appealing to existing rules or authority deriving from the formal social position of the Secretary. It had to be secured by the Planning Secretary's "social engineering."

The new Planning Secretary soon proved that he possessed both functional knowledge and organizational competence. He acquired the necessary technical knowledge; some of the respondents reported that he soon knew more about the plans of their departments than their own personnel. He was able not only to speak their language but also to recommend plan formulations. He described the manner in which he used to brief newly assigned officers. "When a new Director (or Chief Engineer) assumes charge, I call him and tell him how a particular project has been conceived, what was its original purpose, what changes it has undergone, what is its present state of implementation, what are its problems and how they could be solved. I know more about the project than he does. Moreover, I know the thinking in Delhi and the difficulties in getting foreign exchange from the Government of India.

"When you design a project, make sure that you have looked into all aspects of it. Have you taken steps to acquire land for building site, for here several formalities have to be taken care of—notification of parties, approaching the Board of Revenue for acquisition of land, possible court objections, and

[10] We may argue that planning, in the last analysis, is not some special body of knowledge. It is a technique, a method of doing things, an attitude. In this sense the new incumbent of the Planning Department may be said to have possessed the skill necessary for his job.

so on. Have you called for tenders? Will you get machinery in time? I used to tell them that they should make use of all indigenous materials—pickaxes, shovels, crowbars and such. The Chief Engineer does not know the difficulty in getting release of foreign exchange. I know it very well because I go to Delhi quite often."

At the same time, he was tactful in dealing with officials, especially the senior ones; he did not make them feel he was trying to dictate to them or trespass into their domains. He went out of his way to offer them help even in matters that were not clearly his field. For example, "I used to ask them: 'Tell me what is your difficulty. Do you have trouble getting land acquisition, staff, foreign exchange or what is it? If you have any problem, let us discuss it and let us try to solve it.' I took all troubles for them. Suppose a department needed statistical officers, I could at once include a scheme to allot staff from the Bureau (of Economics and Statistics) or organize a Statistical Unit in the department. I helped them organize Planning Units."

Thus he was able to convince other departments that the Planning Department could be very helpful to them Moreover, the monthly Co-ordination Meetings of Secretaries and Heads of Departments were used to create demand for the services of the Planning Department. Convened every month to discuss the progress of plan implementation, they became forums in which the Planning Department criticized lagging departments. Since the Planning Department promptly followed up the decisions of the Co-ordination Meetings, it also became necessary for other departments to reach their targets in accord with the plans. In many cases, the Planning Department had to remove bottlenecks. Many departments found that their schemes could not be started for want of clearance from the Finance Department. Some departments had difficulty in implementing schemes because the necessary land had not been acquired by the Board of Revenue, or the building had not been completed by the Public Works Department, or the Store Purchase Department had not supplied the required equipment. In all these cases, the Planning Department urged the delaying departments to expedite the matter. Thus, the Secretary attempted to modify and upgrade the marginal status of the Planning Department and to

make its services both attractive and desirable.

In a similar manner, the Planning Secretary used the Department's Evaluation Wing to ensure proper plan formulation and implementation; the Evaluation Unit was created largely due to his initiative. In one of the 1960 State (Planning) Advisory Committee meetings a suggestion was made to form a small committee attached to each department for scrutinizing plan schemes and advising on necessary changes before they are implemented. The Planning Secretary immediately took the idea and succeeded in constituting a State Evaluation Committee with the Chief Secretary as chairman; the Finance Secretary, Planning Secretary, and Secretary for Organization and Methods Department as members; and the Deputy Secretary for Planning as convener. This committee suggested projects for evaluation; the Planning Department conducted the actual study. Twenty-three evaluation reports were prepared by the Planning Department, and five more under way at the time of this research. The state evaluation system has been acclaimed the best in india by a Working Group on Evaluation appointed by the National Planning Commission. The Working Group recommended the Andhra Pradesh model for other states.[11]

The Co-ordination Meetings and the Evaluation Unit gave the Planning Department considerable control over state planning. Through these meetings, it was able to keep other administrative departments very much on their toes. At the same time, it was sympathetic towards their difficulties and helped to organize statistical cells and planning units within each major Development Department. It was also helpful in expediting the approval of particular schemes in the Finance Department through the appointment of Financial Advisors and the system of "pre-budget scrutiny."[12]

[11] Government of India, Planning Commission, *Report of the Working Group on Evaluation in States* (New Delhi, 1964), p. 26.

[12] Formerly, the scrutiny of the Finance Department was exercised after the annual budget had been passed by the state Legislature. As a result, much time was spent on correspondence among the Finance Department and the concerned departments before final approval was given by the former. The system of pre-budget scrutiny was introduced to overcome the delay caused by this procedure. According to this arrangement, Development Departments would present the full details of their schemes to the Finance Department several months before the schemes are included in the state budget so that the latter could examine them and raise any objections, at that time. As soon as the budget is passed, Departments could implement their schemes without again getting the Finance Department's approval.

Perhaps the best example of this official's organizational skill was exhibited by the 1963 reorganization of the Planning Department. In 1962, the Deputy Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission suggested that all state governments establish Planning Boards at the state level to assume the responsibility for state planning. The Planning Boards were to become miniature Planning Commissions and thus relieve the National Planning Commission of much of its then-current work. The government of Andhra Pradesh considered the proposal but decided that a Planning Board along the lines suggested by the Planning Commission was not feasible for the state. Instead, the state government decided to strengthen the existing Planning Department. The reorganization of the Planning Department, discussed in detail under Internal Structure, radically changed its structure and composition and made it a semi-technical agency.

The third Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department possessed all the attributes of effective leadership. More than this, what enabled him to strengthen the Planning Department was his deep emotional involvement in the Department's doctrine and programme and his strong sense of identification with the new agency. He served the Department with a devotion beyond the prescribed duties and responsibilities of his office. As the head of a bureaucratic department and a member of the Indian Administrative Service, he was expected to have no special affinity towards a particular department, but to be ready to serve any department. Yet, he successfully avoided transfer to any other department. He was thus able to mould the destiny of his favourite department and maintain his leadership for nine years—an unusually long period in the higher bureaucrat's levels.

Some of our respondents identified the state Planning Department entirely with this Secretary and remarked that "The Planning Department is Mr . . . 's baby". One of the state Cabinet Ministers described him as "the guardian angel of planning in the state". His personal involvement in the organization's activities contributed significantly to the Planning Department's becoming a major agency in the bureaucracy and enabled it to overcome many of the bureaucratic traits detri-

mental to achieving its goals as an innovative agency.[13]

KERALA

In Kerala, the Planning Department was always under the Chief Minister. Between 1951 and 1965, there were six Chief Ministers, who represented three political parties.

Being the Chief Minister of the state placed the incumbent at the top of the functional and status hierarchy. But because of factions within the ruling parties, the Cabinets were always coalitions hanging on a precarious balance of power. As a result, the Chief Minister had to compromise on many important issues, thus weakening his effectiveness as the leader of an innovative agency and, to an extent, reducing, his prestige.

The political leadership in Kerala did not appear to have been dedicated to planning. The idea of planning came to the state rather late—perhaps not until the preparation of the Second Five Year Plan, some three years after the First Five Year Plan had begun. Thus the Ministers who assumed the portfolio of planning during this period were not strongly motivated since they did not fully appreciate the implications of this new activity. We were told that one of the earlier Chief Ministers was interested in planning because it was a convenient way of getting increased funding from the Government of India. This particular Planning Minister also held the portfolio of Minister for Finance. Some other Chief Ministers used planning as a means to satisfy regional and communal interest; planning provided an opportunity to satisfy these more segmental interests without much strain on the state's own resources. It might be said that some of these Ministers used planning as a protective ideology for many more specifically power-oriented activities.[14] Only one Chief Minister seemed an exception; strongly plan-oriented, he

[13] We are omitting the incumbent of the Planning Department from our discussion of leadership because when this study began, he was in office only for four months and nothing significant had taken place in the Department during this time.

[14] On the concept of protective ideology, see Philip Selznick *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, 1953); Edward C. Banfield, "Organization for Policy Planning in the United States Department of Agriculture," *Jour. of Farm Economics* XXXIV, 1952, 14-34.

took effective measures to improve the quality of state planning and to raise the spending capacity of the development Departments.[15] In fact, he was the only Minister in Kerala who attempted to adopt the grass-root ideology in planning. Several respondents in this state, including some who were hostile to his regime, voiced this opinion. As was the case with other Chief Ministers, his term of office was quite short, and his approach created no permanent effect.

Not unlike Andhra Pradesh, the political leadership of Kerala had little functional expertise in planning. Because their tenure in office was comparatively short, the Ministers did not get a chance to acquire the needed skills. The frequent changes in Planning Ministers in Andhra Pradesh were offset by continuity of the administration while in Kerala, political parties alternated in power, thereby hindering any long-term policy or perspective in planning.

In terms of organizational competence, the Chief Ministers generally did not rank high. They tended to solve problems on an *ad hoc* rather than a more permanent or long-term basis. For the preparation of the Third Five Year Plan, the Cabinet constituted eight Study Groups and a Co-ordination Committee. To formulate the Fourth Plan, a Programme Advisory Committee was appointed. Again, two Ministers were exceptions. As a first step towards improved state planning, one of them established and attached to the Planning Department a Bureau of Economic Studies. He also attempted to alter the administrative machinery to enable it to handle planning. Paradoxically, his attitude towards the Planning Department does not seem consistent with many of his other activities relating to planning. Because he was convinced that planning did not require a separate Department,

[15] On account of the weakness of the state administrative machinery, the Departments were not able to utilize all the budgetary allotments for the plan. Thus, during the First Plan period, the state spent only 83 per cent of the total plan outlay. In the first year of the Second Five Year Plan, it spent only 62 per cent of the annual plan allotment. This figure was the lowest among all the Indian states. By an all-out effort, the Chief Minister was able to raise expenditure to 85 per cent during the second year and 100 percent during the third year of the Second Plan. See E. M. S. Namboodiripad, *Twenty-Eight Months in Kerala: A Retrospect* (New Delhi, 1959). p 135.

he recommended that the two-year-old Planning Department merge with the Chief Secretary's Department, an organizational situation which had existed previously. He offered the following explanation: "The states in India do not plan. State planning is a myth. All planning is done by the Centre. There is nobody in the Planning Department (of the state) who knows more about planning than I do, and my knowledge of planning is only general. The officials' idea of planning is that it is a collation of various plans submitted by other Departments . . . . The concept of planning as thinking about the future, utilization of resources, to get maximum returns for minimum inputs and the like, is not there. There is nobody in the government who has any idea that such an approach is necessary. Their (the officials') whole effort is used to get whatever they can from the Centre. They are on the lookout as to how they can achieve this and what plans should be selected for this purpose.

"This kind of work does not need a separate Department. The real question in planning is what is the direction of planning. The mechanism of planning is not as important as the persons who control it."

Thus he was not confident that the Planning Department would be able to effect any state planning. He was skeptical of the state bureaucracy's ability to draw up and implement plans. Only a fundamental change in the personnel of the bureaucracy could effect any planning, and he confessed he did not feel that he could succeed in bringing about this change in the existing set-up.

The other Chief Minister gave the Planning Secretary control over certain sections of the Finance Department, which were relevant to Planning. He had been Minister of Finance in an earlier Cabinet and had realized the problems of co-ordination between finance and planning.

In general, none of the Chief Ministers took any major steps to strengthen the Planning Department, and none seems to have encouraged the administrative leadership to take any initiative in this regard. As a matter of fact, the relation between the Chief Ministers and their Planning Secretaries did not facilitate measures to strengthen the Department. Two Secretaries became unpopular with their Ministers and were removed from the

Planning Department. Under these circumstances, the administrative leadership position of the Planning Department *vis-a-vis* other Departments became quite weak, undermining its bargaining power.[16]

Political leadership also lacked continuity. Not only were Cabinets shortlived, but even when the same political party continued under different leadership, a deviation from the existing policy was necessary, at least, to justifiy the change of leadership.

Thus the political heads of the Planning Department were generally low in leadership attributes; that they were Chief Ministers did not contribute much to the success of the Planning Department. This is because, as Chief Ministers, they had too many different responsibilties to be able to devote adequate energy to any one of them.

Traditionally the Chief Secretary of the princely state of Travancore, the forerunner of Kerala, enjoyed very high status, much above the other Secretaries in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This position continued after the formation of Kerala. The importance of this office is indicated by the fact that every Cabinet wanted its own trusted official to be the Chief Secretary. Consequently, there was a change of Chief Secretary along with a change of Cabinet. The position of this office was further enhanced by the fact that its incumbents were always "imported" from the outside. State officials were deemed unsuitable for the post because of their alleged susceptibility to communal and regional pressures. Moreover, until 1960, the Chief Secretary was an ICS officer while other Secretaries were only IAS men, thus creating a wide status gap between them. Even when he was a member of the IAS, the fact that he was from outside gave him additional prestige. It is not accidental that, in the Secretariat organization chart, he is placed above the other Secretaries. In Andhra Pradesh, the Chief Secretary is equated with other Secretaries on the organization chart.

Though the Planning Department started as a unit in the

16 According to Likert, the capacity to influence upwards (in a social system) is essential for a superviser to fulfil his functions successfully. "To be effective in leading his own group, a superviser must be able to influence his own boss." Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York, 1961), 113-14.

Industries (Development) Department, it was soon transferred to the Chief Secretariat. Since then it has been administratively located within the Chief Secretary's Department with the Planning Secretary designated as Additional Secretary. According to our interviews, the reason for this arrangement was that the Government of India which attached great importance to planning wanted the Chief Secretary of the state to assume responsibility for state planning Administrative convenience also suggested that this activity could be effectively performed only by a person of the status and authority of the Chief Secretary. Much of planning depends on the co-operation of the Finance Department. Only the Chief Secretary could exercise effective control over Finance. Moreover, far from being relegated to the position of an appendage of the Chief Secretariat, as it appeared, planning was elevated to preeminence by the fact that the Chief Secretary himself handled it. Yet the extreme vulnerability of the office of the Chief Secretary to political change had a direct bearing on the morale of the Chief Secretary, lowering his prestige among some of his key colleagues and undermining his capacity to act as the state bureaucracy's leader. Frequent changes of personnel prevented incumbents from adopting a long-term perspective with regard to planning. Hence, the Chief Secretary's leadership of the Planning Department, potentially an advantageous arrangement, became a disadvantage.

Generally the Chief Secretaries were highly motivated to planning. This was not only because of the normative expectation of their role but because the men chosen for those posts have usually proven some genuine capacity for administration. None of the Chief Secretaries could be rated high on functional competence directly relevant to planning tasks; their education and training had emphasized administration. In this regard, they were similar to their counterparts in Andhra Pradesh.

The earlier Chief Secretaries manifested some skill for organizational work. One of them transferred the planning unit, then established in the Industries Department, to his department. Another raised the Department to a semi-independent status, placing it in the charge of an Additional Secretary. Since that time (1955), no further steps were taken to strengthen the Planning Department organizationally, until late 1963, when

certain sections of the Finance Department were placed under the Planning Secretary's control.

Between 1955 and 1963, there were two attempts to integrate the Planning Department with the Chief Secretariat. One, a recommendation of the State Administrative Reforms Committee of which the Chief Secretary was a member, stated: "There is no need for separate departments for Home, and Planning and Development and the nature of the work dealt with in these departments is such that they should form part of the Chief Secretary's department, namely, the Public Department."[17] Again when the proposal to separate the Development wing from the Planning Department came up in 1960, the Chief Secretary supported the view that the creation of a full-time Development Commissioner's post would relieve the Planning Department of much of its work. There would not be enough work to justify a separate Planning and Development Department, so planning and development could be made sections of the Public Department under the Chief Secretary. The official who recommended this told the interviewer that the suggestion was not due to a lack of appreciation of the importance of planning; on the contrary, it was a recognition of its importance. One could only infer from this that he did not perceive the creative role which a strong and independent Planning Department could play in state planning.

This lack of perception may largely be due to the Chief Secretaries' lack of continuity in office, which hampered their ability to take a long-term view of state planning. There were seven Chief Secretaries between 1951-65, the longest term of office being three years.

Perhaps the Chief Secretary was not very active in planning because there was an Additional Secretary in charge. From 1955, planning was under an Additional Secretary and was still so at the time this study was completed. The title itself indicates that there is a full Secretary who acts as the formal head of the Planning Department, who, as has been stated, is the Chief Secretary. There were six Additional Secretaries in the Planning Department between 1955-65. Of these, two held office (acting) for less than six months, one for a little over a

[17] Government of Kerala, *Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee*, I, (Trivandrum, 1958), p. 90.

year, one for two and a half years, and the remaining two (of whom one continues in office) for three years. Their hierarchical position was generally conducive to the effective transaction of business, for, while they themselves were not very highly placed in the hierarchy, they were part of the Chief Secretariat. This helped them to use the authority of the Chief Secretariat in securing compliance from other departments. However, their status in the hierarchy was not commensurate with their work as co-ordinators of department plans, since, as Additional Secretaries, they were placed below the other Secretaries.

The Additional Secretaries were all general administrators. Their functional competence was not considerable, and their tenure in office was too short to enable them to acquire the skills needed for plan co-ordination. One of the Additional Secretaries, however, did stay in office for five years. During this period, he also acted for a time as Deputy Secretary, which helped him form a better understanding of the problems involved in state planning. He found that the Departments lacked experience in drafting plan proposals, thus creating considerable difficulties with the state Finance Department and the Central Planning Commission. To solve this, he issued a brochure that contained instructions for preparing plans.[18] He also found that no real planning could be done without the Finance Department's co-operation. He therefore arranged for the appointment of a common Deputy Secretary for both the Planning and Finance Departments. Another Additional Secretary went a step further and secured control of certain sections of the Finance Department, relevant to planning. The efforts then made were responsible for correcting some of the sectoral imbalances in the Annual Plans caused by arbitrarily approving or withholding approval of schemes already included in the Plan. This Additional Secretary was also partly responsible for designing the form of the Programme Advisory Committee.[19] No

18 Government of Travancore-Cochin, *Second Five Year Plan, 1956-1961: Code of Instructions for Preparation*, Trivandrum 1954.

19 The Programme Advisory Committee consisted of 9 members of whom 5 were Secretaries to the Government, 2 retired officials and 2 non-officials. The Planning Secretary was the convener of the Committee. It was constituted in response to the request of the Deputy Chairman of the Indian Planning Commission to establish Planning Boards at the state level (see earlier). The Programme Advisory Committee was an *ad hoc* body, established for the formulation of the Draft Fourth Five Year Plan which has now become redundant.

other evidence of organizational skill on the part of the Additional Planning Secretaries was available. Probably, they were caught between a relatively indifferent political leadership and the power of the established departments. Their major problem was probably survival rather than expansion. Furthermore, their lack of strong motivation and personal involvement in planning did not encourage them to proceed with bold, expansion programmes or to seek the required support vigorously. These characteristics, of which we found no evidence, seem very important in the success of an innovative agency, especially in its formative period.

The bureaucratic tradition in Kerala has been generally one of subservience to the political executive. In this way considerable dependence on initiative from above was built into the situation. Even when the Additional Secretaries possessed the required initiative, they were afraid to use it because of the lack of support from political executives who were, themselves, in highly vulnerable positions.

Table 1 shows the position of leadership in the two states on the different attributes of our model. It summarizes the major points previously presented. The table shows wide differences in the overall leadership pattern between Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Generally, for most of the attributes, the leadership in Andhra Pradesh ranked high, and that in Kerala, low. The difference is least marked in terms of formal position, status, and functional competence but much more pronounced with regard to motivation, organizational competence, and continuity. Also, the differences, are less at the political than at the administrative level.

It was stated earlier that the primary direct responsibility for the Planning Department's leadership rested with the Planning Secretary, a permanent civil servant. It should be pointed out that the qualities required of a planner are somewhat different from those of an administrator. A planner should be able not only to inspire and motivate his own staff but also the staff of other departments which have the responsibility for suggesting and implementing the plans. He therefore should have some "social skills" in addition to administrative ones. Planning requires the adoption of suitable devices to ensure

Table 1

POSITION OF LEADERSHIP ON VARIOUS ATTRIBUTES

Category	*Number who held office*	*Length in office, Range*	*Formal Position*	*Status*	*Motivation for Planning*	*Functional Competence*	*Organizational Competence*	*Continuity**
ANDHRA PRADESH								
Planning Minister	6	Max. 3 yrs Min. 1 yr	H	H	H	L	L	H
Chief Secretary	3	Max. 6 yrs Min. 2 yrs	H	H	H	L	M	H
Planning Secretary**	4	Max. 9 yrs Min. 9 mo.	H	H	H	H	H	H
KERALA								
Planning Minister	6	Max. 3 yrs	H	H	M	L	L	L
Chief Secretary	7	Max. 3 yrs Min. 1 yr	H	H	M	L	L	L
Planning Secretary	6	Max. 3 yrs Min 5 mo.	M	M	M	L	L	L

Note: H high, M medium, L low.

* Continuity has been evaluated in terms of policy and not of personnel.

** Since one man held office for 9, of the 11 to 12 years of the existence of the Planning Department, his qualities have been projected to other incumbents. In all other cases, a rough average rating has been assigned. These attributes are continuous and do not permit divisions into high, medium, and low.

Personal involvement has not been introduced as an attribute in the table because this was found applicable only at one level—the Planning Secretary.

proper bureaucrtaic behaviour for achieving plan objectives; this calls for organizational competence of a special kind. Moreover, since planning is oriented towards the future, the planner should not only be able to think ahead in original projections but should also remain in office long enough to see, and be accountable for, the achievement of the planning goals. The low score of the Kerala bureaucratic leadership for such

qualities as motivation, organizational skill, and continuity largely accounts for the lower efficiency of the state Planning Department, while the good characteristics of the bureaucratic leadership in Andhra Pradesh made its Planning Department strong and effective.

Attempts to introduce and sustain new norms and values may meet with many obstacles and frustrations because of the constituents' resistance to change and the susceptibility of the political executive to a variety of pressures. Only a strongly motivated and committed individual can overcome these frustrations and pursue his goals with zeal.

Such a zeal could be facilitated by the leader's emotional involvement in the organization's activities. In a bureaucracy, personal involvement is viewed largely with disfavour and is carefully guarded against. The emphasis is on the impersonal, secondary relationship.[20] The ethos of the higher civil service in India has discouraged its members from identifying themselves with any particular activity and encouraged them to serve any department to which they are assigned with, equal loyalty. Their training and the system of regular rotation in office are intended to ensure against any specialization and involvement. The aim has been to free the officials from any subjective involvement in the affairs of any particular department, enabling him to work with objectivity. One result of this is that the official confines himself to the written prescriptions of his role. It also results in emphasizing one's perfunctory role, thereby discouraging the use of critical innovative roles. Thus, the bureaucratic leadership has a built-in tendency to be conservative and to follow the lines of least resistance.

Andhra Pradesh, however, presented an exception to this rule. The third Secretary of the Planning Department in this state was a zealous worker in the cause of planning and insisted that he should not be transferred to any other department. He was not personally involved in the affairs of his department but wanted others to become similarly identified. The departmental staff meetings, as well as the co-ordination meetings, were intended to involve the personnel of these agencies increasingly

[20] Max Weber termed this "formalistic impersonality, *sine ira et studio.*" See his *Theory. op. cit.*, p. 340.

in the activities of their departments. No evidence is available to indicate that other officials of the department in either state showed as much psychological identification with the department as he, even though they were willing to do as much as they could do within the prescribed limits. This emotional involvement of the third Secretary in his state's Planning Department's activities have raised the organization to its present state of eminence. The limited involvement in the officials of the Kerala Planning Department did not encourage the planning agency to increase its effectiveness or grow in size.

Doctrine

Doctrine may be defined as the specification of values, objectives, and means underlying social action. The objectives of the Planning Departments were stated only in very vague and general terms when the departments were established. Since then, these objectives have undergone a considerable change. The respondents who were asked about the objectives of the Planning Departments in the two states (Question 3, Appendix B) preferred to reply in terms of their major duties and responsibilities rather than in terms of any broad goals of the agencies. A large number of respondents said that the Planning Departments facilitate state planning by co-ordinating departmental plans, and that they act as a liaison between the state government and the Planning Commission of India. Some of them mentioned review of progress of plan implementation among the main objectives of the Planning Departments; a few of those who mentioned this function also referred to supervision of plan implementation as a goal. A small number mentioned tendering planning advice as one of the responsibilities of the state Planning Departments. The major responsibilities of the Planning Departments listed by the interviewees were four: co-ordination, review, providing advice, and acting as liaison. Table 2 shows the pattern of response about the doctrine of the state Planning Departments.

A greater number of respondents in Andhra Pradesh mentioned the review and advisory role of the Planning Department than in Kerala. Of these, 75 per cent of the reply came from

Table 2

DOCTRINE OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENTS AS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS

Items	*Andhra Pradesh* (%) $N = 42$	*Kerala* (%) $N = 33$
Co-ordination	100	100
Review	83	67
Liaison	74	39
Advice	31	9

officials of the Planning Department itself. In Kerala, only three officials, two of them members of the Planning Department, mentioned the Department's advisory role. The meaning attached to co-ordination and review by the respondents varied. However, a general trend in the pattern of these meanings between the two states was found. This is discussed in detail in the next section.

The state Planning Departments were created to take care of planning in a general way. They were in charge of neither formulating nor implementing plans though they were to facilitate and supervise both these activities. In Kerala, the Planning Unit started as an agency to supply the Planning Commission with consolidated reports about state plan progress. Since the unit was started one year after the First Five Year Plan was formulated, it had no planning function to perform. In Andhra Pradesh, this was also the case, even though the Planning Unit made some effort to evolve a plan for the new state, by separating the schemes for Andhra from the Five Year Plan of Madras.[21] The Planning Secretary in Andhra Pradesh (then Andhra) was also the Development Commissioner and had to supervise implementation of Community Development Projects.

Only when the Second Five Year Plan was formulated did the doctrine of the Planning Departments begin to be more clearly outlined. At that time, an agency was needed not only to channel the information received from the Planning Commission to the different responsible departments but also to collect the plans from the different departments and check their conformity with Planning Commission instructions. The Planning Depart-

[21] See B. Natarajan, *Five Year Plan for Andhra* (Karnool, 1964).

ment assumed this function and co-ordinated the departmental plans before sending them to the Planning Commission for approval.

As the plans increased in size and complexity, review was assigned to the Planning Departments. Instead of sending routine progress reports to the Planning Commission, the Planning Departments were expected to scrutinize them and see that implementation was progressing as originally expected. Thus, while co-ordination and review were not initially intended, they have become the most important responsibilities of the Planning Departments. However, the nature and extent of co-ordination and review differed in the two states.

In Andhra Pradesh, the facilitative role in planning had been converted into one of leadership. The Planning Department assumed the leadership in state planning and suggested guidelines to be followed by other Departments. According to one respondent, its role was that of a whip, putting pressure on the departments to make them comply with the planning requirements. Its control over state planning was aided by four factors:

1. Personal enthusiasm of the Planning Secretary
2. His influence over the Cabinet, especially the Cabinet Sub-Committee for Planning
3. The Planning Department's control over allocation of plan funds; and
4. Effective use of the Co-ordination and Evaluation Committees.

Under its third Secretary, the Planning Department of Andhra Pradesh seems to have further clarified its doctrine. The Secretary succeeded in attaining considerable control over allocation and reallocation of plan resources, a function previously controlled by the Finance Department. Thus, it appears that the Planning Department's doctrine then began to incorporate the notion that the primary responsibility for the apportionment of plan resources rests with itself and not with the Finance Department.

Secondly, the Secretary's enthusiasm and personal involvement, already discussed in the context of leadership patterns, had a positive influence on officials in other Departments. In a sense then, the Planning Department began to function as a

kind of educational agency, seeking to instill the desire to plan well and to facilitate the attainment of their plans in other officials.

In Kerala, the official doctrine of the Planning Department remained facilitative. The Planning Department, however, was more a catalyst than a whip; even its catalystic role did not develop until recently. The respondents associated with the Planning Department at different times did not credit it with any active role in planning. Its co-ordination function was described as a "collation" and "consolidation" of Departmental plans, mostly a clerical function of aggregating proposed schemes of other Departments into one package. Of those who ascribed scrutiny of plans, review of progress, and advice to the Planning Department, only a small number were from outside of the Planning Department. So, while the Planning Department has of late increased its activities in the states, the constituent departments have either not recognized this claim or are not aware of its new roles. For a long time, state planning was influenced more by the Finance Department than by the Planning Department. All major decisions about planning were made by agencies outside the Planning Department which was small in size and relatively weak so far as leadership is concerned. As a result, it had to be content with what other departments were willing to permit it to do. Thus, both co-ordination and review were confined to minimal functions necessary for discharging them.

As might be generally expected, the interpretation of doctrine was largely left to the leadership of the Planning Department. As the creators of the Planning Department neither envisaged nor anticipated that the Department would come to assume certain roles, the Planning Department leadership needed to redefine the objectives and to formulate policies from time to time in the light of exigencies and existing needs. The lack of specificity of doctrine gave the leadership considerable latitude. A bold and dynamic leader could feel free to define and legitimatize his department's mission very much the way he wanted it to, even when this encroached upon, and was not always acceptable to, the constituent units. Again, due to the lack of specificity, the weaker leadership in Kerala could allow

the Department to drift in direction of greatest pressures and to adjust its goals accordingly without violating the broad objective of the agency. The Finance Department in Kerala could freely alter the priority pattern of the state plan by approving or disapproving schemes as components of the plan; the Planning Department had to acquiesce. The Planning Department in Kerala could thus keep up its appearances as a change agent while it was, by and large, supporting the *status quo.*

In both Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, a major doctrinal element seems to have remained stable over the period with which this study is concerned. This was the underlying premise that the planning task is based on project and scheme inputs by other Departments, and that the process of generating the overall state plan amounts to some form of bargaining and negotiating among constituent departments with greater (Andhra Pradesh) or lesser (Kerala) responsibility for the final resolution of potential conflicts in the hands of the Planning Department. This differs greatly from a planning process in which the planning experts themselves derive various targets, on the basis of which, they generate schemes, and then submit these plans to other Departments for implementation or consideration. And it is also quite different from a model in which various localities throughout the state define their own targets and submit their schemes to the Planning Department, which would then process them in some appropriate manner. This approach, in fact, was tried initially in Andhra Pradesh (for preparing the Second Plan) but did not seem to have been successful enough to be continued.

The extent to which leadership can deviate in defining and transforming doctrine is largely determined by the environment.[22] Innovation has to be confined to the prescribed and permitted limits of values and norms of the dominant groups affected by it. Thus in Andhra Pradesh, the Planning Department could not suggest or carry out any measures that involved fundamental structural changes in the bureaucracy even when such changes might have been prerequisite to more successful planning. All its activities had to be confined to changes that did not upset existing values and norms. This put a limit on the

[22] James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment," *American Sociological Rev.* XXIII (1958).

innovative role of the Planning Department.

Programme

Programme refers to actions related to the performance of functions and services constituting the output of the institution. It is the operational counterpart of the doctrine.

The programme of the Planning Departments consisted of taking steps to facilitate the plan effort—co-ordination, review, advice, and liaison. As the degree of emphasis on these functions was different in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, so was the method of achieving them. This is evident from the following table.

Table 3

PROGRAMME OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT AS PERCEIVED BY RESPONDENTS

rogramme	*Andhra Pradesh* (%) *N*=*42*	*Kerala* (%) *N*=*33*
Consolidation of Department Plans	69	82
Processing of Department Plans	60	45
Scrutiny of Department Plans	55	15
Review of Progress	81	73
Helping Departments in Problem-Solving	67	18
Allocation of Resources	40	—
Getting Clearance from the Government of India	40	24
Evaluation of Plan Implementation	40	—
Administration of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics	74	70

It shows that in Andhra Pradesh more respondents identified the Planning Department with the different activities associated with planning than in Kerala. This difference was particularly great with regard to scrutiny, problem-solving, and clearing state plan schemes with the Government of India. This is not only because the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department enjoys more planning functions than its counterpart in Kerala but also because the former was able, through effective communications and other measures (such as co-ordination meetings), to make its activities known to other Departments.

Moreover, the respondents in Andhra Pradesh associated the Planning Department with two functions (allocation and evaluation); no respondent in Kerala mentioned this. It is also to be noted that the Planning Department in Kerala had neither power in the allocation of resources nor had it any evaluation unit.

It was stated in a previous section that the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh had better control over planning than that in Kerala. Because the Andhra Pradesh doctrine envisaged an effective share in state planning, an elaborate programme was required to exercise this increased control effectively. From the beginning, Andhra Pradesh had a strong Planning Department; in addition, the Planning Secretary was the convener of several state-level committees for planning. There is evidence that he influenced both the agenda and the decisions of these groups. Moreover, he took immediate steps to see that these decisions were promptly implemented by the concerned Departments.

In Andhra Pradesh, co-ordination was much more than a collation or consolidation of Department schemes. Although this was not so for a major part of the Second Plan, as the officials of the Planning Department became experienced in planning, they began to exercise detailed scrutiny of Departmental plans to an extent that invited criticism from the concerned Departments. Five outside respondents said that the Planning Department was undertaking scrutiny of Department plans in a manner they (the respondents) did not approve. Interviewees from the Planning Department admitted that, while they did not examine the purely technical aspects of schemes for which they were not competent, they *did* examine all the economic aspects of plans including the pattern of priorities, physical, and financial targets, and consistency with other plans. They further said that economists and statisticians had been appointed to the Planning Department precisely to aid in this work.

The Andhra Pradesh Planning Department also exercised effective control over the allocation of resources among different Departments. Though this was in the domain of the Cabinet, the Planning Secretary had a dominant voice in

apportioning resources. The great influence which he exercised over the senior Ministers of the state Cabinet and his own long experience in planning lent weight to his advice on these matters. The assumption by the Planning Department of effective, if not formal, power over the resource allocation process deprived the Finance Department of one of its major traditional prerogatives and gave the Planning Department some control over plan expenditure.

At the same time, effective measures were taken to see that plan implementation was proceeding according to plan schedules. This was achieved through the monthly, and later bimonthly, Co-ordination Meetings of the Secretaries and Heads of Executive Departments. At these meetings, all departments were required to report their previous month's progress, and if no progress had been made, they had to explain this to the Planning Department. If any department had problems in implementing schemes, it was to get help from Planning. The Planning Departments, on its part, took prompt measures to help the departments concerned. For example, if there was delay in getting clearance of a scheme from the Government of India Planning Commission, or from the state Finance Department, or if the problem involved other agencies inside or outside the state, the Planning Department would address the agency concerned and initiate steps to solve the problem. To help the development departments to formulate plans and prepare progress reports, the Planning Department helped Planning Units and Statistical Cells. To process the raw data received from the Departments and to make them suitable for plan purposes, it assumed control over the Bureau of Economics and Statistics. An evaluation wing in the Planning Department conducted evaluation studies of selected plan schemes to see whether plans were being implemented properly.

In Kerala, the Planning Department's control over state planning was very weak. Its doctrine did not postulate a strong leadership role. For a long time, its co-ordinating function was limited to the collation of Department plans. Respondents, associated with the Planning Department as late as 1960, did not claim that the Department undertook any scrunity of specific schemes during that period. It did process the plans

submitted by other departments and checked them for their internal consistency, conformity with the directives of the Planning Commission, pattern of priorities, and targets. These assessments were mostly quite routine till 1963. The Department did not have any control over allocation or reallocation of funds till the Planning Secretary assumed control over plan budget in 1963.

The review exercised by the Kerala Planning Department was also relatively superficial. The Department would receive progress reports from other Departments and scrutinize them to see that they were on schedule; if they were not, it requested that the concerned Departments achieve the targets or seek help in solving their problems. Of late, review has been made more thorough, but the constituent departments have not yet begun to feel the help of the Planning Department. Only one respondent outside the Department mentioned the latter as having a significant problem-solving role. The Planning Department in this state administers the Bureau of Economics and Statistics.

Resources

By resources are meant physical, human, and technological inputs which the institution needs to realize its goals. In the case of the Planning Departments, resources meant money, personnel, and various technical data received in the form of directives from the Planning Commission, Department plans, progress reports, evaluation reports, statistics, and all non-official data relevant to planning.

The funds of the Planning Department come from the state's revenue budget. The amount is voted by the state Legislature as a matter of course unless the Department wants a larger allocation. In the latter instance, if the amount involved is large, the approval of the Cabinet is sought. But a strong Planning Minister could sanction such requests and secure Cabinet and Legislative approval.

The personnel of the Planning Department come from the bureaucracy—mostly from the pool of generalist administrators and clerks. All senior administrative posts are held by members

of the IAS, and junior hands are recruited by promotion or transfer from other bureaucratic departments in the Secretariat. However, the Departmental leadership could create non-administrative, technical posts and fill them with technical men, if it felt the need for introducing an element of professionalism into the Department. Thus, in Kerala, a Bureau of Economic Studies was established in 1958 as part of the Planning Department to conduct research and advise the government on planning. Its staff consisted of economists. In Andhra Pradesh, an economist was placed in charge of manpower and evaluation sections in 1961. After the reorganization of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department in 1963, the technical branch was staffed by economists and statisticians.

In Andhra Pradesh, the Planning unit started with an Additional Secretary and three sections.[23] A year later, it had a full Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, and six sections. The formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 brought five sections to the Department from the erstwhile Hyderabad State Planning Department. A new post of Deputy Secretary was also created, and in 1961, an evaluation section was added. The Third Plan necessitated further departmental expansion, and four more sections, one Deputy, and one Assistant Secretary were added. After the reorganization of the Department in 1963, the size of the Department was further increased. When this study was conducted, it had a Secretary, a Joint Secretary, two Deputy Secretaries, two Assistant Secretaries, one Director, five Deputy Directors (of which two posts were vacant), one Assistant Director, and fifteen sections.

Routine expenditure of the Department do not require the Finance Department's approval but new expenditure does, as, for instance, the salaries for additional staff. This approval must be obtained before the demand is included in the budget proposal. There have been at least two occasions when the

[23] Generally, a section consists of a Section Officer (called Superintendent in Kerala), 2 or 3 clerks and a typist. In Andhra Pradesh, up to 1963, it is difficult to specify the exact number of sections in the Planning Department because some sections were also engaged in work relating to the Development wing, under the Planning Department until that year.

Finance Department raised objections to the Planning Department's request for more funds, namely for the expansion of the staff of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics and for the establishment of a Regional Transport Survey. In both cases, the Planning Secretary was able to get the objections overruled at the Cabinet level. Generally, the Planning Department does not have any difficulty in getting the required financial resources. The phenomenal growth of the Planning Department over the last decade raised the budget of the Department considerably.

In Kerala, the Planning unit started out with a Deputy Secretary and one section. A year later, one more section was added. In 1955, there were an Additional Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, and three sections. In 1956, on the formation of Kerala state, an Assistant Secretary and another section were added. The creation of the Bureau of Economic Studies in 1958 added a Director and a small staff to the Planning Department. Finally, when the preparation of the Fourth Plan necessitated more staff, one more section was established. At the time of this study, the staff consisted of an Additional Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, and five sections. The Additional and Deputy Secretaries were not full-time officers of the Planning Department. The former had some functions in the Finance Department, while both he and the Deputy Secretary were also in charge of the Store Purchase Department.

As in Andhra Pradesh, the Kerala Department does not need the Finance Department's approval for routine expenditure. The Department's demand for additional funds at different times have been insignificant. One exception occurred when the Bureau of Economic Studies was established. Since this request was made by the Chief Minister himself, there was no room for objection from the Finance Department. There was no instance when the Additional or even the Chief Secretary took initiative for any significant expansion of the Department. Hence, the Finance Department had had no occasion to interfere in the Planning Department's expansion.

There is a real limitation on resources at the technical input level where the Planning Department has to use data supplied by the respective development departments. The plans

formulated by these Departments are not always well conceived nor are their details worked out carefully. Their progress reports are in many respects incomplete.[24] Officials of the Planning and Finance Departments in both states have generally agreed that Departmental plans reach them in half-finished form and that persons in charge of preparing them do not give their best attention to the formulation of schemes and the preparation of progress reports. Since the Planning Departments are not expert bodies, they are not qualified to scrutinize schemes or judge their feasibility on purely technical grounds. For example, they could not go into the technical details of a scheme prepared, say, by the Public Works or Public Health Department as this would require substantial knowledge of engineering or medicine. The economists and statisticians of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department could examine only the comparative merit of different schemes and their feasibility in the context of objectives, priorities, and fundings of the state plan. The Planning Departments in both states attempted to overcome this difficulty by encouraging the development departments to create planning units. But because these planning units are manned by the regular staff of the Departments and not by experts, the quality of Planning has not improved.

Internal Structure

An important feature of the Planning Departments in the two states is that they form integral parts of the state bureaucracies. In Andhra Pradesh, the Department started as a unit of the Chief Secretariat, while in Kerala, it was first located in the Industries Department and later transferred to the Chief Secretariat. Though the first head of the Planning Unit in Andhra Pradesh was a professional economist, his appointment was purely *ad hoc*; no attempt was made to fill the position similarly when he left. His successors have all been members of the

[24] A close look at the tables of the Annual Progress Reports of the Five Year Plans, published by the Planning Department in the two states, reveals that many columns are left blank for want of data in spite of the fact that these reports are prepared and published several months after the year under review is over.

bureaucracy. From the beginning, the Kerala Planning Department was under officials from the regular administrative staff.

The organization of the Planning Departments also follows the general bureaucratic pattern. At the top is a Minister for Planning. Under him is a Planning Secretary who acts as the Minister's adviser in policy-making and administration. The Secretary is assisted by Deputy and Assistant Secretaries and clerical staff. While the Deputy Secretary shares some aspects of decision-making with the Secretary, Assistant Secretaries and clerks facilitate the collection and processing of the relevant information for these decisions. On all important matters, the Secretary issues orders after getting the approval of his Minister, who is generally expected to follow the former's advice. The Secretary's orders are communicated to the different levels through the Assistant Secretary and the Section Officers.

From 1956, in the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department, there was a change in the communication pattern though not in the control mechanism. The change was introduced by the third Secretary who held periodic staff meetings during which he discussed the problems of the Department. These meetings helped the Secretary to communicate the doctrine and programme of the Department to his subordinates. Five respondents of the Planning Department, who were in the Department for over six years (two were officials at the middle level and three at the lower level), told us that these meetings helped a lot in speeding up work in the Department. They also felt that staff members of the Department felt free to bring any problem to the meeting because of the patience and prompt action of the Secretary. The meetings thus served to communicate ideas and problems among different layers of the Department. Through these meetings, the Planning Secretary was able to create a team spirit and a feeling of participation in the Department's activities among his staff. They also greatly aided in building an organizational identity, that is, in "transforming men and groups from neutral technical units into participants who have a peculiar stamp, sensitivity and commitment."[25] This is shown by the high degree of consensus and uniformity in the answers of the

[25] Selznick, Leadership, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

Planning Department respondents at the time of interview.

The composition of the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh underwent considerable change when it was reorganized in 1963. As a result of reorganization, the character of the Department changed from a purely administrative to an administrative technical structure with both administrative and technical personnel. Its activities now include both administration and research. Its technical staff advises the Secretaries and assists the Department in processing the large volume of technical data that emanate from the Development Departments. There is some sharing of authority between administrative and technical staff at the top level.

In Kerala, the hierarchy consisted of the Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary, the Additional Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, and five sections. Control across the line is exercised by the Additional Secretary who has virtual authority over the Department; the Chief Secretary acts in inter-departmental matters only. There has been no change in the Department's structure except for a brief three-year interlude (1958-61) when the Bureau of Economic Studies functioned as part of the Department. This Bureau started as a wing of the Planning Department, enjoying secretariat status (a policy-making role). But in 1961 it was separated from the Planning Secretariat and converted into an executive (policy-implementing) agency. Of late, communication has been improved by regular staff meetings, attended by the top officials of the Bureau. This helps to mitigate some of the disadvantages of the Bureau's subordination to the Planning Department.

Though internal structure follows the traditional pattern with a single line of command, the composition and role distribution of its personnel are largely determined by leadership. The Andhra Pradesh Planning Department illustrates this point. Its Planning Department consists of a number of technical men; in this respect it is different not only from that of Kerala but from the rest of the bureaucracy in Andhra Pradesh itself. It has laid the foundation for the development of a strong technically-oriented planning body.

Table 4 shows the composition of personnel at different levels in the Planning Departments of Andhra Pradesh and

Kerala. The Andhra Pradesh Department has nearly three times the staff of that of Kerala, of which more than one-fourth being professional men. This large professional staff enabled the

Table 4

COMPOSITION OF PERSONNEL OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENTS IN ANDHRA PRADESH AND KERALA

Category		*Andhra Pradesh*	*Kerala*
Administrative			
Top Level		4	2
Middle Level		2	1
Lower Level		40	20
Technical			
Top Level		1	0
Middle Level		6	0
Lower Level		11	0
	Total	64	23
Technical Staff as per cent of Total		28	0

Note:— Administrative personnel include all officials who are generalists and could be assigned to any department in the Secretariat organization. An explanation of the different levels of administrative staff is given in Appendix A, footnote 8.

Technical personnel are those who hold a university degree, generally an M. A. in economics or statistics and are recruited because of their specialization. The hierarchy consists of the Director at the top, the Deputy and Assistant Directors in the middle, and Research Officers, Statistical Assistants, and Investigators at the lower level.

Andhra Pradesh Department to acquire a fairly high degree of control over state planning. The Kerala Planning Department, with its small staff of generalists, could not achieve this.

Internal structure is, of course, affected not only by leadership but by doctrine and progiamme of the organization. The nature of the organizational mission influences internal structure. An organization, engaged in repetitive types of functions, as a matter of routine could achieve efficiency through a

bureaucratic model of operation.[26] But a non-routine task where functions are not uniform requires more flexible machinery.[27] Planning is a non-routine task. It emphasizes the need to think ahead, to explore alternatives, to take risks, and to act swiftly for it involves making decisions which have no precedents, and whose consequences cannot be predictable accurately. The emphasis on speed means by-passing many rules and procedures of the established bureaucracy and using informal channels of communication as well as the formal ones. Thus, the Planning Department needed a structure, different from the pattern that existed in the other bureaucratic departments.

Because the doctrine of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department called for action in planning, a comprehensive programme was needed to achieve Departmental goals. The programme, in turn, called for changes in the composition of personnel since many activities of the Planning Department required technical men to carry them out. The employment of technical men contributed to both efficiency and legitimacy of the Department's programme.[28] It also necessitated some sharing of power between administrative and technical personnel, thus changing the character of the Department's control system. Of course, the full problem cannot be solved simply by including technical experts among general administrators. For, it must be determined which specific tasks are purely technical, which technical-administrative, and which need to be handled

[26] Even here, changes in technique require change in both hierarchical structure and centre of decision-making. Janowitz reports that even in the army, the prototype of hierarchical structure, the requirements, of modern warfare, and its complex technology have reduced hierarchical domination of lower levels and increased delegation of responsibility to them. See Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment," *Administrative Science Quart.*, III (1958-59), pp. 473-93.

[27] On this point, see several studies on treatment-oriental mental hospitals and correctional schools, see especially, Humburg, *op. cit.*

[28] One of the tasks of leadership is to obtain legitimacy for the organization's activities, especially in the case of goals which are new and not fully accepted by the environment. See Burton Clark, *op cit.*, Charles Perrow, "Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," *American Sociological Rev.*, XXVI (1961), pp. 854-66.

precisely by administrators of considerable experience.

Again, planning placed great emphasis on speed and promptness in action. This called for a change in the communication pattern and the co-operation of employees at all levels to achieve goals on time. A more collegial model of work, different from the hierarchical pattern of super-and sub-ordination characteristic of traditional bureaucracies, needed to be adopted. The staff meetings in the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department were partly suggested by this need.

This does not mean that these were necessitated by the nature of the doctrine because at least some of the changes (staff meetings, emphasis on promptness, and personal involvement) seeemed attributable more to personal attitudes of the leadership towards work than to specific planning needs. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the implementation of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department doctrine would not have been effective without these structural changes, whatever the motive of leadership might have been.

In Kerala, because the doctrine of the Planning Department did not envisage an active share in state planning for a long time, the Department did not have to deviate from its original routine functions during this period. Even when a research wing was added to the Department in 1958, its subsequent development, ending with its reduction in status, shows that the Planning Department did not feel the need for a technical wing because of the Department's modest planning responsibilities. Hence, there was no basic need to alter the structure of the Kerala Planning Department until 1963 when a new Planning Secretary assumed charge and initiated a programme of revitalizing the Department. His control over plan finances has been mentioned. He also pressed the Bureau of Economics and Statistics into the service of state planning and used it increasingly as a technical wing of the Department. The Bureau prepared 47 Working Papers on the different aspects of the state economy to serve as guidelines for the departments in formulating the Draft Fourth Five Year Plan.

We may now summarize the salient features of the Planning Departments in the two states. They were originally established as planning units attached to the bureaucracy. Subsequently,

they were raised to independent Departments of the government. Over time, the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh developed into a full-fledged Department, almost tripling its staff during the last decade. It also expanded considerably in terms of functions. In Kerala, the Planning Department did not show any appreciable growth in either size or functions over this period even though during the last three years (1963-66) there have been a change for the better. An analysis of the working of the two Departments showed that their success largely depended on the quality of the leadership and the degree of the leadership's involvement in the organization's activities. Leadership has been the most critical factor in the organization of the Planning Departments. The difference in the quality of the leadership explains how, in Andhra Pradesh, the Department became relatively strong and powerful, while in Kerala its growth has been haphazard. A strong relationship among leadership and other variables in the system also exists. Thus, a strong leader could redefine and even transform the doctrine of the agency to suit his personal ideas and objectives, while a weak leader would allow it to drift according to pressures exerted by other departments. This flexibility was due to lack of specificity of the doctrine. We also found strong relationship between doctrine and other variables—programes resources, and internal structure. These relations are reciprocal and influence each other. Leadership and doctrine, however, set a limit to these as they set a limit to each other.

Furthermore, the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department incorporated many non-bureaucratic elements in its structure to handle the planning task more effectively.

Chapter Four

Linkages

THE institution-building model views the various transactions of an innovative organization from four vantage points. In this manner, four categories of linkages are defined as those which are enabling, functional, normative, and diffused. In this chapter, we shall examine these linkages with respect to the organization and development of the two Planning Departments. The enabling and functional linkages have been found most important in the creation and growth of the Planning Departments, the former for securing authority and legitimacy, the latter for ensuring the acquisition of needed inputs and disposing of outputs. The normative and diffused linkages have played only a secondary role in the growth of the Planning Departments.

The Enabling Linkages

Table 5 shows the different units of the enabling linkages as seen by the respondents of the Planning Departments of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. The table indicates general agreement among respondents in both states about the role of the Planning Commission, the state Cabinet, and the state Legislature in lending authority and legitimacy to the Planning Departments. In Andhra Pradesh, several respondents mentioned the state Governor's role as an enabling factor. These respondents, however, are officials associated with the Planning Department in its earliest stages when the Governor was, in fact, an active element in both planning and administration of the state.

The Planning Commission is a common factor to both states and provides the main source of legitimacy to the state Planning Departments. The Planning Commission has accepted the Planning Departments as its agents in communi-

cating instructions to the state development departments and in collecting and transmitting the data it needs from the states. In fact, the original function of the Kerala (then Travancore-Cochin) Planning Department was to collect progress reports from the state departments and transmit these to the Planning Commission. The Planning Commission now accepts the Planning Departments as co-ordinating agencies of planning at the state level. It has empowered the Planning Departments to approve or divert funds from one major activity to another, subject only to confirmation. In reviewing plan implementation progress, the Planning Commission has placed increased reliance on the state Planning Departments since the Commission has neither the required staff nor full knowledge of local conditions to allow for detailed study of each scheme.

Table 5

THE ENABLING LINKAGES OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENTS

	Andhra Pradesh (*Per cent*) *N=19*	*Kerala* (*Per cent*) *N=11*
Planning Commission	84	73
State Governor	32	0
State Cabinet/Cabinet Sub-Committee	79	82
State Legislature	58	64

The Planning Commission, however, does not exercise any direct control over the Planning Departments nor has it shown any considerable interest in strengthening them. There has been one exception to this. In 1962, the Deputy Chairman of the Commission requested that all states establish Planning Boards along the lines of the Planning Commission. However, the Commission did not follow this up and after some time, the proposal was allowed to rest. Only the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department took advantage of this proposal to strengthen itself. This resulted in the reorganization of 1963.

The Planning Commission has neither the actual authority to seek to strengthen the state Planning Departments nor does it engage in the political effort this would require. The state

Departments, however, have invoked the image of the Commission to legitimatize their actions and claims to expand their area of operation. On a small scale, the state Planning Departments perform some of the roles of the Planning Commission. They act as advisers on planning to other state departments and suggest strategies to be followed by these departments. In Andhra Pradesh, the Department has further expanded its authority over allocation of resources, detailed scrutiny of plan schemes and progress reports, evaluation, and other research activities. These functions have been claimed and legitimatized by the Department on the grounds that similar powers are exercised by the Planning Commission.

The Governor is a constitutional head of the state and not actually expected to play any active role in government. The first Governor of Andhra Pradesh was an exception. For most of his tenure (1953-57), he was the *de facto* ruler of the state and took a keen interest in development activities. At one point, when he ruled as the President's representative, he expressed a desire to directly run the Development Department. He frequently visited the Community Project areas to check on their progress and constantly urged his officers to take a personal interest in their work. Those who lagged behind were taken to task by him. In one of the notes adddressed to them, he wrote: "Real administrative improvement is not merely a matter of compliance with rules or observance of formalities; it is, in essence, a question of zeal, alertness, progressive outlook, intense supervision, personal attention, constant review, maintenance of the highest standards of integrity and also professional competence, a crusade against delays, insistence on real action-mindedness, a fight against indecision and procrastination, the development of a habit of co-ordination and systematic thinking and, of course, justice, firmness and impartiality combined with a great measure of humanity and spirit of service. Work, hard work and continuous work is of course implicit in all these."[1]

When the post of the Planning Secretary became vacant in November 1955, he appointed to that post a man of proven com-

[1] Indian Institute of Public Administration, "Development and Administration in Planning in India," *Lecture Seminars* (New Delhi, 1961), pp. 185-86 (mimeographed).

petence, and thus put the state Planning Department on a firm footing. The Governor also played a significant part in constituting a number of high-level planning committees—the Cabinet Sub-Committee for Planning, the State Planning and Development Committee, and the Co-ordination Committee. Of these, the Co-ordination Committee was mostly his own idea, and, in the hands of a dynamic Planning Secretary, it soon became the most powerful instrument for plan co-ordination and implementation.

In this instance, the Governor is an exception. There is no other instance, during the 14 years covered by this study, of a Governor playing any major role in planning. His role was made possible by a combination of circumstances which prevailed during the early stages of the state. The same Governor found it increasingly difficult to continue his active role later on.

The Governors of Kerala, as a rule, were constitutional heads, and their role in planning was quite insignificant. Though Cabinet instability and brief periods of Presidential rule gave the Governor of Kerala opportunities to dominate the government, this was generally not the case. On one occasion, the Adviser to the Governor, who was in office for over one year, acted as the real executive and launched a number of development projects. He designated the Additional Planning Secretary as Additional Planning Commissioner to supervise the implementation of these schemes, but the arrangement was discontinued with his departure from office.

As a steady source of authority and legitimacy, the state Cabinet is the most important of the enabling units of the Planning Department. The Cabinet is the *de facto* executive of the state. In Andhra Pradesh, the state Cabinet showed a great deal of interest in the Planning Department. The Governor's initiative had given the Department the advantage of an early start, and the Cabinet support enabled it to continue its momentum of growth. The first Cabinet brought in an economist to take care of planning. In 1955, the Cabinet constituted a Sub-Committee for planning from within its own ranks. It consisted of the Chief Minister, the Deputy Chief Minister, the Ministers for Planning and Finance and the Planning Secretary, who, as was pointed out earlier, acted as convener. The relationship between the Planning Secretary and the Cabinet was also

very cordial. The former was taken into confidence on all matters relating to planning and served as the Cabinet's informal adviser on the plans. The Cabinet's preference for this man is shown by the fact that his term was extended after superannuation and his name recommended to the President of India for a distinguished service award.[2] That the Secretary was allowed to hold the same post for nearly a decade shows the Cabinet's interest in the Department as much as its confidence in the ability of its particular leader. Some of the interviewees stated that the Cabinet never turned down any proposal in which the Planning Secretary had shown a pronounced interest. According to the Planning Secretary, he never had any problem with any of the state Cabinets.

In Kerala, the relationship between the Cabinet and the Planning Department was different. There was no Cabinet Sub-Committee for planning except for a brief two-year period (1961-1963). The Chief Minister also served as the Minister for Planning, thus blurring the distinction between his role as head of the Cabinet and leader of the Planning Department. But for this study's purposes, these two roles can be kept separate.

The Cabinets used planning more as a protective ideology for their power-oriented activities than as an actual tool of socio-economic development. The Cabinet members were not hostile to planning, but circumstances made an effective planning effort exceptionally difficult. Frequent changes of Cabinet ruled out any long-term policy in administration or planning. Each Cabinet sought to do something before it lost power; its action, however, had to be oriented towards satisfying the interest groups, powerful both inside the Cabinet and outside. During this relatively short period, each Cabinet attempted to undertake activities with a direct and immediate appeal to the electorate. As a result, there was a strong tendency to emphasize short-range social welfare over long-range development activities. Thus, in education, about 25-30 per cent more schools were sanctioned above the target for education fixed for the state by the Planning Commission. In the field of communication, the original outlay of Rs. 90 million for the Third Five Year Plan

[2] He was actually awarded the title of "Padma Shri" in 1962 by the President of India.

has risen to Rs. 200 million. Needless to say, these are at the expense of other schemes. Many irrigation projects were taken up simultaneously to satisfy regional interests without thought to priority or availability of resources. Many of them will remain incomplete at the end of the Third Plan, and their carry-over to the Fourth Plan will result in the use of all the Fourth Plan allotment for irrigation to complete them. Thus, many projects which should have been included in the Fourth Plan will have to be postponed. For example, one respondent said, "The state Electricity Board is going ahead with the construction of a hydroelectric project. This is actually a multi-purpose project and will release 1,400 cusecs of water for irrigation. But we are unable to squeeze an irrigation project in our Departmental plan for want of money."[3]

The main consideration in these policies was not long-term economic or social planning but the satisfaction of interest-group pressures. Planning has thus become a protective ideology for carrying out and legitimatizing these activities.

The relationship between the Cabinet and the Planning Department was at best ambivalent. Elsewhere the attitude of the Chief Ministers towards the Planning Department has been described; their attitude was shared by the whole Cabinet. Perhaps the Cabinet's suspicion of the bureaucracy extended to the Planning Department as well, and the Cabinets in Kerala did not want a strong Planning Department that would undermine their freedom in planning.

In Andhra Pradesh, the role of the Legislature in planning has been marginal. Theoretically, the Legislature is sovereign; no money can be spent on any plan without its approval. On account of the growth of the party system, the ruling party in the Legislature is bound by party discipline to support any measure introduced by the Cabinet. Since the Cabinet would have incorporated all major suggestions of the party in the plan, only minor amendments to the plan are made in the Legislature. However, the Opposition parties get an opportunity to criticize the plan at this stage. Yet, leading members of the Opposition parties would have already offered their criticism in the State

[3] Some of these imbalances were subsequently reduced between 1963-66.

(Planning) Advisory Committee, and much of the discussion in the Legislature is therefore aimed at the electorate. In the case of the Annual Plans, into which each Five Year Plan is broken up for inclusion in the annual state budget, the Legislature has an opportunity to discuss the plans only after they have become part of the state budget request. This is due to the time relation between the formulation of the plan and the scheduling of the meetings of the Legislature.

The fiscal year extends from April to March. In September of the previous year, the Development Departments are asked to prepare their plan proposals for the coming fiscal year. In November, the Department budget proposals are co-ordinated by the Planning Department and sent to the Planning Commission for approval. In December-January, the Planning Commission discusses the Annual Plan with the state representatives. The plan is then sent back to the different Departments for the revision specified by the Planning Commission. This is hastily done because, about this time, the Department plans are due at the Finance Secretariat for inclusion in the state budget to be presented to the Legislature in March. Thus the time relation between the formulation of the Annual Plan and the meeting of the Legislature does not give the latter an opportunity to review the plan before the time the budget is discussed.

In Kerala, the Legislature has been more than an approving body. The ruling parties never had a comfortable majority in the Legislature, and party discipline was not always strong. As a result, the Legislature's approval of the plans presented by the Cabinet did not follow as a matter of course. However, the criticisms in the Legislature were more often directed towards the Planning Commission rather than the plan itself. All political parties in the state agreed that the state's claims were not properly recognized by the Government of India and that the amount allotted for the state plan was insufficient. However, as the state was under the President's rule when the Second Plan was drafted, there was no Legislature during that period. The same position continued when this study was conducted, so the preparation of the Fourth Plan will also miss the Legislature's criticism.

Thus the most important element among the enabling linkages has been the Cabinet. Its attitude towards planning has

largely decided the shape and destiny of the Planning Department. Because of the marginal character of the Planning Department and the absence of a power base of its own, the Planning Department required strong support from the enabling units not only for its growth but even for its survival. In Andhra Pradesh, this support was forthcoming in full measure, helping the Planning Department to progress with its expansion programme. In Kerala, the Cabinet never bestowed its best attention to planning but used it more as a device for maintainining the governmetal power distribution than for socio-economic development. Moreover, it was not very enthusiastic about the Planning Department. As a result, the latter had to follow a cautious and conservative policy and was confined to pattern-maintenance rather than goal-achievement activities.

Functional Linkages

The Planning Departments functioned as administrative departments of the state Government with the development departments as their constituents. Since both the formulation and implementation of the plans were the responsibility of the development departments, the success of the Planning Departments lay in seeing that these departments carried out their new assignments promptly. But the development departments found it difficult, if not impossible, to cope with the demands of planning. In both Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, the bureaucracy's attitude towards planning showed striking similarities. This is attributable to the similarities in the characteristics of the bureaucratic personnel in both states which is caused by the adoption of uniform rules for recruitment to, and promotion in, public service. Moreover, 63 per cent of our respondents from the development Departments belonged to the All-India Services, and this has contributed to homogeneity of interests and outlook.[4]

[4] We found that in educational background, age, and length of service, the bureaucracy in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala showed no significant difference. For instance, the median age of the respondents in Andhra Pradesh was 46, that of Kerala 45.

[5] Identity of responses to questions could be also due to similarity in the tasks performed and problems faced. See Landsberger, *op. cit.*

Hence we found basically identical responses to many questions[5] (especially questions 14, 16, 21 and 22; see Appendix B) and similar behaviouristic norms in the personnel of both the Andhra Pradesh and Kerala bureaucracies. When differences were observed, they were found to be the result of the varying roles of the two Planning Departments. Where the Planning Department was able to pursue its goals vigorously, the bureaucracy was compelled to change some of its old behaviour. This happened in Andhra Pradesh. There, the Planning Department took several measures to foster the new planning norms and values among its constituent departments.

Where planning was treated as a routine function, as in Kerala, the development departments did not feel the need to change their old ways, except marginally. In general, neither state's bureaucracy showed any tendency to adjust itself voluntarily to the needs of a planned era. On the contrary, the introduction of planning created tension between the Planning Department, which had the primary responsibility for introducing the new values, and the development departments which were to incorporate these new values in their behaviour.

The tension level was related to the Planning Departments' degree of enforcement of the new doctrine and programme and also to the maximum deviation from established values permitted by the environment, especially by the enabling and functional units.[6] Moreover, the intensity of the conflict was considerably lessened by the fact that, as members of the bureaucracy the personnel of both the Planning and development departments shared common traditions and values. Hence the Planning Department sympathized with many of the bureaucracy's problems. Further, the inter-departmental transferability of personnel gave an impersonal character to many of the issues that caused tension. Conflict can occur only when individuals have deep personal involvement in their Departments. Such an attitude is considered dysfunctional in a bureaucracy, and very few individuals of this type were encountered in this study.[7]

[6] See Philip Selznick, "Dilemmas of Leadership and Doctrine" in *Studies in Leadership, ed.*, A. W. Gouldner (New York, 1950), pp. 560-91. See also his TVA, *op. cit.*

[7] The best example of this type of individual is the third Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department.

Nevertheless, conflict was unavoidable because of the incompatibility of many bureaucratic structures with planning requirements. There were two major occasions for tension between the Planning and development departments. One was over co-ordination and the other, over review.

Co-ordination involved checking plan proposals and component schemes to verify whether they were actually schemes as defined by the Planning Commission, and whether they were drafted in accordance with the instructions issued for that purpose. The development departments were expected and instructed to prepare schemes in standard form, stating the central aims of the plan, existing state of affairs and expected targets, monetary outlay in terms of capital and revenue, material requirements both in its domestic and foreign components, employment potential, phasing of the plan year by year, and so on. The departments were also required to arrange the different schemes in order of priorities. This meant a drastic change from the past when schemes were prepared in a haphazard manner without much consideration for priorities, long-term effects, and inter-dependencies.[8] The review process implied periodic progress reporting during plan implementation to the Planning Department, which determined whether progress was keeping pace with original schedules. Progress reporting, therefore, placed the departments under constant pressure to keep to schedules and to achieve the physical and financial targets fixed by the plan.

Both co-ordination and review called for a new set of behaviour on the part of the bureaucratic personnel who had internalized the values and norms and adjusted to the needs of a colonial administration. This meant breaking from the past rhythm of work to a new one emphasizing frugality and efficiency in spending and speed and promptness in decision-making and decision-implementation.

Here, the Planning Departments had to face two major problems: defective planning and delay. Defective planning was characterized by plan formulation without due regard to priorities, resources, feasibility and cost-benefit analysis. Usually, the Planning Commission fixed targets for each sector, and the

[8] The only exception has been the Public Works Department (PWD) but even the PWD was deficient in many ways.

were either postponed or dropped.[12]

Because of defective estimates, costs and targets were seldom worked out correctly; therefore, achievements in many cases had no relation to original estimates. The Progress Reports of the Five Year Plans illustrate this point.[13]

Here are several cases of the mode of implementation's defeating the purpose of the plan:

1) In Andhra Pradesh, a duck extension scheme involving Rs. 2,00,000 was initiated because the Government of India offered a subsidy. The objective was to raise an exotic variety of duckling and upgrade the local stock by cross-breeding. Of the three centres planned, two were started in 1959. An amount was allocated for cold storage hiring charges without first seeing if such facilities were available anywhere near the centres. A mammoth incubator with 2500 capacity was ordered for one of the centres while the maximum expected laying strength was only 100 eggs. After the buildings had been erected

[12] Government of Kerala, *Third Five Year Plan: First Year's Progress Report* (Trivandrum, 1965), pp. 28-148. Our inference is supported by an earlier study conducted by the state Bureau of Economic Studies (a wing of the Planning Department). "In view of the very poor implementation of Animal Husbandry plan schemes, we have attempted to find out whether there are any special circumstances that account for it. We have, however, failed to find any such explanation . . . It will be noticed that a very large number of schemes have not even been started yet, many of them have been dropped altogether. This arises from the defective method of planning taken recourse to at present whereby schemes are included in the plan without thorough scrutiny . . . .This defective method, however, obtains in all Departments." Government of Kerala, *A Critical Note on the Achievements for the First Three Years of the Second Five Year Plan* (Trivandrum, 1960), p. 17.

[13] See especially Andhra Pradesh, *Third Five Year Plan, Review of Progress*, 1961-1962, *op. cit.* and Kerala, *Third Five Year Plan, First Year's Progress Report, op. cit.* There is a grave defect in depending on published progress reports. Routine progress reporting does not, in all cases, show the correct physical and financial achievements. For instance. in the case of setting up an industrial unit, machinery might have been purchased, but the building site might not have been acquired or personnel might not have been appointed. Here, expenditure will show much progress, especially if machinery forms a large proportion of total expenditure. Or, the unit might have been completed but water or electricity connections would not have been provided, so it remains idle. Here, physical targets will show hundred per cent achievement.

and equipment purchased, it was found that this particular breed of duck was not available anywhere in the country except in numbers too small to run even one centre efficiently. To solve this problem, the officials-in-charge of the centres bought the local breed which were multiplied and distributed among the people, even though the specific objective of the scheme was to discourage the spread of the local breed. A related problem arose—the eggs could not be disposed of because of lack of demand by the local market. These problems were still unsolved when a third centre was opened in 1962.[14]

2) Again in Andhra Pradesh, a Beggar Home was started because it could be sponsored and financed by the Government of India; but the officials could not get any beggars to rehabilitate. Therefore, they rounded up some ticketless travellers from the nearby railway station to be in the Home. Naturally, the beggars slipped away one after another.[15]

3) Some welfare schemes for the backward classes, initiated in Andhra Pradesh during the Second Plan, were found to be totally unrealistic to the needs of the beneficiaries. The Development Commissioner asked the Director of Harijan Walfare to visit the area and ascertain the needs of the people before formulating further schemes.

4) A housing scheme was started in Kerala during the Second Plan without first determining the needs and preferences of the potential tenants. As a result, houses were built but remained unoccupied because nobody wanted to live in them.[16]

5) One of the objectives of the Five Year Plans was to strengthen the co-operative movement with a view to bringing small producers within its fold and thus protect them from exploitation by middlemen and big producers. Accordingly, schemes for establishing primary co-operative societies in the coir industry were prepared and implemented in Kerala. A survey of these societies revealed that more than 12 per cent of the society members had no relation to the coir industry whatsoever

[14] Government of Andhra Pradesh, Planning Department, *Report on the Working of the Duck Extension Centres* (Hyderabad, 1965).

[15] Government of Andhra Pradesh, Planning Department, *Report on the Working of the Beggar Home at Hanamkonda* (Hyderabad, 1965).

[16] Government of Kerala, *Second Five Year Plan, A Critical Note*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

and another 10 per cent consisted of middlemen, business men, and factory owners. These two groups together formed such a decisive force in these societies that the societies became instruments of those very interests against whom its members needed protection. The small producers were uninterested in becoming members of societies not planned to suit to their particular needs and problems. And since the programmes had to be continued and progress reported on time, the authorities persuaded whomever they could to accept membership in these societies.[17]

These cases are not necessarily typical; they are relatively unimportant schemes, involving small amounts of money. But in the absence of studies treating larger schemes, this information must suffice. However, there is little doubt that the bureaucracy's attitude towards the drafting and implementation of bigger schemes was the same as that towards the smaller ones. It is representative of a tendency, widespread in the bureaucracy. These schemes show they were formulated by individuals who not only did not understand the problems they were called upon to solve but did not very much care to understand them.

Defective planning was ascribed by interviewees to three main problems: (1) Lack of statistical data for preparing estimates, (2) inexperience of departmental personnel in planning work, and (3) indifference or carelessness of officials in working out the scheme details. The third aspect was particularly emphasized by some of the Planning and Finance Department respondents and by a number of non-official persons.

Both Planning Departments attempted to correct the first defect by bringing the Statistics Department under control and expanding its area of activity to enable it to improve the quality and quantity of the data collected. To prepare the Fourth Five Year Plan, the Planning Departments in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala issued working papers on the major aspects of the state economy, that gave the Departments guidelines. In addition, the Planning Departments helped their constituents organize Planning Units. In Andhra Pradesh, Statistical Cells were also established within Departments at the insistence of the Planning Department. The Planning Departments in this

[17] P. K. Gopalakrishnan, "Thirteen Years of Planning in Kerala: A Critique," *Kerala Labour and Industrial Relations Review*, II, 4 (October, 1964), p. 23.

way helped other Departments prepare their plans more systematically and based on more systematic and accurate data.[18]

Inexperience—the second factor in defective planning—was combated by the Planning Departments by sending the development departments formats for plan preparation. These formats contained basic information to be included in the plan.[19]

The failure of the development departments to prepare properly worked-out plans was a major problem in state planning. While decisions on schemes to be included in the Departmental plans are taken by officials at the top, details are worked out at intermediate levels of the hierarchy. Because of centralization of decision-making power and lack of delegation of authority, officials at the middle level are generally not inclined to take responsibility or initiate innovation.[20] So, to be on the safer side, they accept the blueprints supplied by the Central Ministries and simply fill them with facts and figures. Thus, people who know the local conditions and who could make innovations in drafting the proposals either do not have the authority to do so or else they do not exercise it; people who have authority are so far removed from the field of action that they have little first-hand knowledge of the case at hand. As a result, if plans look theoretically feasible, they are approved. Only when the scheme is implemented are the defects manifested, and then due to the absence of effective feedback, they often remain undetected, not allowing corrective steps to be taken in time.[21]

[18] The Planning Units, attached to each major Department, have not solved the problem because the personnel of these units are not experts but regular Departmental officials.

[19] See Government of Travancore-Cochin, Second Five Year Plan, Code of Instructions, *op. cit.*

[20] Appleby's criticism, made in 1956, is quite relevant today "... The root of India's administrative problem is an insistence on the avoidance of the making of decisions which should be made by others—notably by subordinates. Here, traditional practice is so far in the other direction that there has been a monumental failure to develop in the subordinates, the capacity needed to accept and use delegated responsibility." Paul H. Appleby. *Re-Examination of India's Administrative System with Special Reference to Administration of Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises* (New Delhi, 1959), p. 5.

[21] According to Crozier, a bureaucracy is a system where "the feedback process—error—information—correction—does not function well and where consequently there cannot be any quick readjustment of the programmes of action in view of the errors committed." Crozier: *op. cit.*, p. 187.

The Andhra Pradesh Planning Department attempted to *cope with the problem of defective planning by examining and* evaluating Departmental plans in detail. Sometimes, the Planning Department suggested strategies and even types of schemes to be taken up by the development departments. "We found that in irrigation, all our resources were tied up with a few long-term projects which would yield results only several years later. I suggested that, instead of going for projects with long periods of gestation, they (Public Works Department) should concentrate on quick-maturing schemes. So also, in electricity, we found that a disproportionately large amount of money was being spent on distribution to the neglect of generation of power. I suggested that a balance should be struck between generation and distribution. We are currently making an evaluation study of the electricity schemes undertaken by the state."

While this has compelled the Departments to take a second look at their plans, it has not removed the source of the difficulty. This arises out of lack of motivation on the part of the personnel at the subordinate levels due to incentive lags on the one hand, and the absence of delegated authority and responsibility on the other. These problems were largely beyond the permitted doctrine and programme of the Planning Department and it could not act to remedy the situation.

In Kerala, the Planning Department did not go into detailed scrutiny of Departmental plans and only suggested moderate alterations in them. But such suggestions were seldom accepted by the respective departments. The small size of staff and the weak position of the Planning Department *vis-a-vis* the development departments prevented it from undertaking any detailed scrutiny of the departmental plans. "We know we are not competent to sit in judgment over schemes prepared by experts in other Departments. So, we never tried to question their technical aspects. Our scrutiny was confined to checking whether a scheme was one for which there was a provision in the all-India plan and whether it supplied details required by the Planning Commission. We even accepted the pattern of priorities they made, even though occasionally I used to suggest changes. (Asked what these changes were and how they were received by the concerned Departments, the respondent said

he) ... suggested that the Public Works Department sh concentrate on medium and minor irrigation schemes inste taking up a few major schemes. But my suggestions wer well received. The Chief Engineer wanted big schemes be this would give him bigger staff and plenty of resource empire-building activities. The Minister supports him be big schemes are status symbols for the state. If my suggestion accepted, it would have released plenty of water for irrig and much of the state's food problem would have been so As it is, all the irrigation schemes taken up during the Se Plan are left incomplete and have not resulted in bringing land under irrigation."

Another respondent said, "We used to advise them (c Departments) on minor strategies. Instead of taking up schemes, I suggested that they (the development Departm should complete the spillover projects. In the case of a muni water supply scheme in town (X), I suggested that the bu provision made for another town (Y) should be transferr (X) so that the scheme in (X) could be completed inste both being taken up simultaneously and left incomplete. In case my suggestion was accepted. Generally, they do no our suggestions. We will only present the common sense poi view. Still they do not like to be told."

Recently, the Planning Department's role of scrutiny of proposals has extended its scope. However, at the time o study, this still remains to be legitimatized, and as Ta shows, other Depratments still do not think the Kerala Plan Department scrutinizes plans in detail.

The second major problem which the Planning De ments faced was delay. This took two forms: delay in ge plan proposals and progress reports on time and delay in implementation. Thus at one of the 1957 Co-ordination Mee in Andhra Pradesh, it was pointed out that certain Departr had not sent their proposals for inclusion in the Annual even two months after the last deadline. These schemes due before April. By December 1962, 25 per cent of the de ments had not sent the budget proposals even though the e September had been fixed as the deadline. Three reminder been issued, apart from inviting the personal attention o

Secretaries concerned, but these also failed to evoke response from the delaying departments. Again, in 1962, the Minister for Planning pointed out that, lacking fiscal statements from certain departments, money had not been claimed from the Government of India for the past three years.

Once the Bureau of Economics and Statistics (under the Planning Department) complained that it was not possible for the Bureau to prepare comprehensive and consolidated reviews it was expected to. The requisite information had not been received on time, and the data that had been received were, in several cases, incomplete, several columns in the prescribed statements having been excluded.

In Kerala, no records were readily available from which an idea about delay could be gained. Respondents of the Planning and Finance Departments, however, admitted that such delays were commonplace in government.

Some of the causes for delay were extra-departmental (lack of clearance of projects by the Planning Commission, difficulty in getting machinery and equipment, and foreign exchange), but most of them came from within the state bureaucracies. Table 6 gives an idea of the most common causes of delay.

Table 6

SOURCES OF DELAY AS SEEN BY RESPONDENTS

Source	*Andhra Pradesh (Per cent) N=34*	*Kerala (Per cent) N=27*
Cabinet	9	15
Administrative Department	59	56
Finance Department	82	78
Public Works Department	35	41
Revenue Department	41	44
Store Purchase Department	59	15
Other Miscellaneous (state)	29	37
Central Ministry	24	19
Planning Commission	6	0

The nature of the problem is similar in both states. An interesting feature of the pattern of response (not revealed by

this table) is that most of the Executive Department respondents allowed that their administrative departments were partly responsible for the delay. Some respondents from the Planning and Finance Departments supported this view. Similarly, almost all repondents found the Finance Departments to be a source of delay—except those from the Department itself. In Kerala, there were only a few people who attributed delay to the Store Purchase Department. Since it is under the Planning Department, it is probably more responsive than in Andhra Pradesh where it is a separate department.

The pattern of response obtained can be compared with the data available from documentary sources. In one of the 1958 Co-ordination Meetings in Andhra Pradesh, the following reasons were given for not achieving plan targets on time:

1. non-approval of schemes,
2. late approval of schemes,
3. late appointment of staff,
4. delay in the Central Store Purchase Department,
5. non-availability of equipment,
6. delay in securing suitable sites,
7. import restrictions,
8. want of sanction from Central Ministries,
9. delay in collecting share capital in some co-operative societies,
10. foreign exchange restrictions,
11. paucity of trained staff,
12. delay in construction of buildings, and
13. dearth of suitable candidates for training courses.

In Kerala, the failure to achieve the Second Five Year Plan's original targets was attributed to the following external and internal factors. External factors were:

1. non-avilability of requisite foreign exchange on time,
2. delay at the Central Ministries in clearing schemes, and
3. short supply of essential articles for construct on activities.

The internal causes were:

1. inexperience of officials,
2. uncertainty about available resources,
3. late sanction of schemes,

4. manpower shortage,
5. delay in acquiring land, and
6. lack of co-ordination between administrative and executive departments.[22]

Most of the alleged reasons for delay are the same. The important factor is that the difficulties still persist and have not shown much improvement over time.

An examination of the major causes of delay inside the state is in order. Here, the largest volume of opinion centres around the processing of plans at the Secretariat level, both in the administrative and Finance Departments. (The Finance Department is treated separately.) The present procedure in the administrative departments is slow and circular. A proposal from, say, the Director of Agriculture, does not go directly to the Secretary of Agriculture but rather to the lowest subordinate in his office. The work at this level determines whether the proposal conforms to the existing government policy and whether there are precedents for or against such a step.[23] The proposal along with the notes from the clerk then goes to the Assistant Secretary and from there, to the Deputy Secretary, at which stage, the case can be decided if large additional expenditures or changes of policy are not involved. If there is a question about finances or policy, it should go to the Secretary. The whole process should take several days; if, however, details have to be supplied by the Executive Department, delays can run into weeks. To avoid this delay, the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Reforms Committee suggested that heads of Executive Departments (line agency) should be given the status of Additional Secretaries (staff) so that they could then dispose of the files. In Kerala, the Reforms Committee was against adopting this procedure, but it recommended that the files from heads of Executive Departments be handled by the Secretaries directly instead of allowing them to move down and come up again.[24]

[22] Government of Kerala, Second Five Year Plan, Review of Progress of Schemes, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

[23] There has been criticism that notation made at this level is uninformed and irrelevant. See Government of Andhra Pradesh, *Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee* (Hyderabad, 1960).

[24] For Andhra Pradesh, see *Ibid.*; for Kerala, see Government of Kerala, Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee, *op. cit.*

None of these reforms was accepted by the two states. The only change in this line has been the "jumping of levels".[25] Under the present arrangement, where all decisions are taken by a few individuals at the top, it is difficult for the decision-makers to dispense with clerical assistance. The number of cases they have to handle is so large that it is impossible for them to study or remember detailed facts of any case; they must rely on notes prepared by clerks.

The Planning Departments in the two states partly solved the procedural problem by addressing and getting data directly from the Executive Departments instead of using the "proper channel." In Andhra Pradesh, the Planning Secretary brought all matters of delay to the Co-ordination Meetings which he convened. According to a Planning Department respondent, "It was a good forum for combating delays because nobody wanted his Department to be accused of delay in a meeting attended by his peers." He added, "If we do not get the proposals from the administrative department on time, we will assume that these departments have no comments to make on the proposals and will treat the proposals received directly from their executive departments as final. This sometimes hurt the administrative departments because it involved questions of procedure."

In Kerala, the Planning Department adopted another procedure. "Sometimes we do the scrutiny of the proposals ourselves without waiting for the proposals to come to us from the administrative departments and then we inform them (administrative departments, about our action. In this case, we reverse the procedure. We found that many administrative departments liked it that way (because it saved them the trouble of scrutiny)."

Another major cause of delay—especially at the implementation stage—is the lack of prompt complementary input supply by other Departments. Staff members have to be selected by the Public Service Commission, machinery has to be purchased through the Store Purchase Department, land has to be

[25] Jumping levels means that a file need not go through all the levels in the hierarchy but only through two.

acquired through the Revenue Board, buildings have to be put up by the Public Works Department, and so on.

Lack of timely input supply is chiefly due to the absence of an "administrative *gestalt*" and the different department's lack of perception of a common goal. Thus, the Public Works Department would complete all its buildings on time but might delay constructing buildings needed by other departments. Lack of prompt action is also due to the emphasis on impersonality, rule-observance as opposed to goal-achievement, formal communication lines, absence of a sense of urgency, and lack of a sense of participation in a common endeavour. These also militate against the perception of a common goal.

The Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh vigorously tried through the monthly Co-ordination Meetings to overcome these defects. These meetings cut across many bureaucratic procedures. They brought together officials of several Departments,[26] who learned about the activities of each other's department. Though formal in character, they gave the officials an opportunity to meet with one another and/or to renew old acquaintances, and also impressed upon the different departments the inter-dependence of all governmental activity and the need to integrate departmental goals with the broader governmental goals. The Co-ordination Meetings thus helped to enlarge or broaden, what Guest calls, the bureaucratic participants' "span of cognition".[27]

Also, these meetings created a sense of urgency among the officials. The main theme was the review of plan progress, and the individual departments were required to report the progress achieved during the previous months. The meetings stressed the need to achieve targets on time. The Planning Secretary, as convener, not only prepared the agenda and minutes of these meetings but aggressively followed up their decisions. If a department was having difficulty in implementing a particular decision taken in these meetings, the Planning Secretary offered

[26] These meetings were attended by the Secretaries of all "Development Departments" and the heads of their Executive Departments. Attendance of this body in 1965 averaged about 50 members.

[27] Robert H. Guest, *Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership* (Homewood, 1962), p. 111.

to help solve the problems, so it would have no excuse for non-compliance with the decision. Moreover, their progress had to be reported at the next meeting. The development departments were thus under constant pressure to comply with the time schedules, especially because the Planning Department made it a point to see that they did so.

This emphasis on schedule compelled the departments to adopt measures that would expedite the goal-achievement process. As information was an important element in this process, informal means of communication was used increasingly to supplement the formal channel hitherto relied upon. Personal contact was also widely used to expedite action. Thus, at least in three respects—inter-dependence, sense of urgency, and improved communication—the Co-ordination Meetings attempted to introduce major change in the bureaucratic structure.

In Kerala, there was no machinery comparable to the Andhra Pradesh Co-ordination Meetings. There were periodical meetings of Secretaries to Government, presided over by the Chief Secretary in which the participants could discuss their problems and identify plausible solutions. The Planning Department played no special role in these meetings even though an aggressive Planning Secretary could have had a dominant role. Each major department held its own meetings to discuss its plan progress; the Planning Secretary was invited to these meetings. Again, his role in these departmental meetings was not a dominant one. For a time, the review function was taken from the departments by the State Planning Advisory Board which, through a sub-committee organization, held quarterly reviews. This procedure was discontinued after two years, and the old system of departmental meetings was revived.

Some time in 1962, the Chief Minister of the state convened a meeting of all Secretaries and Heads of Executive Departments to critically assess plan achievement. He wanted to establish such meetings on a regular basis, but the heads of some major departments simply did not attend, sending their deputies instead. No attempt was made to convene the meeting again.

The difference between the system of review in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala was that the Co-ordination Meetings in the former were a powerful instrument in the hands of the Planning

Department through which the departments were encouraged to adhere to time schedules in implementation and promptly remove bottlenecks in implementation. As already stated, each department had to report the action taken on the decision of the previous meeting at the next meeting. Such urgency and compulsion were lacking in Kerala where meetings were held compartmentally. The role of the Planning Department in such meetings was only that of a problem-solving aid; it did not take problems into its own hands and aggressively followed them up. Moreover, since the development departments were not willing to admit that the Planning Department could solve problems that they themselves could not, most often, the departments themselves attempted to solve their own problems without bringing them to the attention of the Planning Department. The fact that the constituent departments did not consider the problem-solving role of the Planning Department important is shown in Table 3. Only 18 per cent of the respondents said that the Planning Department had this role. The following case illustrates this attitude, "An ice plant costing Rs 1,70,000 was installed for a certain department. But for nearly 18 months, it remained idle for want of electric connection. The plant would have remained idle for several more months if the contractor who installed the plant had not pressed for full payment. According to the contract, 50 per cent payment was to be made only after the plant had been commissioned. But the contractor found that the plant was not going to be commissioned in the immediate future for no fault of his. Even at this point, the Planning Department would not have known of this problem but for the fact that the official concerned with the sanction of the amount to the contractor happened to be from the Planning Department; since he was also in charge of the Store Purchase Department."

This is in sharp contrast with the situation in Andhra Pradesh where the Planning Department was not only able to convince the departments of its usefulness to them but could also moderately compel them to seek its help. It may be added that the Co-ordination Meetings served to transfer the new norms of planning to the constituent departments.

The Finance Department. As a unit in the functional area of the Planning Department, the Finance Department enjoys a

unique position. Not only is it the most important unit in the functional area, but it is guided by its own norms and values and staffed by a separate cadre of officials who scrupulously protect these norms and values.[28] Technically, the Planning Department does not depend on the Finance Department in the sense other departments do; it is not a spending department and does not undertake any development activity itself. But its co-ordination and review work brings it face to face with the Finance Department which traditionally has performed these functions. Moreover, as the spokesman of other departments in expediting sanction of schemes, the Planning Department often comes in contact with the Finance Department.

The traditional mentality of the Finance Department has been one of conservatism; it has frowned upon all spending and been suspicious of all demands.[29] This attitude is incompatible with planning, where heavy expenditures are necessary in the expectation of comparatively distant, indirect, and sometimes problematic returns. Thus, the occasions for tension between the Finance and Planning Departments are many. The tension is more acute, not only because the values and norms involved are widely different, but also because the Finance Department is the most powerful department in the Secretariat. In fact, tension existed not only between the Finance and Planning Departments but between the Finance and the development departments (Table 6). This was because the Finance Department exercised its power of financial scrutiny so as to delay or even reject proposals.

[28] For the position of the Finance Department in the states, see Indian Institute of Public Administration Study Group, "The Problem of Financial Control in Bombay State," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration* IV (1958), pp. 435-50. See also, A. Premchand, "Financial Control in Madras State," *Indian Jour. of Public Administration,* IX (1963), pp. 49-63.

[29] An interesting case, reported to the interviewer, of a Finance Secretary in one of the states illustrates the typical mentality of the Finance Department. On the eve of his retirement early in the 1950's, this official told his colleagues how much money he had saved the government during his stewardship of the Finance Department. He used to note in his diary the financial implications of all the proposals he had turned down. On his retirement, he added them up and got a colossal figure. He pointed out that had he sanctioned the proposals, the departments would have just squandered the amounts.

In Andhra Pradesh, because of the emergence of the Planning Department as a strong factor in the formulation of state plans, the Finance Department gradually lost its power to reject particular plan schemes. While the Finance Department could recommend that a particular scheme be postponed or even dropped, the final decision was left to the Planning Department which, together with the concerned departments, decided on schemes to be included in the plan and the order of their priorities. The Planning Department also took over from the Finance Department the function of allocating and reallocating funds for plan schemes.

The Planning Department's assumption of an important power from the Finance Department had a remarkable effect on planning. It freed state planning from the whims of the Finance Department and gave the Planning Department vital control over planning, through the allocation of resources among sectors on a priority basis. The Finance Department's acceptance or rejection of proposals was not based on considerations of priority but on old canons of economy which would not permit priority to many plan schemes with indirect and problematic benefits.

The Finance Department, of course, did not lose all its control over planning. While it could not disapprove of a plan scheme, it could still, at the time of scrutiny, suggest modifications. After the annual budget is passed by the state Legislature, the Finance Department subjects all proposals to a detailed study; at this point, it can, and does, raise objections. There has been a general complaint that the Finance Department applied old canons in processing plan proposals. As a result, most of the objections raised by the Finance Department are said to be "irrelevant and frivolous." The state Administrative Reforms Committee reports that "... the Secretaries to government in charge of administrative departments as well as heads of departments have emphatically expressed the opinion that the existing practice of regarding financial scrutiny of departmental proposals is creating bottlenecks and causing considerable delay in implementation of the schemes of development.... Financial centralization as prevailing at present is bound to be detrimental to the speedy execution of the plan schemes.... It seems

as though 'itemized scrutiny' is given more importance than 'overall economy,' an attitude certainly not sound in principle. The present conception of financial control extends to the examination of even technical details of schemes and work programmes and the raising of objections even though the Finance Secretariat is not fully equipped for the purpose."[30] The same complaint was repeated by many respondents at the time of this study.

The Finance Department raises questions and objections because the proposals may not contain sufficient details on several unclear points. Most departmental plans, in fact, are lacking in detail. At the time schemes are formulated, details are not worked out; token amounts are included for each category of expenditure. The departments work out details after the Legislature has approved the budget. When the Finance Department begins its scrutiny, it therefore finds many discrepancies on which to base its objections. Much time, during which the scheme should be operational, is spent in correspondence.

Actually, both departments are probably equally responsible for this. The demanding departments do not always carefully work out the financial aspects of the plan; they have a tendency to demand more in anticipation of a Finance Department cut. They are not generally careful in drafting proposals because "even if we took care, the Finance Department would still have occasion to find fault with our proposals and so we develop an attitude of carelessness, hoping that if there are defects, the Finance Department will point them out."

To overcome delay in the Finance Secretariat's scrutiny of proposals, the Planning Department used the monthly Co-ordination Meetings where such matters were brought up. Financial Advisers were appointed—one for each major group of departments—to help the development departments draft proposals acceptable to the Finance Department and give them advice on financial matters. However, this arrangement did not work satisfactorily, so at the insistence of the Planning Department, the system of "pre-budget scrutiny" was introduced. According to this arrangement, all schemes are to be scrutinized by the

[30] Government of Andhra Pradesh, Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

Finance Department before they are included in the budget, allowing the schemes to be carried out as soon as the budget is passed.

In Kerala, the position of the Planning Department *vis-a-vis* the Finance Department, was somewhat different. The Finance Department was the most powerful department in the Secretariat (next to the Chief Secretariat). It was headed by powerful Secretaries who were senior in service and enjoyed continuity of office. (There were only two Secretaries in this department after the planning unit was started, and one of them was in office from 1953 to 1961.) The Minister who held the finance portfolio was also next to the Chief Minister in terms of hierarchy and status. The Finance Department had its own planning section from the very beginning of the state planning effort. By contrast, the Planning Department was never a full-fledged department nor did its Secretaries enjoy continuity or particularly high status. During the entire period of the First Plan, planning was only a small unit under the Chief Secretariat. This had no effect on the Finance Department's position as it made no distinction between a plan and a non-plan scheme. The axe of the Finance Department fell heavily on both types of programmes. The problem arose only when planning was separated and put under the charge of an Additional Secretary. The head of the new Planning Department found that the Planning Department could not effectively control planning without the co-operation of the Finance Department. To handle this, he not only suggested but also secured the appointment of a finance man as Deputy Secretary of the Planning Department.

This process of co-optation did not work out to the satisfaction of the Planning Department. An officer from the Finance Department changed his administrative designation but remained loyal to his parent department and therefore performed the same type of work as he had done before. The arrangement was discontinued after five years. Thus, the establishment of the Planning Department did not in any way alter the discretionary ability of the Finance Department in dealing with plan schemes. The Planning Department had little control over the pattern of fund allocation or priority designation. (For the Third Plan, these were decided by the Working Groups, the Study Groups,

and the Co-ordination Committee; for the Draft Fourth Plan, the Programme Advisory Committee was responsible.) The pattern developed for Annual Plans by the Planning Department was altered by the Cabinet, often to accommodate group and local pressures. When reviewing these proposals, the Finance Department continued to approve or disapprove them without much consideration for the priority pattern suggested by planning. Consequently, the whole system of priorities was considerably distorted. As an official of the Planning Department remarked, "The Finance Department could and did dispense with funds in its own way independent of us." In Kerala, fund reallocation was also decided upon by the Finance Department even though the Planning Department's advice was sought. Naturally, the operating, developing departments looked to the Finance, not the Planning, Department, for money.

To circumvent this difficulty and remove state planning from the Finance Department's discretion, the present Planning Additional Secretary suggested that a new liaison with the Finance Department be established at a high level. According to him, "Making the Deputy Secretary of Finance work as Deputy Secretary of the Planning Department did not succeed in visibly changing the thinking of the Finance Department which was not development-oriented. For a number of years, the Planning Department was instrumental in distoring the pattern of priorities. It had to join other departments in fighting for favours from the Finance Department. As a result, the whole power to decide was abdicated to the Finance Department which disposed of funds according to its own prejudices and predilections."

According to the present arrangement, the Additional Planning Secretary also works as Additional Finance Secretary and, in the latter capacity, has full powers of the Finance Secretary over certain sections of finance, including planning. By combining these two roles, he can (1) avoid Finance Department delays in processing proposals already scrutinized by the Planning Department, and (2) ensure against the Finance Department's altering priorities decided upon or approved by the Planning Department.

Normative Linkages

Normative linkages are units which embody and protect norms and values relevant to the doctrine and programme of the institution. Organizations may protect certain norms and values without a direct linkage of the enabling and functional category existing between the institution and the norm-protecting agencies. The presence of these norms and values in other parts of society will be helpfull to the institution because they enhance the process of fostering new values and norms in the environment.

In the case of planning, it was found that the ICS and IAS groups incorporate such protective norms. These groups constitute the elite cadre of the bureaucracy which is a closed community with its own values and norms. The ICS tradition emphasized hard work, promptness, creativity, objectivity, and impartiality. The new IAS has been specially geared to undertake the task of nation-building. Its training emphasizes the new role of the administrator in a democratic, development-oriented nation. Political leadership considers this cadre the bulwark of the administration and has placed its members in key government positions. The ICS and IAS community has been generally positive in its attitude towards planning even though bureaucratic culture has blunted its members' initiative and dynamism. As an important segment of the country's intelligentsia, this group holds generally liberal and modernistic views.[31] Its members have taken initiative in a series of activities associated with planning. In Andhra Pradesh, they were very active in the State Planning and Development Committee which consists of members of this service. In Kerala, this group came into prominence only very recently, as political leadership was generally suspicious of it and avoided it in the early period.

[31] This is illustrated by the recommendations of the Andhra Pradesh State Administrative Reforms Committee Report (*op. cit.*) which suggested radical changes in the administrative structure of the state. It is significant that 6 out of 7 of its members were from the ICS-IAS group. See also the note on "Administrative Measures to Meet the Emergency." Government of Andhra Pradesh, January, 1963. One of the themes of the Annual District Collectors' Conferences (in both Andhra Pradesh and Kerala) also has been how to improve planning in the state.

All the Indian political parties (except the Swatantra Party)[32] also embody the norms and values of planning, because planning has been accepted as national ideology.[33] The Indian National Congress Party is wedded to planning as an instrument of socio-economic reform[34] and had played a leading part in the diffusion of planning ideals throughout the country. This party's interest in planning dates back to 1938 when it appointed a National Planning Committee to prepare a development plan for the country. Continuing this interest in planning, the party took initiative in starting the Five Year Plans when it came to power in 1947. In the states, the Congress Party has identified itself with the national planning effort and has used all its media for giving and getting planning support.

The Communist Party, the second most important political party in India,* has been generally favourable to planning even though it disagrees with the means adopted for planning. It supports the values and norms of planning and is perhaps the only party in India which has emphasized the behaviouristic aspect of the planning. In fact, during the brief period of its rule in Kerala, the Communist Government took strong measures to expedite the implementation of many planning schemes.[35] In the manifestos and public statements of its leaders, the party has adopted a line generally favourable to the Indian planning efforts.

The socialist parties and other smaller political organizations also support planning. In general, the political parties have

[32] From an interview with leading members of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature Swatantra Party, we understand that this party also supports the idea of planning with some reservations. It differs with the ruling party in that it feels the state should limit its role in the economic sphere but should take overall leadership in economic development.

[33] Ideology may be defined as "a system of beliefs, publicly expressed with the manifest purpose of influencing the sentiments and actions of others" See F. X, Sutton *et al.*, *The American Business Creed* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956), p. 2.

[34] See Humayun Kabir, "Congress Ideology," *Indian Quart.*, XVI (1960), 3-23.

[35] See E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Twenty-eight Months, *op. cit* See also his *Economics and Politics of India's Socialistic Pattern* (New Delhi, 1966).

* This position has changed after the General Election of 1967.

been helpful in fostering the norms and values that underlie the doctrine and programmes of Indian plans.

Other groups in both states have been helpful in protecting the new values. It may be noted that, since planning has been accepted as an ideology, no party or group which looks to the masses for support can afford to oppose it without risking a loss of position. Thus the Chambers of Commerce, Manufacturers' Associations, labour unions, and even communal groups have included or accepted planning as one of their basic doctrines.

One feature of this support may be noted. The ICS/IAS group held norms conducive to planning but more in the nature of idealized objectives to be aimed at rather than realistic targets. They formed part of the traditional bureaucracy whose doctrines were not very functional for the Planning Department. The ICS/IAS group was soon caught by the wider bureaucratic culture and its members were unwilling or unable to free themselves from it.

In part, this may by attributed to the attitude of political leadership's and its extreme caution towards planning, at least as far as its administrative aspects were concerned. To some extent, the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh, capitalized on the normative support from both these groups. For example, the State Administrative Reforms Committee (of which the Planning Secretary was a member) recommended some radical structural changes in the top level of the bureaucracy. The state standing Administrative Reforms Committee suggested changes in administrative procedures. The Planning Department also used the ruling party's normative support of planning to strengthen itself.

In Kerala, the ICS and IAS groups were not strong factors in the administration until very recently. In the beginning, the state was reluctant to accept officers of these groups in the bureaucracy. The multiplicity of political parties made securing their support very difficult and to some extent nullified the value of this support.

Diffused Linkages

Diffused linkages refer to public opinion and to those media

capable of affecting it, i.e., newspapers, journals, and radio. Since planning had been accepted as an ideology, there has been little difficulty in getting support from these diffused linkage units. The government itself had provided them with forums for this purpose. Thus, the Block Planning Advisory Committees in the Community Development and National Extension Service Blocks and the District Development Councils consisted of individuals who had been prominent in their localities and who had shown interest in furthering the planning activities of government. In Andhra Pradesh, elected representatives of the people have now taken the place of these committees. The government-owned radio occasionally broadcasts speeches by experts and other prominent citizens, about different aspects of the plan. Its publicity departments issue literature on planning and arrange free film shows in different parts of the state. It also celebrates "Plan Weeks," "Savings Weeks," "Family Planning Weeks," and the like, thereby popularizing the values and norms of planning. The government also encourages the press to issue special editions on the plans. Thus, an attempt has been made in both states to mobilize individuals whose support could be used to strengthen state planning activities and to counteract any possible source of opposition.

It may be added that the problem has not been to get support for the norms and values of planning but to induce the supporters to translate this support into their behaviour. Expressing support is different from concrete actions.[36] One disadvantage of using planning as an ideology is that many of its supporters have supported it not out of any conviction in the superior advantage of its values and norms but because it is considered improper not to. A remedial measure will be to devise appropriate machanisms that will provide government encouragement for people, fostering the new values in their behaviour patterns. This aspect of the problem has not been explored since the organizational location of the Planning Departments prevented them from doing anything directly in this regard. Since the Planning Departments were established as administrative departments of the state Secretariat, and lacked

[36] See Kurt Lewin, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-64.

an executive counterpart, they did not have direct access to the public. They received inputs from the departments of the bureaucracy, and their outputs were consumed by these bureaucratic departments. The public could not associate the Planning Departments with any product or service for their immediate and direct use, which deprived the Planning Departments of a supportive constituency—a source of power in transactions with other environmental units. The absence of such a constituency not only lessened the role of the diffused linkages relative to the Planning Departments but compelled the Planning Departments to look for other sources of support for their existence and development.

It can be seen from the foregoing sections that the environmental units most relevant to the working of the state Planning Departments were the enabling and functional linkages. For reasons already stated, the normative and diffused linkage units played only a secondary role. The peculiar nature of the Planning Departments (the precarious character of their doctrine, the marginal nature of their products, and the absence of an external constituency or a power base), coupled with the fact that they fostered values incompatible with the established bureaucratic departments, required that the Planning Departments receive special support and protection from the enabling units. Where this support was forthcoming, the Planning Department was able to perform many of its planning activities in Andhra Pradesh. Where such support was lacking, as in Kerala, the Planning Department was severely handicapped in its activities. There, it was necessary to enter into a formalized alliance with the Finance Department, the most powerful agency in the state bureaucracy handling most of the work which the Planning Department claimed as its field. There is good evidence to support the argument that an organization that does not enjoy the continued and overt support of the enabling linkages (and which lacks other sources of strength from the normative and diffused units) will drift to that agency most powerful in its functional area.

Chapter Five

Conclusions

AT THE end of Chapter I, we raised several questions whose answers are of vital significance to the planners who want to accomplish socio-economic development through the established bureaucracy. We then analyzed the working of the Planning Departments of two states and identified some of the key-factors that make a Planning Department an effective instrument of social change. Our focus was on the extent to which, and the processes and strategies by which, a Planning agency (itself a part of the bureaucracy) can act as an agent of change and provide the rest of the bureaucracy the necessary momentum to introduce and sustain change. In this chapter our findings are set forth in the form of specific hypotheses. While doing so, a brief review of some of the main lines of supporting evidence is made along with indications of policy implications of the study.

Our hypotheses are:

1. Innovative organizations require strong personalized leadership—persons with leadership attributes and strong personal involvement in the doctrine and programme of the agency.
2. An innovative organization, operating within a bureaucratic framework, will tend to modify many of its bureaucratic structures, especially those linked with the innovative organization in a relationship of mutual dependence.
3. An innovative organization requires a power base or external constituency from which it can draw support for its doctrine and programme. In the absence of this, it requires strong support from enabling units. In other words, the effectiveness of an innovative agency which lacks a power base or external constituency is positively related to support from enabling units.

4. In the absence of support from enabling units, an innovative organization lacking a power base or external constituency will drift to that agency most powerful in its functional area.
5. The strategies available to organizational leadership to resolve conflicts in the organization's favour are directly related to the power of its leadership and its relation to enabling units. An organization high in the power-hierarchy (or adequately protected by higher authorities) can choose from a variety of strategies ranging from persuasion to coercion to further its ends while an organization lower in the hierarchy is far more restricted in its choice of strategies to resolve conflicts in its own favour.

At this point, two qualifying statements should be made. One concerns hypotheses. These hypotheses should not be interpreted as necessarily being capable of applying to all cases of organization building. They are based on only two cases, further, they are based upon a study of a special type of bureaucratic organizations, namely, public bureaucracies. It cannot be assumed that our findings will hold for all bureaucracies. Hence, the limited number of cases examined and the peculiarity of the organizations prevent interpreting resultant hypotheses too generally. There is, however, no reason why, under similar circumstances, they should not be true. In spite of their *ad hoc* character, the fact that the organizations examined are typical of the agencies through which socio-economic development is being attempted in many of the developing countries, gives further significance to these findings.

The second qualification concerns the innovative character of the agencies included in this study. Throughout this book, the Planning Department has been described as an innovative agency and the instrument of socio-economic development. This is not wholly correct. As stated earlier, the state Planning Departments do neither planning nor plan implementation, even though they have some responsibility for supervising both these activities. Neither the Central Planning Commission nor the state executive—the major enabling units of the Planning Department—has visualized any real planning role for the Planning

Department. Nor has the Planning Department assumed such a role even in Andhra Pradesh where it had more control over state planning than in Kerala. In terms of planning needs, the power enjoyed by the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department was rather limited. It had no power to introduce any major innovation necessary to use the bureaucracy as a change-agent. Such an innovation was beyond the scope of the Planning Department's mandate and capacity and had to come from the political executive.

The political executives in the two states realized the nature of the problem and the Administrative Reforms Committees in both states, appointed by them, recommended several techniques for removing the administrative difficulties. The Andhra Pradesh Committee recommended that heads of executive departments (line) should be designated as Additional Secretaries (staff) and should be given Secretariat status; it also suggested that heads of departments be given greater financial powers. The Committee warned against the tendency for Secretariat officers to lean heavily on their clerks for advice and for the disposal of cases. These recommendations have not been implemented. In Kerala, where the Reforms Committee was against both changing the present status of executive department heads and delegating greater financial powers to them, it recommended none the less other measures to avoid delay. It also prescribed the use of a merit system for appointment and promotion and the institution of an incentive plan to increase producturty. These recommendations have been kept in abeyance. Paradoxically enough, the Andhra Pradesh Reforms Committee, which consisted of an overwhelming majority of officials (6 out of 7), recommended more radical kinds of change than did the Kerala Reforms Committee which consisted of only 2 officials out of 7 members, including an expert on public administration. However, the result of the efforts in both cases was the same. In both states, no fundamental change has been introduced as a result of the recommendations of the Reforms Committees. It may be too much to expect that the bureaucracy will change long-established behaviour patterns without a strong external compulsion. This compulsion may have to come from the political executive. There has been no attempt by the polit-

cal executives in either state to give the necessary impetus and direction for such change. As a result, one does not find any fundamental change in the traditional bureaucracry. Even though the Indian planners have recognized the need for radical structural and behavioural changes in the bureaucracy as a prerequisite to successful planning, the political executive as the agent of reform appears unwilling to do anything that will affect the bureaucratic structure. This may be due to either an exaggerated fear of non-co-operation by the bureaucracy if reforms were introduced or to the political executive's sharing of a common value system with the bureaucracy. This has put severe limitations on state planning. The ability of the Planning Departments to act as change-agents has been very limited since their doctrine and programme do not permit the introduction of any radical change in the existing bureaucratic structure.

Hypothesis 1

Innovative organizations require strong personalized leadership—persons with leadership attributes and strong personal involvement in the doctrine and programme of the organization.

The effectiveness of the Planning Department depends on several factors; of these, leadership was found to be the most important. In fact, leadership appears to be important in all new organizations, especially those which tend to deviate from existing ones in values and goals. It was found that leadership is an independent variable with all other variables dependent on it. As used here, leadership is a complex of several attributes whose presence or absence will determine strength or weakness. An individual high in all these attributes will be more effective than one possessing a few of them. Drawing on the experience of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, it could be said that there has been only one individual who met this criteria for leadership. He was the third secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department. Being strong, he carried out a series of measures which introduced innovations both within his Department and the bureaucracy. For example, in the Department, he introduced many structural changes, including a better communication network, through regular staff meetings, a sense of participa-

tion and urgency among members, and an element of professionalism. In the bureaucracy, he made use of the monthly Co-ordination Meetings of Secretaries and Heads of Executive Departments to stress the need for inter-departmental co-operation in problem-solving and prompt implementation of actions. The constitution of the Evaluation Committee, similarly, impressed upon departments the need to re-evaluate implementation plans so that resultant schemes would have a greater probability of success. This official helped initiate planning units and statistical cells in the development departments which slightly changed the internal structure of these departments. The unique position of this official enabled him not only to carry out these changes, but also to make positive suggestions to other departments which they were bound to consider. Thus, he suggested and arranged seminars for the Agriculture and Industries Departments to review their policy and performance, allowing them to form a clear idea of their priorities for the next plan period. In the field of finance, he demonstrated the need for rationality of a motor vehicles tax between the Andhra and Telengana regions and persuaded the Cabinet to accept it.

At the same time, there were officials in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala who had been high in some attributes but low in others. One Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department was a man with high status in the profession, highly placed in the functional hierarchy and strongly motivated to planning. He was, however, low in terms of bureaucratic status and organizational competence, which prevented him from achieving anything substantial in the functional area dominated by status-conscious and more organizationally experienced officials. The first Secretary of the Kerala Planning Department had been strongly motivated. He had continuity, had acquired functional skills, and had shown some qualities of organizational competence as well (for example, coalition with the Finance Department), but his rather low status in the hierarchy prevented him from asserting the legitimate claims of the Planning Department (especially *vis-a-vis* the field of finance). The Chief Ministers and Chief Secretaries of Kerala had high status and hierarchical position and some of them were planning-motivated, but they lacked continuity in office which seems to have

prevented their adopting a long-term policy. Therefore, it could be concluded that successful leadership requires a combination of all these elements to enable it to carry out any major organizational goal.

These qualities, however necessary, do not adequately explain the relative success of the Andhra Pradesh Planning Department. This Planning Department succeeded, though to a moderate extent, not only because leadership, relative to the analytical attributes, was very strong but also because the person responsible for building and guiding the department for nearly a decade was personally and emotionally involved in it. He took the challenge more as a mission than as a routine task in his bureaucratic career. Only this attitude can adequately explain his willingness to undertake tasks far beyond the normative expectations of his role. It may be added that, in showing such psychological involvement, he was actually violating the norms of the bureaucracy which emphasized the principle of *sine ira est studio*. There is conclusive evidence that, without the third Secretary's deep personal identification with the cause of planning, the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh would not have grown to its present position.[1] No other individual in either state has shown such personal dedication to his task.

Leadership is important not only because it determines the kind of transactions the organization can make with the environment, but also because it is a determinant of other elements of the organization which, in turn, reinforce leadership. There is a strong dependency relationship between leadership, doctrine, programme, resources, and internal structure. While the initial doctrine was set by political leadership, the development, elaboration, redefinition, and transformation of this doctrine is a function of leadership.[2] The third chapter describes how the

[1] Not only in the state, but also at the Planning Commission many people referred to the Planning Department as "Mr. . . . 's (third Secretary) department" even though it was several months after his exit that we visited them. According to Simon, Smithburg, and Thomson, "Figures like Gifford Pinchot in the U.S. Forest Service or Daniel Hoan, former Mayor of Milwaukee, have come to serve as symbols of organizations they led and the accomplishments of their organizations are attributed . . . to their personal qualities." See Simon *et. al., op. cit.*, p. 104.

[2] Herbert A. Simon, "Birth of an Organization: The Economic Co-operation Administration," *Public Administration Rev.*, XIII (1953).

goals of administrative co-ordination and routine review of the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh were transformed into processes which gave the Planning Department a considerable share in state planning, largely because of the bold and aggressive action of the leadership. The adaptation of the programme to the revised goals—detailed scrutiny of proposals and progress reports, evaluation, and control over allocation and reallocation—was achieved simultaneously. The introduction of changes in the internal structure of the department—improving channels of communication, imparting a sense of participation, and technical orientation—was largely due to organizational leadership. Such intra-departmental goals were neither designed nor anticipated in the organizational blueprint of the department.

By contrast, no change over time in the doctrine, programme, resource position, or internal structure of the Planning Department occurred in Kerala This may be ascribed to its relatively week leadership, to the lack of leaders' personal involvement in the departmental activities as well as to the discontinuities of the state political process.

Thus ample support has been found for the hypothesis that innovative organizations require strong personalized leadership. This is the type of leadership that could transform a neutral bureaucracy into a committed polity and that could institutionalize the new values of the organization.[3]

An important implication of this finding for organization building and for introducing change is that the success of an organization—especially one with precarious values and a marginal status—largely depends on the quality of the leadership and the interest which leadership takes in the organization. In a hierarchical agency like a bureaucratic department, this means the head of the bureau or department must be a man of exceptional qualities who feels some psychological attachment to the agency. An established bureaucracy having to do routine functions may dispense with these leadership qualities because both the organization and the environment have institutionalized

[3] See Selznick, Leadership, *op. cit.* On this point, see also, John Glover and Paul R. Lawrence, *A Case Study of High Level Administration in a Large Organization* (Boston, 1960); Robert H. Guest, *op. cit.;* David E. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the March* (New York, 1944).

certain behaviour patterns towards each other. However, an innovative agency whose major objective is change has to establish new behaviour patterns in almost all its internal activities and transactions. This requires initiative, skill, boldness and determination for consummating these goals. A neutral bureaucracy that stresses exchangeability of personnel between departments and avoidance of involvement may not be able to carry through any innovation or sustain an innovative effort if introduced.

The wisdom of assigning planning to bureaucratic departments as is the case with the Indian states, may be seriously disputed, even when the role of these departments in planning is very limited.[4] It may be stated that the problem involved in planning is changing human behaviour. When planning is handled through bureaucracy, the problem becomes one of creating certain structural and behavioural changes which act as an effective instrument within the bureaucracy. The Indian planners have created a new department from within the bureaucracy, staffed it with personnel from existing bureaucratic departments, and entrusted it with the task of changing the behaviour of other departmental personnel. One cannot find any logic in asking one group of persons to change the behaviour of another group when both groups share the same values and norms and are governed by them. There is much truth in the New Deal dictum that new ideas require new blood. The success of the Indian experiment largely, if not entirely, depends on the quality of leadership which has to change both the behaviour of personnel of other departments and of the personnel of its own department. This requires qualities approaching those of a charismatic leader. Such leadership, found in a bureaucracy, is only accidental. To leave as important a task as the leadership of the planning organization to chance and accident is certainly not good planning.

[4] If one considers planning an important activity of government, there is the need for some place where the various departmental plans can be assembled, reviewed, and adjusted to one another. There is also the need for some particular office or unit to lay out the common procedures and common assumptions on which planning is to be based. So, even when original roles are not contemplated, the need for a planning department to carry out the above functions cannot be exaggerated.

Hypothesis 2

An innovative organization operating within a bureaucratic framework will tend to modify many of its bureaucratic structures, especially those linked with the innovative organizations in a relationship of mutual dependence.

In describing the model of bureaucracy, it has been argued that a bureaucratic structure is not conducive to innovation because of several inhibiting factors. The characteristics of such a model are a single hierarchy and line of command, emphasis on rules, absence of effective communication and feedback, preoccupation with subgoals to the abandonment of the total agency goals, and the absence of a futuristic orientation, resulting in lack of a sense of urgency. It is assumed that when such an agency is entrusted with the task of innovation, it will have to shed many of its bureaucratic traits to become an effective instrument of change. The Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh is a case in point. Here, the Planning Department was an innovative agency in only a limited sense and because of this limitation, its deviation from the bureaucratic model was also limited. Nevertheless, it introduced some modest innovations in the plannning and problem-solving systems through co-ordination meetings, and so on. The work of planning required a change in the internal structure of the Planning Department. It is difficult to say whether all the changes introduced in the Planning Department (especially internal changes such as the organization of staff meetings) were dictated by the pressure of the new task or by the personal beliefs of the leadership. It can be said, however, that some of the changes were due more to planning needs than to personal preferences. For example, the creation of an evaluation unit in the Planning Department was necessitated by the need to control plan implementation; this unit had to be handled by professionals. To attain better control over planning, the Planning Department required experts from the profession in order to legitimatize its new role which led to the reorganization of 1963. These shifts have not changed the basic character of the Planning Department as a bureaucratic agency but have introduced significant modifications into the established pattern. It can be argued that since the Planning Department's goals themselves were modest, more radical changes were not necessary.

At the same time, the Planning Department in Kerala did not envisage the introduction of any change in the environment. It did not attempt to change existing patterns in the bureaucracy and, even if it did, there is no evidence that it succeeded significantly. If the Additional Planning Secretary occasionally went out of his way to suggest priorities or give advice, it involved his personal influence and not his administrative authority; this did not necessitate any change in the structure of the Planning Department. There was some innovation when the office of Deputy Secretary for Planning and Finance were combined; but this was not a structural change, and after some time, this system was discontinued. Thus, it appears that the wider the scope of innovation undertaken by an organization, the greater will be the tendency for it to incorporate many non-bureaucratic structures.[5]

In conclusion, innovative agencies require that many modifications be made in the bureaucratic structure. Attempts to introduce innovation through a bureaucratic agency may therefore either fail or result in a change in the character of the agency before change can be successfully introduced. This holds not only for the Planning Department but for all other branches of the bureaucracy engaged in developmental activities. Yet, it is this structural aspect that has not been given close attention in Indian planning. An agency for introducing change should be designed to facilitate structures conducive to the rapid introduction of change. Otherwise, it will have to undergo a trial-and-error period in the process of incorporating them; this will slacken the process of innovation.

Hypothesis 3

An innovative organization requires a strong power base or external constituency from which it can draw support for its doctrine and prog-

[5] Our finding has ample support from literature on organizational change. Organizational adaptations to change in task structure have been reported in both business and other types of organizations. See James E. McNulty, "Organizational Change in Growing Enterprises," *Administrative Science Quart* VII (1962-63), pp. 1-21, James D. Thompson and Frederick L. Bates, "Technology, Organization and Administration," *Administrative Science Quart.* III (1957-58), pp. 325-43; Morris Janowitz, *op. cit.*; Hamburg, *op. cit.*

ramme. In the absence of this, it requires strong support from enabling units. In other words, the effectiveness of an innovative agency which lacks a power base or external constituency is positively related to support from enabling linkages

Usually, an organization achieves support through its clients who form an external constituency, or who develop some vested interest in the organization either through employment or products and services. Some organizations may produce vital goods and services which provide them with a good power base. Any attempt to curb their area of activity will be resisted by their constituents. The Planning Department, however, was not such an organization. Its products were not considered indispensable by their users. It had constituents but not the general public; rather they were administrative departments that did not consider themselves dependent on the Planning Department because of the marginality of its products. Moreover, the Planning Department needed assistance in fostering new values among these unenthusiastic constituents. Its position as an administrative department of government prevented it from having any direct transactions with agencies other than governmental departments, thus depriving it of support from normative and diffused linkages throughout the larger body politic. Thus, lacking a base of its own, and having no external constituency to appeal to, its only source of support were the enabling units within the state which also served as enabling units of the other inamicable departments. As described earlier, the central Planning Commission did not extend any positive support to the state Planning Departments.

Here again, the experiences of the two state Planning Departments offer a good contrast, giving ample support to this hypothesis. In Andhra Pradesh, the enabling units strongly supported the Planning Department, but in Kerala, they did not. As a result, the Planning Department in Andhra Pradesh became relatively stronger than that in Kerala and developed into a major department of government. Many of the activities of the Department, including its expansion of power and personnel, were possible because the state Cabinet was willing to approve its policies and programmes. In Kerala, the Cabinet never took a positive attitude towards the Planning Department, and,

as a result, it could not develop into a strong department.[6]

Hypothesis 4

In the absence of support from enabling units, an organization lacking a power base or external constituency will drift to that agency most powerful in its functional area.

The absence of support from the enabling units in Kerala compelled the Planning Department of that state to ally with the department most powerful in its functional area. This was the Finance Department which controlled many of the activities actually earmarked for the Planning Department. Without the co-operation of the Finance Department, the Planning Department could not function effectively. This feeling resulted in the co-optation of a member of the Finance Department into the Planning Department to overcome opposition from the former. The appointment of a combined Deputy Secretary for Planning and Finance, drawn from the Finance Department, was made with this aim. However, this arrangement did not work to the advantage of the Planning Department and was discontinued after a time. The dependence on the Finance Department was not lessened nor was support from enabling units increased. So, another coalition was attempted, by giving the Planning Secretary control over some important areas of finance.[7] In Andhra Pradesh, because such a need was not felt, the Planning Department continued without allying with other units in its functional area.

This makes a strong case for granting an innovative agency special attention and protection from the enabling units. Actually this has been recognized in Indian planning and has

[6] This is in conformity with the conclusions arrived at by Landsberger, *loc. cit.*, who made a study of middle management behaviour in three comparable companies. He found that the scheduling (planning) department in these organizations needed special protection of higher management. See also, H. Edward Wrapp, "Organization for Long Range Planning," *Harvard Business Rev.*, XXXV, 1 (Jan.—Feb. 1957).

[7] See Landsberger, *op. cit.* He observes that "unless the (scheduling) department has the support of higher management and draws its influence from there, it will tend to be too heavily influenced by whatever department is most influential at the moment." See also Burton Clark, *op. cit.*

become one of the reasons for placing planning under the Chief Minister or the Chief Secretary. However, this is no solution unless the patron himself is strong. Placing the agency under the direct control of enabling units has another disadvantage: it prevents the organization from developing an identity of its own and making itself a viable unit which could, over time, stand by itself to become fully institutionalized. Moreover, it makes the agency vulnerable to any change which affects top positions. When a new regime which does not have the same degree of enthusiasm for the agency as the predecessor comes to power, the organization is bound to suffer a setback. The solution seems to be for the patron not to run the agency himself or interfere in its day-to-day affairs, but to create adequate internal leadership which could develop a strength of its own, approaching the patron only when necessary. The cases of the Andhra Pradesh and Kerala Planning Departments show the weakness of the dependence relationship and the advantage of developing internal leadership.

Hypothesis 5

The strategies available to organizational leadership to resolve conflicts in the organization's favour are directly related to the power of its leadership and its relation to enabling units. An organization high in the power-hierarchy (or adequately protected by higher authorities) can choose from a variety of strategies, ranging from persuasion to coercion, to further its ends while an organization lower in the hierarchy is far more restricted in its choice of strategies to resolve conflicts in its own favour.

While this holds for all organizations in general, it is of particular significance to new and change-oriented organizations which are, by definition, conflict-arousing.

As an agency in charge of state planning, the Planning Department encountered conflict-situations on several occasions. It had to persuade administrative departments to follow certain standard procedures in preparing schemes. It had to see that schemes were implemented on time, in the manner envisaged, and that progress was reported promptly. Since bureaucratic departments were not accustomed to this kind of discipline, they found

it difficult to comply with the Planning Department's demands. Compliance with the instructions, especially in plan formulation, in several cases assumed the form of ritualism; meanwhile, delay was widespread in all departments over the whole period of planning.

In Andhra Pradesh, the Planning Department attempted to meet the first of these defects by helping the departments start planning cells which could prepare plans more carefully and systematically. This problem-solving approach was followed by the more powerful method of evaluation through which the Planning Department could expose the defects of any plan and its implementation. In addition, the Planning Secretary suggested strategies to be followed in drafting plans. In the case of electricity, he advised that a proper balance be maintained between generation and distribution; regarding irrigation, his suggestion was that quick-maturing schemes be taken up instead of projects with long gestation periods. He also arranged seminars for the Agriculture and Industries Departments. After the Planning Department had been reorganized, a series of studies were conducted; papers on different aspects of the state economy were prepared as guidelines for departmental planning. The development departments had to accept the lead given by the Planning Department in several cases. Thus, a mild form of coercion was used to see that departments followed the outline of the Planning Department.

To counteract delay, the Planning Department made effective use of the monthly Co-ordination Meetings and took prompt measures to enforce their decisions. The departments which failed to submit reports on time were asked to explain the delay and to get the Planning Department's help with their problems. In turn, the Planning Department helped them to organize statistical cells and arrange a system of pre-budget scrutiny to avoid Finance Department delays.

There was another area in which the Planning Department had to face a conflict-situation. This was resource allocation.[8] As demand always exceeded supply, the Planning Department

[8] Resources allocation has been recognized as a fertile area of inter-departmental conflict in organizations. See March and Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-24.

had to find a solution acceptable to all departments. Here, it followed a strategy of persuasion.[9] It convinced certain departments that even if they were given what they asked for, they would not be able to spend it due to structural and practical limitations. It told others that their claims could be considered at the time of reallocation. To every department, it explained that the current allocation was only temporary and subject to modification by the Planning Commission that would review its case. The Planning Department promised to support such claims before the Planning Commission.

Another important problem which the Planning Department had to face was with the Finance Department. This centered in two areas. One was an interest-conflict—the Planning Department claimed a share in the work of co-ordination and review which were traditionally the prerogatives of the Finance Department. The other was one of value, namely, attitude towards spending and criteria application for financial scrutiny of plan proposals.

To settle interest-conflicts the Planning Department used the strategy of bargaining.[10] While claiming the right of co-ordination, review, allocation, and reallocation, the Planning Department confined itself to scrutiny of proposals in terms of broader objectives, priorities, and policies. It neither interfered with the itemized scrutiny which the Finance Department conducted on all plan schemes nor argued for dispensing with this scrutiny which was based on the old canons governing the patterns of spending and caused unnecessary delay in implementing plans. The Planning Department's only attempt to obviate delay has been the institution of the pre-budget scrutiny. In other areas, the Planning Department even helped the Finance Department find and augment its resources. An

[9] According to March and Simon, "Implicit in the use of persuasion is the belief that at some level, objectives are shared and that disagreement over subgoals can be mediated by reference to common goals." *Ibid.*, p. 129. The Planning Department agreed with the demands of other Departments for more money, but the realization of certain objectives required a particular pattern of allocation on which, however, the Departments were not in agreement,

[10] See March and Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 130; Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defence: A General Theory* (New York, 1962), pp. 313-20.

example mentioned earlier is the tax rationalization scheme suggested by the Planning Department. Hence, both the Finance and Planning Departments gained in the process of bargaining.

To resolve the conflict over different interests, the Planning Department mostly relied on competition,[11] assuming that its attacks against obsolete canons of finance would draw the support of other departments. It received this support because no department liked the Finance Department. The outcome was generally favourable to the Planning Department.

The use of persuasion, problem-solving, pressure, bargaining, and competition was made possible because the Planning Department was strong enough to afford to be selective in the use of strategies. It could use whatever strategy that seemed appropriate, taking into consideration the nature of the issue and the position of the parties. Where leadership was neither strong nor supported by the enabling units, the choice of strategy was limited (e. g., Kerala).

In Kerala, the role of the Planning Department was very limited. It did not attempt to institutionalize a thorough scrutiny of departmental plans since it did not have adequate staff. Nor was there any machinery to examine the implementation of schemes as there was in the case of Andhra (the evaluation unit). This excluded another potential area of conflict. It did not have effective powers of co-ordination. For the Third Plan, co-ordination was secured by eight Study Groups and by a Co-ordination Committee; for the Draft Fourth Plan, by the Programme Advisory Committee. Thus, two major sources of conflict—co-ordination and resource allocation—have been avoided by leaving the problem to extra-departmental agencies, resorting to what March and Simon call, the method of "politics" in solving problems.[12] Other departments did not feel the presence of the Planning Department as a threat, nor did they find their activities constrained by the Planning Department. Therefore, there were few occasions for conflict. However, the Planning Department found that its activities were severely circumscribed by the Finance

[11] See Thomson and McEwen, *op. cit.*

[12] The basic strategy in politics is not to allow relations to be defined as bilateral, but to expand the relevant parties by the inclusion of potential allies. See March & Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

Department which did most of the work that the Planning Department had expected to do and was unwilling to hand this over to the Planning Department. Thus, the Finance Department continued as the co-ordinating agency which altered the pattern of plan priorities by sanctioning schemes on an *ad hoc* basis, rejecting some and delaying others in the process. To get over this difficulty, the Planning Department adopted the strategy of "co-optation".[13] Later, another attempt was made to establish liaison with the Finance Department at a higher level through which the Additional Planning Secretary obtained control of some sections of the Finance Department.

It may be stated that both politics and co-optation are comparatively weak strategies in conflict resolution and may not always result in resolving the conflict to the advantage of the user. Co-optation may even result in the opposite of what was originally intended. This is shown in the Kerala Planning Department[14] whose weak position did not enable it to use bargaining, competition, or pressure as methods of resolving conflicts.[15] To use these techniques requires that the party has a position of strength to begin with; this was not true of the Kerala Planning Department.

Thus the hypothesis that the strategies available to organizational leadership to resolve conflicts in its favour are directly related to the organization's power position. Since a new agency charged with fostering change is bound to face many conflict-situations, it is very important that its location and relation with sources which control authority and power enable it to solve conflicts to its advantage, allowing it to foster innovation. Otherwise, it will be quite ineffective as a change-agent and, though apparently engaged in innovation, it may not really be dealing with change but rather continuing or helping to continue old patterns.[16]

It may be pointed out that the Planning Departments' location within the bureaucracy and their regular bureaucratic staffing resulted in sharing a common bureaucratic culture with

[13] See Selznick, *TVA*, *op. cit.*

[14] This was equally true of the TVA. See Selznick, *TVA.*, *op. cit.*

[15] On this point, see Thompson and McEwen, *op. cit.*

[16] See Bansfield, *op. cit.*

other departments. The frequent transfers of personnel among the Planning Department and its constituents also contributed to identity of interests between them while an impersonal attitude towards issues, characteristic of the bureaucracy, took the heat out of conflicts and converted them into administrative problems requiring routine solutions. This practice, however, does not minimize the importance of conflicts which a really innovative agency has to face when attempting to introduce change in or through a bureaucracy. If the agency is not able to resolve these conflicts, it may cease to foster innovation; indeed, it may even identify itself with those elements which support the *status quo*.

Chapter Six

Postscript

THE FOREGOING chapters (except the first two sections of chapter 2) were written at the end of 1965. The purpose of the present chapter is to update the information contained in them and to review the conclusions in the light of subsequent developments.

During the three years following the study, some major events, significant to planning, took place in the country. Since these have some bearing on our analyses, we shall discuss them before describing the developments in the Planning Departments of the two states.

The most important event of the period was the crisis in Indian planning, necessitating the postponement of the Fourth Five Year Plan. Crises were a recurring feature of India's Five Year Plans and have caused major shifts in objectives and priorities during both the Second and Third Plans. The planners, however, assumed them to be temporary and ascribed them to the stresses and strains of a growing economy and to flood, drought, and foreign aggressions. Such crises were resolved on *ad hoc* bases by re-adjustment of plan priorities and targets. But the recent crisis was cumulative and, hence, deeper than the earlier ones and only indefinite postponement of the Fourth Five Year Plan was found to give the answer. Therefore, instead of another Five Year Plan, government adopted Annual Plans. The three Annual Plans that followed the Third Plan were spill-overs of earlier Plans to which a few new projects were added. Of late, efforts have been revived to prepare a new draft Fourth Plan but uncertainty regarding resource availability has compelled the planners to go slow.

It is now generally agreed that the crises in Indian planning have to be traced to factors other than flood, drought, and foreign aggressions. These were rather the

occasions than the actual causes. One of the major causes was the defective method of programme planning and plan implementation. The techniques used were traditional and unscientific. In formulating schemes and working out their details, application of rigorous cost-benefit analysis and of modern methods of programming and accounting is not generally made. In implementing projects, there has been a total neglect of the use of control and feedback mechanisms. As a result, many of the elements of planning are lost and the plans failed to deliver the promised goods. This is more true of state planning which accounts for nearly half of the national plan efforts. The bureaucratic departments which are in charge of plan formulation and implementation have been rather slow in adjusting to the requirements of planning. At the state level, there is no machinery worth the name for planning. The only agency having any overall responsibility for planning is the Planning Department. Its location and staffing pattern and the limited role assigned to it have reduced its effectiveness and weakened its control over the functional departments. The crisis highlighted these weaknesses in state planning and some states, including Kerala, are taking steps to overcome them.

The second major event of the period was the General Election of February 1967. Though the election again returned the Indian National Congress Party to power at the Centre, it unseated Congress governments in more than half of the Indian states. Even at the Centre, the strength of the Congress Party was reduced from a comfortable to a precarious majority. While the new power position did not upset the fundamental assumptions and ideologies of planning in any non-Congress states (except Kerala), the relation between the Centre and states had to be redefined. This found expression in the increasing refusal of some states to comply with the Centre's directions in both administration and planning. The fiat of the Planning Commission no more ran unch[illegible] d in the states even though the latter's weak financial [illegible] nd heavy dependence on the former for resources [illegible] scope for independent action.

The third event was [illegible] lation of the Admini- trative Reforms Comm[illegible] (ARC) proposals

change in the composition and functions of the Planning Commission, and increased plan responsibilities for the states which were urged to create Planning Boards to assume greater planning tasks.[1] The Commission pointed out that the heavy dependence of the states on the Planning Commission and the Centre for resources had compelled them to comply with the latter's directives and to adopt priorities and projects which were unrelated to the real needs of the states. According to the ARC Study Team, ". . . a view was expressed by most of the state representatives who appeared before us that there was very little scope for planning at the state and lower levels. Apart from the imposition of decisions on plan targets, the states are also many times given the methodology of achieving the objectives, and departures even from the patterns of staffing, etc., are not permitted. In such cases, the only option to the states is either to accept the Central programmes or reject them. Since each programme carries a subsidy (sometimes as much as 100 per cent) from the Centre, the states almost invariably accept such offers even when these have limited utility and applicability for them. The net result is the growing tendency towards inter-state similarity in the sectoral distribution of plan outlays. There is thus, consciously or unconsciously, a tendency on the part of the states to follow the National pattern of priorities and Central directions with consequential neglect of their own specific growth capacity and requirements. This may not always be in the best interests either of the country as a whole or of the particular state or states."[2]

The Study Team further found that this process inhibited the desire of the state departments to work out correct and complete details regarding project planning and programming, with the result that targets were never realized as planned. There was wide disparity between physical targets and achievements. Even when financial outlay exceeded targets, physical

[1] Government of India, Administrative Reforms Commission, *Interim Report of the Study Team on the Machinery for Planning*, March 1967; *Report of the Study Team on Machinery for Planning*, December 1967; *Interim Report: Machinery for Planning*, April 1967, *Report: Machinery for Planning*, March 1968.

[2] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team*, p. 87.

output was much below estimates. The assumptions and yardsticks given by the Centre were used for working out targets. Their applicability to states were not taken into account. The Study Team pointed out that the increase in cost of many projects was due to the tendency of the departments to underplay costs and overplay benefits in order to get easy clearance from the Finance Department and the Central agencies. Once approved, it did not matter much even if costs rose to 200 per cent. After the project is approved, emphasis shifts to completion and questions are rarely asked as to the earlier costs and benefits.[3]

As a remedy for these, the ARC recommended that states should be given more freedom in detailed sectoral planning, including preparation and execution of individual schemes and programmes and that the Planning Commission must confine its scrutiny to such schemes that involve a substantial amount of investment, a sizable foreign exchange component, considerations of inter-state nature, significant policy implications from the national point of view, or implications of basic national priorities.[4] It also recommended modifications in the pattern of Central aid to states.[5]

To enable states to discharge the increased responsibility in planning, the ARC recommended the establishment of a Planning Board in each state.[6] The state Planning Board was to have five members, of whom four were to be full-time, of which one of the full-time members was to be the chairman. The members were to be chosen on the basis of expertise and experience. They were to have the status of Ministers of State and the chairman was to have the rank of a Cabinet Minister. None of the members was to be a Minister. However, the Chief Minister and Finance Minister were to be associated with the working of the Board and kept continuously informed of the matters coming up for discussion at the meeting of the Board. The term of the members was to be five years.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

[4] Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report: Machinery for Planning*, pp. 20-21.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-33.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-14.

The functions of the Planning Board were as follows:

1. To make an assessment of the state's resources and formulate plans for the most effective and balanced utilization of those resources;

2. To determine plan priorities of the state within the framework of the priorities of the national plan;

3. To assist district authorities in formulating their development plans within the spheres in which such planning is considered useful and feasible, and to co-ordinate these plans with the state plan;

4. To identify factors which tend to retard economic and social development of the state and determine conditions to be established for successful execution of the plans; and

5. To review the progress of implementation of the plan programmes and recommend such adjustments in policies and measures as the review may indicate.

The Board's secretariat was normally to have four units: Agriculture and Irrigation, Power, Industry and Transport, Social Services, and Evaluation.

The ARC also recommended the creation of Planning Cells in the Development Departments of the states.

ANDHRA PRADESH

In Andhra Pradesh, the position of the Planning Department during this period was one of strengthening the base and increasing the sphere of control. The General Election of 1967 did not affect the government in power. As a matter of fact, the new Cabinet was headed by the same person who was Chief Minister before the Election. There was, however, a change of the Planning Minister for a short period; in April 1967, the Chief Minister relinquished his planning portfolio but resumed it in early 1968.

There was a change of the Chief Secretary towards the end of 1967. A dynamic and forceful officer took over as Chief Secretary and began functioning as an effective Development Commissioner.

The officer who was heading the Planning Department at the time of our study retired in June 1966. As the government

did not want to appoint to that post a person without any background in planning, the Joint Secretary who was already holding his post for quite some time continued to be in charge of the Department. In early 1968, he was made full Secretary for Planning. He had already proved his motivation and skill for the task. The Director (Economics and Resources) resigned his post to take up assignment elsewhere. Government made an effort to get a suitable person as successor but it was without any success and so the post has remained vacant.

During this period, two important developments took place which contributed to an expansion of the role of the Planning Department and an increase in its prestige. A State Development Board was created with the Chief Secretary as Chairman and the Planning Secretary as Member-Secretary. By virtue of this, a direct liaison was, for the first time, established between the Planning Department and the District Administration, whose work this Board was to review. The role of the Planning Department was thus expanded to include direct supervision of the implementation of the Plan schemes in the field, a situation which did not exist before.

The second development was the setting up of a high-power state level committee called Resources and Expenditure Committee with the Chief Secretary as Chairman and the Planning and Finance Secretaries as members. For quite some time, government was observing that the calculation of resources and expenditure for plan programmes on certain *ad hoc* formula laid down by the Planning Commission had resulted in deviations and distortions on both revenue and expenditure sides. These distortions and deviation came to light only at the end of the year when it was too late to take corrective measures. It was found that a constant review of revenue and expenditure was necessary to initiate prompt remedial action. It was also found imperative that expenditure was confined within the revenues, and that revenues were realized fully and promptly. To achieve this, the Committee was entrusted with vast powers over assessment and collection of revenue, to prescribe expenditure for various departments, and to suggest reallocations and reappropriations. It was to make quarterly review of the actual execution of the plan in the context of the budget based on

performance during the preceding quarter. The Committee was also to review, once in a quarter, the financial working of all undertakings in which government has invested either in equity or as loan, or has underwritten the capital issue. It will be seen that membership of the Planning Secretary in the Resources and Expenditure Committee gave him a voice not only in matters relating to Plan resources and expenditure, but also tax collection, non-Plan expenditure, and the working of the various corporations.

The two new bodies—the State Development Board and the Resources and Expenditure Committee—have been much more effective in bringing about co-ordination and supervision of Plan implementation than the Co-ordination Committee ever was. (It may be pointed out that, over the years, the Co-ordination Committee had become quite unwieldy and could not meet very often. Hence, much of its work had been delegated to smaller committees consisting of groups of departments.) Membership of the Planning Secretary (and the Chief Secretary) in these bodies vastly increased the control of the Planning Department in plan implementation and resource allocation.

Among the other developments in the Planning Department mention may be made of its scheme to constitute a panel of economists to advise the Department on matters relating to planning, and of its collaboration with various universities in the state for taking up certain studies on its behalf.

Thus, in spite of the general crisis in planning, the Planning Department has been steadily expanding its sphere of authority and influence. This was largely due to the fact that its leadership (political and administrative) possessed in large measure the necessary attributes described in our model.

KERALA

In Kerala, the three years after our study had been a period of strengthening of the planning effort. In an earlier chapter, we described how assumption of certain sections of the Finance Department by the Planning Secretary enabled him to gain better control over state planning including allocation of funds, correction of imbalances, and restoration of priorities. During this

period, the Planning Secretary had charge of the entire Finance department for over one year. This also helped co-ordination between planning and finance; but no new ground was gained as it also coincided with a period of Annual Plans.

Unlike in Andhra Pradesh, the General Election brought about a change of government in Kerala, marking the beginning of a new era in planning. The new government, particularly the Chief Minister, was wedded to a new approach to planning than was hitherto followed. The Chief Minister himself supplied its outline and philosophy. The first took the form of the Planning Board and the second was contained in his memorandum to the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission entitled "*Towards an Alternate Policy Framework for the Fourth Five Year Plan.*"[7]

The Planning Board was established in September 1967 to give direction and purpose to state Planning.[8] It consists of the Chief Minister (Chairman), Finance Minister, four experts including the Economic Adviser, the Chief Secretary, the Planning Secretary, and the Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics.[9] The Board has four divisions—Economics, Agri-

[7] Letter from E.M.S. Namoodiripad, Chief Minister of Kerala, to Prof. D. R. Gadgil, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, dated Trivandrum, October 23, 1968. See also his *A Critique of the Planning Commission's Approach to the Fourth Five Year Plan* (Trivandrum, Government of Kerala, August 19, 1968)

[8] Government of Kerala, G.O. (P) No. 44/67 Plg., dated Trivandrum, September 7, 1967.

[9] The presence of the Chief Minister and Finance Minister enabled the Board to secure Cabinet support for its programme; membership of the Chief Secretary and Planning Secretary ensured administrative co-ordination. It may be pointed out that in the composition of the Planning Board, the Kerala Government followed the model envisaged by the Planning Commission rather than that recommended by the ARC The Planning Commission suggested, " . . . it might be helpful if the Chief Minister could be Chairman of the Planning Board and the Finance Minister . . . a member . . . .In addition, it might be possible to secure for the State Planning Board, the assistance of two or three persons with special experience and knowledge who may preferably serve full time as members . . . .The state Statistical Bureau would, of course, need to work in very close association with the Planning Board." D.O. Letter No 4(G)/62 Plan, dated March 20, 1962, to the Chief Ministeres of all States from the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.

culture, Industry and Infra-structure, and Social Services—each under an expert member. The functions of the Board are the following:

1) To undertake continuous appraisal of the progress of the state economy and make proposals for effective utilization and development of the state's natural, material, and human resources;

2) To undertake and arrange for continuous study of the special problems of the state;

3) To formulate the broad objectives of the development plan and to elaborate the Plan objectives into long-term, mediumterm, and short-term plans and specific projects and programmes;

4) To evaluate projects and programmes and determine inter-sectoral priorities;

5) To formulate targets and outlays for different sectors of development, together with estimates of resources;

6) To assist the state government and the departments concerned in planning for integrated development in different regions of the state; and

7) To assist and advise Panchayat Raj institutions and Municipal Bodies in the formulation and development of plans and mobilization of resources at the district and local levels.

The Planning Board has done some good work since its inception. Its first task was to frame a new Fourth Five Year Plan for the state in the light of the revised resource estimates of the Planning Commission and its own assessment of the state's needs and priorities. On the basis of these, it invited proposals from the Development Departments for inclusion in the Fourth Plan Draft. It then scrutinized the departmental programmes and selected proposals which were capable of realizing the objectives considered desirable.

The Draft Fourth Plan of Kerala, prepared by the Planning Board, has been commended by the Planning Commission. This is good proof that the Board has lived up to expectation at least to begin with. But, like all other state plans, it leaves to the Government of India and the Planning Commission, the responsibility for finding resources!

The role of the Planning Department in the new set-up is yet to be clearly defined. For the last one year, it has acted as

liaison with the Finance Department and the bureaucracy and in helping the Planning Board to establish itself. The scope of liaison could range from disciplining the Development Departments in the requirements of programme planning and plan implementation to acting as a clearing house for planning at the administrative level. In the changed context of planning in the state, the first role seems appropriate and forthcoming. The long experience of the Planning Secretary, his control over plan finances and his status as member of the state Planning Board give him ample functional authority and expertise for the new role.

The gains which the Kerala Planning Department made during the last three years were due to a variety of factors. The long term in office of the Planning Secretary (since 1963) enabled him to improve his functional competence while his assumption of part of the Finance Department gave him control over allocation of plan funds. The latter, especially, enabled him to dominate the Development Departments. Though from September 1967, direct control of the sections of the Finance Department by the Planning Secretary has not been there due to the redesignation of the post of Additional Secretary (Planning and Finance) as Planning Secretary, thanks to the co-operative attitude taken by the incumbents of the post of Finance Secretary[10] and the recognition of the expertise of the Planning Secretary in matters relating to planning and finance,[11] co-ordination between planning and finance was healthy and the dominant role of the Planning Secretary in matters of plan finance continued. The Chief Minister also seems to have recognized the important role which a good Planning Department with effective co-ordination with the Finance Department could play in state planning, and this added another source of strength to the Department.

[10] There were frequent changes in the person of the Finance Secretary since the new government took over (February 1967). For some time, the Planning Secretary himself was Finance Secretary; others posted as Finance Secretary did not have any background in the subject.

[11] He has been put in charge of the entire work relating to the presentation of memoranda and materials to, and discussion with, the Fifth Finance Commission. Since July 1968, he is also Member-Secretary of the State Pay Commission.

Thus, the developments in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, subsequent to our study, affirm our hypothesis. They also throw light on certain issues which are of interest to those engaged in building organizations for socio-economic development. Two of the issues are discussed below because of their immediate relevance to our study:

1. Whether the arrangement by which the Planning Secretary controls certain sections of the Finance Department facilitates planning; and

2. Whether an independent Planning Board, functioning outside the bureaucratic framework or a Planning Department forming part of the bureaucracy, will be a better agency for facilitating planning.

Since some sort of liaison between Planning and Finance Departments exists in many states (see Chapter 2), its implications may be further examined. Opinion is divided on the feasibility of combining planning with finance. Many hold the view that this will avoid duplication of work and delay.[12] Others argue that if the department is headed by a finance man, planning will be subordinated to the needs of resources, if it is dominated by a planning man, economy will be lost. A seminar on state Planning, organized by the Indian Institute of Public Administration in New Delhi in April, 1968, and attended by the Planning Secretaries from Indian states discussed this subject at some length. While no conslusions emerged, the consensus of the seminar was that structural arrangement in itself does not

[12] Hanson says that all the officials in Maharashtra (where Planning forms part of the Finance Department) whom he consulted were united in their view that the location of planning in the Finance Department was an improvement. The specific advantages they claimed for it were (a) that it avoided the need for time-consuming cross-references between the two departments, and (b) that the presence of the planners within the Finance Ministry had a salutary effect on the attitude towards planning of that Ministry's more orthodox-minded officials. The Finance Minister himself spoke of the greater coherence achieved by bringing together planning and finance in the same department and the consequently improved mutual understanding between the people who formulated the plans and those who had to find resources. See Hanson, *op. cit*, p. 80.

bring any advantage or disadvantage.[13] Much depends on the orientation and commitment of the person holding the combined post. If he is strongly development-oriented and has the necessary expertise in planning and public finance, the planning effort would be greatly facilitated. Otherwise, in spite of the best of plans, its implementation will be defeated by the Finance Department sticking to old canons of expenditure.

As regards the question of the Planning Board Versus Planning Department, there are valid reasons for prefering the former. As pointed out by the Administrative Reforms Commission,[14] a bureaucratic department has several disadvantages in acting as an innovative agency; it cannot attract and retain experts and professionals; it cannot provide the flexibility and continuity needed for planning; the nature of the work involved in planning is different from that of a secretariat department. Finally, the leadership of the Planning Department, is generally entrusted to generalist administrators and it is more by accident than by design that competent and committed persons come and stay in the department.[15] A Planning Board can overcome most

[13] According to a senior official who held a combined post in the Planning and Finance Departments for several years, "however perfect the planning machinery may be, the plan effort will be frustrated unless 'Finance' is development-oriented. 'Finance' is the first stage of plan implementation. The central task of planning, both at the national and state level, is how to make the Finance Department plan-and economics-oriented. This can be achieved only if the Head of the Finance Department is trained in Development Economics and Public Finance Where there is no separate body for planning, the combination of Planning and Finance Departments may lead to the planning effort being subordinated (though the experience of Madras and Maharashtra would belie this). Where a separate planning machinery exists (as in Kerala), there is no need for a separate Planning Department. It will, in fact, lead to friction and difficulties In such case, planning and finance may be combined and the Secretary for Planning and Finance be made a member of the Planning Board."

[14] A R C : *Report of the Study Group*, pp. 102-3.

[15] This is endorsed by the ARC Study Team's Report. According to it, out of the 49 officials in the Planning Departments of states, 22 were from the IAS, 18 from Provincial Civil Service, 2 each from the Bureau of Economics and Statistics, and state secretariat services, and 5 from other services. As regards their previous background and experience, 27 held previous field or administrative positions, 7 held posts in extension and welfare departments, 5 (all in Maharashtra) were in Finance Department and 3 had teaching background, the remaining members were in the Bureau of Economics and Statistics. Out of the 22 IAS officials, 6 held degrees in Economics or Statistics, 4 in English, one in History, 2 in Law, 4 in Science and 5 in other subjects. See *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

of these difficulties. It can provide the necessary expertise, flexibility, and continuity required in planning. Because of the expert character of the body, its advice will carry greater weight than that of a departmental agency. It can also establish direct ties with the diffused and normative linkage units in society, which a Planning Department located in the secretariat is unable to do.

The achievement of Andhra Pradesh, with a reorganized and technically oriented Planning Department, would suggest that the basic issue in designing a planning machinery for the state is not the Board versus the Department, but the role which the state government wants to play in planning, its commitment to the tasks of planning, and the particular machinery suitable for planning, taking into consideration the state's experience with existing planning machinery.

The present crisis in planning has given urgency to the task of improving planning machinery and method in both the Centre and states. The coming of non-Congress governments in many states and the recommendation of the ARC have strengthened the argument for the states to have more freedom in planning. Few states, however, are seized of the idea of an independent state planning agency and fewer still have shown any enthusiasm in establishing it. The reasons for not establishing such an agency are many: such a body might act as a super-cabinet; the nature of state planning does not require any specialized agency; there is paucity of experts for manning the agency. Of these, fear of restriction of freedom which a Planning Board might impose on the state political leadership seems the major inhibiting factor. Paradoxically, even as the Planning Commission was urging states to take up larger responsibilities in planning, states were complaining about the dominant role of the Planning Commission and the Central Ministries in determining their priorities and even individual schemes.[16] As Hanson says, "The states cannot reasonably complain that the Commission 'dictates' unless they themselves come forward with plans which are demonstrably well adapted to their individual needs and based upon realistic appraisal of their own capabilities for resource mobilization. It is true that part of the plan, e.g., heavy industry, is ineluctably national and every other part

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

has to conform with nationally determined priorities, limits and proportions. But within this general framework, the scope for effective regional and area planning is immense."[17]

The creation of the Planning Board in Kerala is, therefore, a step in the right direction. The deviation from the recommendation of the ARC in its membership pattern also seems to be warranted, as this would give the agency better status and authority and enable it to achieve better administrative co-ordination.

But the creation of a Planning Board by itself may not improve state planning. There are some major obstacles to effective planning and plan implementation at the state level.

One of them is the severe limitation on the state's resources. States are heavily dependent on the Centre for meeting not only their "plan expenditure" but also "non-plan expenditure". The latter is met out of statutory awards made by the Finance Commissions appointed by the Government of India once in five years. Plan expenditure is met from allocations made by the Planning Commission. States have been dissatisfied with the awards of both Commissions. They complain that while their requirements are rapidly increasing due to the large-scale implementation of social welfare programmes, the scope for increasing the taxes in their sphere is limited. Regarding the Planning Commission, it has been pointed out that political considerations outweigh economic considerations in their allocation of plan resources. There is truth in both complaints. The present division of Central assistance into two broad and independent categories, revenue and capital, and their assignment to two independent bodies, the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission, is rather unscientific and does not take into consideration the inter-dependence of the two items of expenditure. In the context of total planning and spatial allocation of resources for achieving optimum growth, the responsibilities for resource transfer should not be entrusted to two separate agencies without ensuring adequate and continuous co-ordination. National economic planning involves the mobilization and allocation of the entire resources of the country in such a manner

[17] *Hanson, op. cit.*, p. 289.

that the maximum growth rate is generated consistent with social justice. Such a total view is rendered impossible by the present arrangement for federal transfers. The feasibility of combining both tasks and entrusting them to a single agency functioning on a continuing basis may be examined.[18]

The pattern of Central assistance for the plan also needs to be reviewed. Central assistance is given to the states in the form of grants and loans. The grant-loan ratio applicable for a particular project or scheme is the same for all states. A constant ratio-grant tends to aggravate inter-state inequalities. It is necessary to vary the grant-loan ratio as between different states and different projects taking into account the relative financial position of the states. This will help weaker states to get a higher volume of Central assistance as grants.

The system of "tying" Central assistance to individual schemes also needs reconsideration. It is true that assistance to certain sectors which are of vital national and regional importance should be specifically earmarked and its proper utilization ensured. But state governments should have the freedom of deciding priorities regarding individual schemes within each sector. Central assistance for each sector should be related to targets achieved for each sector as a whole and not tied to each scheme. In regard to other projects, states should be given more freedom since they are the best judges of their requirements and priorities. They are more competent to decide the feasibility and need of such projects and as such the selection of projects and the determination of priorities must be left to them. The present method of using Central assistance as a lever for imposing centrally designed projects on the states has only contributed to waste of scarce resources.[19]

Absence of an efficient administrative machinery is another handicap to successful planning. Plans will have to be formulated

[18] Since the focus of this study is mainly on the behavioural and not economic aspect of planning, we have not examined this aspect in any detail. We have no doubt that "Central-State financial relations" forms an important aspect of state planning and deserves to be studied in its own right. Here we are giving only a bird's eye-view of the important issues involved.

[19] ARC *Study Team Report*, p. 87; See also *ARC Report: Machinery for Planning*, pp. 23-33.

and implemented by the Development Departments which use traditional methods in handling planning tasks. Only if modern techniques of project planning and programming are used could original financial and physical targets be achieved. The Development Departments do not have qualified personnel for this. The Planning Cells (or Units) attached to them are manned by regular departmental staff whose knowledge of planning and programming is not superior to that of their colleagues. It is difficult to get qualified personnel in large numbers all at once. But the Planning Board could organize in-service training programmes in modern planning techniques for the staff of Development Departments.

Expertise alone may not be able to deliver the goods. The people who hold posts in development administration must be motivated and committed to the goals of the organization. One way to ensure this is to appoint to such posts only individuals with proven motivation and commitment. It may be pointed out that Roosevelt followed this policy successfully in the implementation of the New Deal programmes in America. But in India, there are practical difficulties in instituting a programme of recruiting motivated individuals due to political, communal, and regional rivalries. A radical reform of the civil service to ensure efficiency and integrity is imperative for the success of any programme; but this also seems impracticable in the present context; it is outside the action programme of all the ruling parties. Under the prevailing circumstances, the only other alternative in motivating the bureaucracy is to provide for a good incentive system, but its effect may not be very significant; A well designed and efficiently carried out evaluation system, though of limited scope, would enable the Planning Board to use the feedback and control mechanisms in ensuring proper planning and prompt implementation of projects.

An important task in development planning, especially in a tradition-oriented agrarian society like that of India, is the implanting of development potential—the ability and willingness to change—in its people. This is the most important but most difficult and least spectacular aspect of planning. No programme of social change can claim success if it fails to motivate the people to change and make them its committed agents. A serious

lacuna in Indian planning is the lack of proper attention to this aspect. Though the Five Year Plans speak eloquently of its need, they have not made any serious effort in devising ways and means of achieving it. The problem assumes great significance at the state level where a large part of the plan effort is directed to projects whose success is dependent on active public co-operation and participation. An irrigation dam could be constructed without much popular co-operation; but to make efficient use of the water so harnessed requires efforts at motivating the farmer to use water which may necessitate a change in his cultural pattern and hence in the established rhythm of his life. A primary school could be constructed in a short time but to persuade the people to send their children to school is a different problem and requires a new approach. Lack of appreciation of the importance of motivating the people (or lack of appropriate mechanisms for achieving it) has reduced the effectiveness of many of the government's development efforts, including top priority items such as agricultural extension and family planning programmes.

Associating the people with development programmes is an important method of establishing ties with them and of making them partners in the development process. The government's efforts in this direction have been only peripheral. In spite of much talk about planning from below, India's Five Year Plans have been impositions from above. It is possible that with the expansion of Panchayati Raj institutions, the problem would be solved to some extent, but this is itself related to the question of improving the machinery for state planning. However, a Planning Board is in a much better position than a Planning Department in activating diffused linkages and getting them involved in the planning process.

Throughout this study, we have been focussing attention on the crucial role of bureaucratic leadership in effecting socio-economic development. Nevertheless, we have emphasized the equally, or even more, crucial role of political leadership in national development. It is the responsibility of the ruling party to discipline the bureaucracy to the requirements of planning. If the bureaucracy has not been so disciplined, major share of the blame must be borne by political leadership. In a democracy

the responsibility of political leadership is not confined to transforming the bureaucracy into a committed agent of change. The discipline of planning has to be accepted by all sections of the community—the bureaucracy, the masses, and the ruling party itself. Economic development calls for hard work, great hardships, and sacrifices. It involves deferment of many present gratifications for future advantages—painful process no doubt but indispensible. In a democracy this is a formidable task for any political party because the electorate may not be inclined to make the necessary sacrifice, and may be led by alternative strategies involving lesser hardships, offered by rival political parties. But it is the responsibility of the ruling party to discipline and educate the electorate in the requirements of planning. But, for this, its leadership must itself incorporate the behaviouristic norms of planning. If they do not obey the rules of the game, their efforts at enforcing these rules on others may not be effective. The biggest obstacle to the success of Indian planning is the lack of commitment to the rules of planning of those who direct planning. This is why fifteen years of planning in India have not made much healthy impact on the socio-economic framework of the country. Unless the political leadership realizes this responsibility and performs its roles in the development process, planning may be reduced to a mere ritual which may result in only waste of scarce means and resources.

Appendix A

Theory and Method of Study

Theory

THE conceptual framework of this study is based on the model developed by the Inter-University Research Programme in Institution Building.[1] This model has been designed for the purpose of studying "the process and strategy of building new institutions (or restructuring existing ones) which incorporate, foster and protect normative relationships and action patterns, perform functions and services which are valued in the environment, and facilitate the assimilation of new physical and social technologies."[2] The Planning Departments in the Indian states are new organizations, established for the purpose of supervising and directing the plan effort and fostering new norms and values. Therefore, the theoretical framework developed for institution-building research seems to be a good model by which to analyse the Planning Departments.

According to this model, the components of an institution can be divided into two broad categories—system variables and linkage variables. System variables consist of leadership, doctrine, programme, resources, and internal structure. They are the elements which are intra-institutional. Linkage variables consist of enabling, functional, normative, and diffused ties. These are external to the institution.

[1] See Hans C. Blaise, "The Process and Strategy of Institution Building for National Development," (Unpublished Ph D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964); Milton J. Esman and Hans C Blaise, "Institution Building Research: Guiding Concepts," (Pittsburgh, February 1966) (Mimeographed); Jiri Nehnevajsa, "Methodological Issues in Institution Building Research: A Working Paper," (Pittsburgh, 1966) (Mimeographed).

[2] Esman and Blaise, *op. cit.*

Linkages arise out of the fact that the institution conducts certain transactions to gain support and overcome resistance, exchange inputs and outputs, structure the environment to provide complementary services, and transfer norms and values to the environment. Though transactions are reciprocal, in the early life of an institution they are generally more one-sided since the institution needs to establish favourable relationships with possible as well as actual linkage units. Only when the new unit is transformed into an institution could it be assumed to have established a degree of stability and commensurate reciprocity.[3]

System Variables

a. *Leadership* refers to a group of persons actively engaged in formulating the doctrine and programme of an institution and directing its operation and relationship with the environment.[4] For these purposes, the scope of the definition of leadership is restricted to include only a small group of persons directly associated with the formulation of policies, programmes, and behavioural norms; they are in actual control of the organization's operation. In other words, this definition is confined to the inclusion of internal or organizational leadership. It refers to people who are intimately involved in the guidance and operation of the agency. According to this definition, leadership of the Planning Department will consist, at the formal level, of the Minister for Planning, the Chief Secretary to the state government and the Secretary (also Joint and Deputy Secretaries) for Planning. The leadership attributes listed in the model include the following:

1. functional role—the formal position in the hierarchy,
2. status—the ascriptive position or influence,
3. motivation to pursue the objective,
4. functional technical competence in the relevant area of activity,

[3] In certain cases, existing units will be more anxious to establish favourable relationships with the new unit than vice versa. This, however, is an extreme case. The Planning Departments were not such units.

[4] This and the subsequent definitions regarding the concepts of the model are taken from Blaise, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-235.

5. organizational competence, i. e., ability to design and implement effective structures and processes for the operation of the institution,
6. role distribution—the pattern of role-assignment among leaders in the organization, and
7. continuity in office.

Our study revealed that while these attributes are necessary they do not sufficiently explain the success or failure of orgnizational leadership in performing critical innovative roles. For reasons explained in Chapter 3, personal involvement of the leader, or leaders, in the doctrine and programme of the organization was an important factor that contributed to the organizations survival and growth. Accordingly, one more element in leadership attributes is introduced.

8. personal involvement.

It was more convenient to deal with role-distribution under internal structure.[5]

b. *Doctrine* may be defined as the specification of values, objectives, and means underlying social action. It is a stable reference point to the institution as a system and to its interaction with the environment relating to all other variables.

Some key characteristics of the doctrine are:

1. specificity,
2. relationship to existing norms, which should be within the prescribed and permitted pattern of behaviour,
3. relationship to preferences and priorities in the environment, which should be related to immediate goals and targets within the society.

The doctrine of the Planning Department can be viewed at two levels. One is related to planning in general, and the other to the specific goals of the Planning Department. Being neither fully in charge of planning nor the implementation of the plan, but having partial responsibility for both, the Planning Department had an unspecified doctrine even though its doctrine can be said to concern statements about the supervision of state plans and the fostering of norms associated with planning. These doctrinal components were originally envisaged by the Planning

[5] On the study of leadership, see Ralph M. Stodgill and Caroll L. Shartle, *Methods in the Study of Administrative Leadership* (Columbus, 1955).

Commission at whose request the Planning Departments were created. Yet, in subsequent stages of institutionalization, there was considerable room for adaptation and alteration of the doctrine itself.

c. *Programme* refers to actions relating to the performance of functions and services which are the outputs of the institution. The determinants of the programme are its consistency with doctrine and with the different programme elements (internal consistency), stability (reliability of output over time both in terms of quality and quantity), feasibility (in terms of availability of resources and disposability of outputs), and contribution to defined societal needs. The programme of the Planning Department included processing plans prepared by different departments and sponsoring them before the Planning Commission, monitoring the implementation of the plan, and giving advice and assistance on general planning matters.

d. *Resources* are physical, human, and technological inputs which the institution needs to achieve its goals. In the case of the Planning Department, physical resources consisted of annual appropriations from the state budgets. Its personnel was recruited from the state bureaucracy whose members are considered competent to handle *any* governmental department and are, therefore, general administrators. The inputs of the Planning Department consisted of departmental plans and data of various kinds relating to the plan, including feedback in the form of progress reports.

e. *Internal Structure* refers to the structure and processes established for the operation and maintenance of the agency. The concern is with the mechanisms and modes of control, communication and decision-making within the institution. Role specification, distribution of authority, and decision-making affect the programme and maintenance of the system; communication patterns affect the identification of the participants with the institution as well as the multifaceted flow of task-related information.

Since it began as a part of the bureaucracy, the structure of the Planning Department closely followed the pattern existing in the bureaucracy, even though it tended to deviate from the more extreme bureaucratic model.

Linkage Variables

Linkages may be defined as the ties of interaction between the institution and other units or agencies which enable the institution to obtain authority and support, exchange resources, overcome resistance to change, structure the environment, and transfer the new norms and values to significant environmental units. They allow the institution to obtain inputs and dispose of outputs.

a. *Enabling Linkages* are linkages with organizations and social groups that control the allocation of authority and resources that the institution needs to function. In the case of the Planning Department, they consist of the Indian Planning Commission, the State Governor, the State Cabinet, the Cabinet Subcommittee for Planning, and the State Legislature.

b. *Functional Linkages* refer to exchanges with agencies which perform complementary or competitive functions which supply inputs, and use the outputs of the institution. The functional linkages of the Planning Department consist of the administrative and executive departments of the bureaucracy. These have been most important in the programme performance of the Planning Department as they are the units through which the Planning Department promotes new normative relationships and action patterns.

c. *Normative Linkages* refer to transactions with organizations and agencies which embody and protect norms and values relevant to the institution's doctrine and programme. This applies to both socio-cultural norms and operational rules As an example, an institution may be affected by the rules and regulations of a civil service commission even though there exist no enabling or functional linkages with that body. The presence of such norms and values in other parts of society will affect the feasibility, process, and strategy of institution building.

In the case of the Planning Department, two important normative groups were found to have norms that supported planning. One is the Indian Civil and Administrative Services (ICS and IAS), an action group with special responsibilities in the country's development effort though it remains a part of the bureaucracy. The other consists of political parties and

interest groups that have accepted planning as part of their action programme.

d. *Diffused Linkages* refer to public opinion and relationship with social groups. The position of the Planning Department did not facilitate direct dealing with these units. Consequently, their role has not been significant.

The above framework was used to collect and analyse data on the role of the Planning Department in bringing about socio-economic development, its relation to internal structure, and to the different linkages—especially those in the functional area represented by the bureaucracy.

Method of Study

This study is based on interviews and documents of the Planning Departments of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Ideally, such a study should have included participant observation to explore the network of informal relationships. However, due to time limitations, this method was not fully utilized[6] Major emphasis in the analysis was placed on interviews; and documentary evidence was used to supplement and refine these data.

The interviewees were selected in the light of discussions with the Secretaries of the states' Planning Departments. On reaching the state capital the initial step was to meet the Secretary for Planning. From him an organization chart of the Planning Department was obtained, along with a list of names of the past and present departmental officials and a brief description of the departmental work. An organization chart of the government Secretariat and a copy of the *Secretariat Office Manual* which describes the structural relations prevailing in the Secretariat as well as the rules and procedures for the transaction of government business were also secured. From these sources, an idea was formed of those people who could provide information relevant to the present study. In consultation with the Planning

[6] We however had opportunity, during the three months in each state, to observe closely many Planning Department officials in their place of work. Almost every other day we had to go to the Planning Department and spend some time with officials. In this way, we got a partial glimpse of the informal relationships in the department.

Secretary, a list of officials to be interviewed was prepared. The Planning Secretary then wrote letters of introduction for the researcher to these officials, requesting their co-operation and assistance. They were assured that the data collected through interviews would be kept confidential and that the interviewees' identity would not be disclosed. Interviewees outside the bureaucracy were chosen from a list of names supplied by the Planning Secretary. By taking into account the role of the selected individuals in the different linkage mappings, supplementary individuals were chosen for interviewing. No formal letters of introduction were written to the latter group, the researcher introduced himself either over the telephone or through a note. There was no hesitation on the part of these respondents to grant interviews.[7]

The interviewees may be divided into four groups, according to their role in planning. The first group consisted of Planning Department members and included all the top officials and all available former officials of this category. It also included about 50 per cent of the officials of the intermediate category and a few of the most experienced section heads.[8] Altogether, 19 officials in Andhra Pradesh and 11 in Kerala were interviewed at length. They included the top officials of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics which, in both states, are under the administrative control of the Planning Departments.

The second group consists of the members of the bureaucracy outside the Planning Department but functionally related to it. They were chosen in accordance with the estimated contribution of their departments to the total plan affort. The Chief Secretary and the Finance Department Secretary were invariably included because of their unique positions in the Secretariat. The Chief

[7] William H. Hunt, Wilder W. Gene. and John C. Wahlke, "Interviewing Political Elites in Cross Cultural Comparative Research," *American Jour. of Sociology*, LXX (1964-65), 59-68.

[8] A convenient classification will be in terms of their functional role. Thus, top officials will include the Secretary, Additional, Joint, and Deputy Secretaries all of whom have the power to make decisions. The intermediate level will include the Assistant Secretaries, who have no original decision-making power. The lower level includes Section Officers (Superintendents in Kerala) and clerks.

Secretary is the head of the Secretariat organization and also has some planning functions. Other Departments selected in both states included Agriculture, Industries, and Public Works. The Departments of Education and Health were included in Kerala. The first three departments account for 69 per cent of the plan outlay in Andhra Pradesh and 76 per cent in Kerala. Because Kerala has one of India's highest per capita expenditures for education and health, these two departments were also included.

The third group consisted of individuals whose relationship to planning conformed largely to the concept of enabling linkages. Members of the state Cabinet, among others, were included. Among the Ministers were the current Chief Minister and Finance Minister of Andhra Pradesh (the Chief Minister was also the Minister for Planning; the Finance Minister was a former Planning Minister), another former Minister for Planning, and the president of the ruling political party (who was formerly Minister for Agriculture). At the time of this study, there was neither Cabinet nor Legislature in Kerala. The State was under the "President's rule". This interview, therefore, included three former Chief Ministers (who were also Planning Ministers) and the Principal Adviser to the state Governor. This Adviser was a former Chief Secretary of Kerala. Some of the prominent members of the State Planning Advisory Committees were also interviewed. These included three members of the state Legislature and a university professor in Andhra Pradesh, and a university professor and the editor of an influential local newspaper in Kerala. Two of the former Chief Ministers of Kerala interviewed were members of the State Advisory Board. In addition, informal discussions were held with a number of local people, including some officials in the two states.

The fourth group consisted of officials of the Indian Planning Commission, an enabling unit for the state Planning Departments. Three of six full-time members of the Planning Commission, two of three Advisers (Programme Administration), and two other officials were interviewed.

Altogether, 83 persons were interviewed—7 Planning Commission officials, 61 state officials and 15 non-officials. Of the 61 officials in the states' bureaucracies, 26 officials were members

of the ICS and IAS—the elite cadre in the bureaucracy. However, the interviewed members of the bureaucracy not constitute a representative sample in any sense.

Most of the officials were interviewed at their offices but the non-officials were interviewed at their homes. The interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 6 hours, though an average interview took from 1 to 2 hours. Members of the Planning Department were interviewed for an extended time which averaged about 2 hours. A typical interview was held in two sessions; however, some interviews took three to four meetings. It was found that there was some positive relationship between a respondent's interest in planning and innovative behaviour and the time he alloted for the interview.

Before settling down to an interview, the interviewer spent some time establishing rapport. Sometimes, one whole meeting was devoted to this, but then the respondent was willing to grant an extended interview at the next occasion. The interviews were partly "non-directive". While the interview was begun with a schedule which directed the respondent's attention to key areas of presumed importance, the interviewees were provided with ample opportunity to add whatever they thought pertinent to each topic. This brought out much information which might not have been gained otherwise.[9] It had the further advantage of making the interviews more informal. The respondent felt less strained and enjoyed the discussion because he had an opportunity to express some of his ideas on related topics.

Slightly different sets of questions were used for each of the four groups, even though all interview schedules had the same focus. Invariably, information elicited included the role, functions, and efficiency of the Planning Department; its sources of support, points of weakness and main contribution; the respondent's experience with, and attitude towards, innovative activities; major changes in the bureaucratic structure after the introduction of planning; suggestions for accelerating socio-economic development, and a few questions on the role of the Finance Department.[10] The check list was constantly reviewed

[9] This method was followed by A.W. Gouldner. See *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (New York, 1950), p. 248.

[10] The Interview Guide is given in Appendix B.

and updated in the light of new information.

No questions were asked on factual data available from documentary sources. Thus, from the Civil List, we collected information about the official's age, salary, date of entry into government service, and the length of service in his present job. Certain other data, such as family background, were collected from secondary sources. In addition to saving time, this rendered the interviewer more acceptable to the respondent and eliminated situations of mutual embarrassment. As a general rule, as much personal data about an interviewee as possible was collected before he was interviewed.[11]

In addition to interviews, extensive use was made of government records, including files, memoranda and published and unpublished documents. In both states, the researcher was given free access to the government records libraries. Files pertinent to the study were located with the help of an annual index of Government Orders. In Kerala, however, there was no such index for the period 1954-58. The records were used to refine the data collected through interviews and to get an idea about the historical process of planning and the creation and development of the Planning Department. A content analysis of the records was also made to determine the doctrine and programme of the Planning Departments and to examine the nature of the problems in planning.

[11] See Annette Garcet, *Interviewing: Its Principles and Methods* (New York, 1942).

Appendix B

Interview Guide

A. Personal Data

1. Present position—since when
2. Position held immediately prior—for how long
3. Length of service in Government
4. Education
5. Special training undergone
6. Membership in Societies, Associations, Clubs, etc.
7. Age

B. Organization chart, work allotment

1. Can you give a brief description of the work of your department?
2. What are the duties and responsibilities of the Planning Department? What were its duties and responsibilities when it was first set up?
3. What are the activities which the Planning Department currently undertakes? How are they related to your work (department)?
4. What are your duties in the department?
5. What are the types of decisions which you could make, all by yourself, without consulting anybody or waiting for anybody's approval?
6. What decisions of yours have to be approved by other persons or agencies? Who are they?
7. Do these persons or agencies generally approve of the decisions taken by you? Have there been instances when they modified or disapproved of your decisions? Can you give an instance? (Another instance? etc.)
8. Why do you think that they modified or disapproved of your decisions? Did you explain to them your reasons for taking such a decision or the need for approving of your decisions without modification? If so, what was their

reaction to it? What was the final outcome? Has this been satisfactory to you? If not, what did you do about it?

9. Do you tell your subordinates exactly what they are supposed to do or do you leave a lot to their own discretion? Which things do you tell them exactly to do and which ones do you leave them to decide?
10. Do you generally get the kind of assistance that you want from your subordinates? Have you encountered any problem in getting such assistance? What specific problems did you come across? Why did they arise? What remedial action did you take?
11. How do you make the aims and purposes of your department clear to members of staff of your department? Do you have staff meetings? How often? Who prepares the agenda? Do these meetings help you to get suggestions from your staff?
12. What arrangements are there to ensure that the decisions made by you are properly implemented?
13. What are the departments and agencies on which your department depends for getting resources for efficient functioning? In what way do you depend on them? Have you been getting their services at the right time and in the right amount?
14. Were there occasions when your department experienced any difficulty in getting services from them? If so, how did you manage the situation? What arrangements have you made (would you suggest) to overcome the kind of difficulty in the future?
15. What is the most useful service your department supplies to other agencies? How is it useful to them? What departments or agencies are dependent on these services? What is the nature of their dependence? Are other agencies involved in the production of the same or similar type of service which you make? Which are these? What is your relation with them?
16. Have you found any administrative proced s that were particularly helpful in the efficient working of your department? Have there been procedures that were hindrances? Please mention some of them. What measures have you

taken (would you suggest) to overcome them?

17. Have you introduced or attempted to introduce any new procedures in the department after you took charge? Please specify. Have you got support from your superiors/ colleagues/ subordinates in implementing them?
18. What is the general procedure for suggesting new projects? Do they originate in your office or outside? If they come from outside, are you bound to accept them? Have you suggested/received new projects? Please mention some of them.
19. In general, if you make suggestions to other departments, how are they received by the concerned departments?
20. Has there been any reorganization in your department in recent years? What was the purpose of the reorganization? What changes in duties and responsibilities were introduced as a result of reorganization? How far has it been an improvement on earlier arrangement? Do you feel there is need for further changes? Please explain.
21. Are you generally satisfied with the way things are done in your department/in other departments? Please elaborate. Have you found that there has been any improvement in these matters recently? If so, what are these? To whom/ what will you attribute them?
22. What aspects of state planning do you find most satisfactory? What aspects are least satisfactory? How could the latter be corrected? What could your department/Planning Department do in this matter?
23. In general, are you satisfied with the work of the Planning Department? If not, why? Did you suggest some changes in it to make it more effective? Please explain.

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Other Publications of Associated Publishing House

HEGEL AND THE MODERN STATE: An Introduction to Hegel's Political Thought

V. R. MEHTA

Few thinkers have exercised a greater influence upon the thought of their own and succeeding generations as G. W. F. Hegel. In philosophy, in politics and in historical studies Hegel's influence has been all pervasive. And yet, paradoxical it may seem, the interpretation of Hegel has varied with the prejudices and predilections of the critics. On the one hand, he has been regarded as the father of the concept of organized freedom, dynamic concept of constitutionalism and the nationalism and on the other hand he has been with equal vehmence dubbed and denounced as a charlaton and an opportunist and a demagogue who chained political speculation to the needs of the state of his times, as well as the father of modern totalitarianism, facism and jingoism.

Mr Metha tries to steer clear of these controversies and tries to present the complex political ideas of Hegel in brief but clear intelligible form How was Hegel related to the intellectual background of his own age? What were the basic promises of his system on which he constructed a ground edifice of his theory of state? Who were the essential character and disposition of his political theory? What influence shaped his philosophy? And, above all, to use Croce's expression, "What is living and what is dead", in his political ideas? This book endeavours to answer these questions keeping in view the problems of the Modern State. It makes a sincere attempt to help the reader to understand Hegel who has been one of the most misunderstood of philosophers in the history of ideas

BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN NORTH INDIA—1803-1857

K.N. PANIKKAR

The author studies the politics of North India in the first half of the nineteenth century. The dominant theme of this monograph is the emergence of the East India Company as the *de facto* paramount authority in India. Dr. Panikkar examines its both positive and negative aspects: (a) assumption of the rights and obligations of the paramount power in relation to the Indian States; and (b) depriving the Mughal Emperor of the various imperial prerogatives enjoyed by him. The British administrators in India realized that if the Company were to appear as the paramount power "in right as well as in authority", the nations of paramountcy associated with the Mughal Emperor had to be obliterated. The significance of this two-pronged policy is brought out by highlighting the British attitude towards the Mughal Emperor on the one hand, and the relations with the states of Rajputana and Cis-Sutlej region on the other The author achieves this not by a direct analysis of relationship but by examining the role of the Residency at Delhi in the expansion and consolidation of British power in India. He thus adds a new dimension to the study of the political history of India, both substantially and methodologically.

THE RED REBEL IN INDIA: A Study of Communist Strategy and Tactics

V.B. SINHA

"The Communist Party of India is not a national party like other parties. It has roots not in India but outside." This statement of Jawaharlal Nehru was not made by him because he was a Congressite. It is an objective statement and a summing-up of the Communist Party in India. In the present book Mr. Sinha substantiates Nehru's point of view by giving an historical analysis of the Communists in India on the basis of data which he has gathered both from official and non-official sources. The author's analysis suggests that the Communists in India are loyal not to their country but to their masters abroad. Whether before independence or after, whether in peace time or during troublous times, the inspiration of the Communists has always come from outside. Such a political party cannot be anything else but anti-national and fifth-columnist.

The author calls his book *The Red Rebel in India*. It gives a dispassionate and objective analysis of the activities of the Communist Party in India right from its inception up to the events at Naxalbari. The book is divided into twelve chapters which are as follows: India—The Red Target, Communist Tactics Till Independence, Armed Struggle, Peaceful Strategy, In Kerala. Support to Chinese Aggression, Plan for Violent Revolution. And its Preparations, Raiding the Communist Dens, Red Rehearsals of Revolution—Bandhs, At Naxalbari, The Way Out.

FROM CASTE TO CLASS : A Study of the Indian Middle Classes

Y. P. CHHIBBAR

In this brief but comprehensive book the author gives a socio-economic survey of the occupational structure of the Indian Middle Class and the changes that it had undergone between 1945 and 1955. This book is based on the case-studies of three-hundred individuals from different caste levels. Dr. Chhibbar's enquiry reveals how the traditional caste which shaped, among other things, the occupational structure of the Indian society gradually began to give way to a diffusion of all castes into all occubations which were alien and at times even recalcitrant to it. Although the process of diffusion started in the early nineteenth century, the emergence of class from caste took long time and till the middle of the twentieth century the impact of caste on the occupational pattern was still prepotent in India. This book, then, provides an invaluable guide to the problems of the middle-class occupation pattern in India and its caste background.

INDIAN WAY TO SOCIALISM

KAMALA GADRE

"The affluent Americans, the acquisitive Englishmen, the assertive Russians, and the aggressive Chinese," writes the author, "may perhaps learn a thing or two from the philosophy of the Indian Revolution with profit to themselves and greater benefit to the entire world" And that philosophy is trusteeship—the Indian way to achieve a socialistic society based on truth and peaceful consent. Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao in his foreword says: "I would recommend this study to the careful attention of all those like myself who believe in the supremacy of means over ends, and in the need for a non-violent transformation of a feudal or capitalist society into a socialist society."

The uneven development of separate national units, particularly during the last century and a half in Europe and Asia, created apparent anomalies in the history of economic ideas, and it is thought by many in this country, as also in the West, that there was neither a doctrine of socialism nor any tradition of socialistic thinking in India.

The author of the *Indian Way To Socialism* dispels that misconception. She analyzes the meaning of socialism from the Indian point of view, and following Gandhiji's ideas of trusteeship, builds up a coherent thesis of socialism, and suggests a practical way of establishing a socialistic society in India. Dr. Rao says: "I have read Mrs Gadre's book with both interest and profit if not also some heart-searching, and am confident that other readers will also get the same experience."

NAGALAND IN TRANSITION

MAJOR V.K. ANAND

Although Dr. Verrier Elwin and others have written many illuminating books about Nagas, no fresh attempt has been undertaken to study the land and people of Nagaland after the British left India. This book fulfils that want. The author toured all the three districts of Nagaland—Kohima, Mokokchung, and Tuensang—inhabited by tribes like Angami, Ao, Konyak, and Sema, and made a first-hand study of Nagas —the Nagas of the past—and what is more relevant to us—the Nagas of the present—how gradually they gave up their superstitions and not-too-civilized past.

Dr. Verrier Elwin read the book in manuscript and commented as follows: "I read your book on Nagas with great appreciation .....I do hope that you will go on with your anthropological studies for, if I may say so, I was greatly impressed with the work."

TRACTS FOR THE TIMES

This is a series in which the intellectuals of India will discuss the crucial problems which face us today. Its general title has been borrowed from that of the famous tracts of the Oxford Movement in England, carried on by John Henry Newman, R.H. Froude, John Keble, Dr. Pusey, and others. Confronted by apathy in religious matters on the one hand, and the challenge of materialism accompanied by atheism on the other, these men began a movement which was to bring new life into the moral and spiritual existence of the British people. The influence of the Tractarians, who made their Tracts very powerful instruments of their ideas, spread far beyond the circle in which they worked.

In India today there is a combination of apathy with sterility which is afflicting every field of activity—spiritual, moral, intellectual, and political. Even those who are aware of the bankruptcy are too depressed to revolt against it, and to try to rescue themselves and others.

The monographs and books in these series, for which the Publishers will enlist the best minds of India, will all deal the aspects of the contemporary situation—not only to analyse the present ills and discontents and lay bare their causes, but also to suggest remedies in a positive approach to all the problems.

The message of the whole series will be: "Fight it out until victory comes."

TRACTS FOR THE TIMES: ONE

THE INTELLECTUAL IN INDIA

NIRAD C. CHAUDHURI

In the first of the Tracts for the Times the author of *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, A Passage to England,* and *The Continent of Circe,* and a contributor to leading newspapers and magazines in India and abroad examines the situation facing the intellectual in India.

As Mr. Chaudhuri sees it, whether the failures are in the political or in the economic and social fields, the first and the most essential preliminary is to bring to bear the power of thinking on all the fields. The main cause of the failures seen in recent years is lack of thought, or incompetent thought.

But the man who would provide the thought, namely, the intellectual, is the man who is the most discouraged in India. Authoritarianism in politics and social life, hostility or apathy to intellectual activities, the precarious economic situation of the intellectual —all tend to make him feel frustrated, if not wholly paralysed.

In the second part of his essay Mr. Chaudhuri shows how the intellectual might conquer this frustration and get round the obstacles to exercise his proper function in contemporary India.

Mr. Chaudhuri's suggestions gain immense practical importance from the fact that he had to face all the difficulties and frustrations in their worst form in his own function as a writer, and has virtually conquered all of them.

ART & LETTERS SERIES

This series is intended to provide in a sequence of short essays a survey of artistic and literary activity of our time, both in India and abroad, and to place all the contemporary movements in their historical setting and inter-relation.

The scope of the essays on art, painting, sculpture, or music, will be similar. All the art will be treated as part of a broad cultural activity, as also in their particular expression, so far as they are self-contained. The selection will be electic, and cover all significant movements and personalities. Apart from this, special questions affecting the history of literature and art about which critical or scholarly opinion has not as yet reached finality will be dealt with in the light of the latest researches and critical works of interpretations. As a rule, the series will attempt to provide a guide to general educated public with the object of promoting both enjoyment and knowledge of art and literature, and it will avoid extreme specialization and superficial popularization.

ART & LETTERS SERIES: ONE

SEALS & STATUETTES OF KULLI, ZHOB, MOHENJO DARO AND HARAPPA

J. P. GUHA

Here is a stimulating analysis of the well-known art objects from Kulli, Zhob, Mohenjo Daro, and Harappa. The author is unable to accept the views of such eminent authorities as Sir John Marshall, Stuart Piggott, Hermann Goetz and others. He proves his point of view not by furnishing new facts but simply by working in terms of particular analysis.

"I have confined myself to such practical conclusions as can be drawn by working in terms of particular analysis, that is, analysis of individual art objects, which alone should give rise to judgments. It is only by keeping as close as possible to the objects of art that I have defined and illustrated my point ot view, and in this way, I have tried to guard against the errors which I find in the views I have inherited from my predecessors"

INDIAN VILLAGES IN TRANSITION : A Motivational Analysis

DURGANAND SINHA

The villages in India have remained backward for centuries. Poverty has been rampant; agricultural production has continued to be miserably low largely due to the lack of implements, outmoded methods of agriculture, and inadequate resources Rural apathy and absence of initiative for improvement rooted in generations of exploitation and neglect have been a major stumbling block in the path of progress. As a result, villages have languished and remained in a state of stagnation so far as the social and economic improvements are concerned. The planners of the country naturally conceived of the community development programme as an important step in the development not only of the rural India but of the entire country. It was designed to bring about new awakening in the village community and intensive socio-economic development and accelerated social change Apart from the economic facts of the programme, it aimed at inducing a psychological change in the rural population by changing their attitudes, and creating in them a new urge towards improvement. Therefore, the psychological aspect of the community development programme is of signal importance. Without the requisite motivation and rising expectations for higher level of living, the programme was not likely to succeed.

The present research was planned to examine this psychological facet of the community development programme and to see whether or not motivational change had followed socio-economic development in the villages and whether high motivation kept pace with material improvement. The conclusions of the author are based on the personal observations and study of the motivations and aspirations of the villagers in a rapidly developing social and economic setting.

A RAJASTHAN VILLAGE

BRIJ RAJ CHAUHAN

Here is a brilliant study of the life of the people living in a village in Rajasthan. It is a study of Ranawaton-ki-Sadri village in Chittorgarh district of Rajasthan, written by one who had initiated teaching of Sociology in Rajasthan and who had personally been observing various facts of rural life for seven years prior to the writing of this book.

The work brings out the nature of a *jagir* village and draws out clearly how a *jagirdar* had directed the process of setting up of a village community. The stages of the village from a small hamlet to the medium-sized community have been traced along with increasing heterogeneity in the life of the people. Special studies of the local institutions of *Hali* the (the permanent plough man) and the *Chokhala* inter-village networks of a caste subcaste) have been attempted for areas wider than the village. Some of festivals, especially the *Govardhan Puja*, have been studied at the regional and even cross-cultural levels.

The book also examines the approaches followed in current scientific village studies and puts to test some of the formulations of the late Prof. Redfield of Chicago University and his associates in this connection. To the general reader in Rajasthan, the book opens out wealth of details. And for readers interested in studying the processes of rural life in Rajasthan, this happens to be the book they might have been waiting for.

WHO RULES A COUNTRY—The Challenge of Democracy in India

R. C. GUPTA

President Wilson said optimistically that the Great War I was fought to make the world safe for democracy. Ten years later, Signor Mussolini ridiculed th idea and wrote its epitaph: "The body of liberty is dead and her corpse already putrescent." There are persons who regard the nineteen-thirties as the twilight of liberty, but the *protagonists of democracy remain unshaken by the tides of reaction they see every* now and then setting in against it in many parts of the world It is true that they are no longer the bouncing optimists they were at the end of the last century. However, they are still convinced that it is the only rational form of government and therefore superior to other political systems. They certainly admit that the world has not yet been made quite safe for democracy. and that great dangers still threaten its existence. But in making all these assertions it is far from the author's intention either to suggest the replacement of democracy by any other political system or to pass a moral judgment upon any political party. It is a universal tendency that every man bears within himself a dormant fascist and that once he is installed in power he undergoes a psychological metamorphosis and exhibits an oligarchical tendency. Dr. Gupta's aim, throughout the book, has been only to present things as they are, without entering into theoretical polemic in order to escape from the vexing situation.

KENNEDY THROUGH INDIAN EYES

EDITED BY RAM SINGH & M.K. HALDAR

To decide at what point and on which issue one will risk one's career, is a difficult and soul-searching decision. And this is true not only in the case of individuals but also in the case of nations, Kennedy made for himself that decision. His life is a challenge to humanity to recognize and affirm its soul and personality so that equality, egalitarianism, peace and freedom may cease to be mere slogans and the world may yet have a chance to become the Parliament of Man, the dream of the great thinkers and savants of all countries down the ages.

This book is a selection of Kennedy's speeches and writings relating to the people of the developing countries. In the long introduction the editors have brought into relief what Kennedy's life and work mean for the world in general and India in particular. *Kennedy Through Indian Eyes* is a homage to the memory of Kennedy who knew that courage itself cannot be supplied to anyone but by his own self. "For this each man must look into his own soul," declared Kennedy: which is his message to the peoples of the developing countries.